An Exposition and Evaluation of the McGowen View on the Inspiration of Scripture (2009)


An Exposition and Evaluation of the McGowen View on the Inspiration of Scripture

by Norman L. Geisler

2009

 

In his book The Divine Spiration of Scripture: Challenging Evangelical Perspectives (Inter Varsity Press, 2007) Scottish Reformed theologian A. T. B. McGowen provides a thought-provoking evaluation of the ongoing debate between the infalliblist and the inerrantist positions. A careful reading of his proposal reveals many positive contributions.

The Positive Contributions of McGowen’s Work

There are many commendable features of this book that are well worth contemplating. First of all, it sees this as a “watershed issue” (9). Further, it observes that theopnuestia in 2 Timothy 3:16 should be translated as “spiration” or breathing out is a better rendering. It also affirms the value of the word “infallible” (39, 48). The term “inerrancy” alone is insufficient. After all, there can be inerrant phone books-with no errors-that do not thereby have divine authority. It also sees the ICBI (International Council on Biblical Inerrancy) statement as a “most significant” statement (104) and would chose it, if necessary, over the errancy view of Rogers and McKim (212). Likewise, McGowen would choose B. B Warfield over Jack Rogers of Fuller Seminary (161). He even cites favorably both John Woodbridge’s critique of Rogers and McKim (99) as well as that of Donald Bloesch who agrees (100, 125). Nor does McGowen deny that God can, if He chooses, produce an inerrant text (113-114), as inerrantists have long held.. Furthermore, he even says the Bible is a “co-authored” book by both God and human beings (148). Then too, his definition of inspiration hits some important key notes of the doctrine when he affirms that “the Holy Spirit caused men to write books and his supervisory action was such that although these books are truly the work of human beings, they are also the Word of God”(43). He is certainly right in denying the “mechanical dictation” of Scripture(163).

Further, the book is on track in rejecting the neo-orthodox view of Scripture that the Bible merely “become the Word of God” in a moment of encounter with Him through the Bible (29). It is not the Word of God subjectively but is God’s Word objectively (73). Likewise, revelation is not merely an event as many neo-orthodox claim (21). McGowen is also correct in affirms that inspiration is verbal (136) and that there are any degrees of inspiration (134).and that it is not the authors of Scripture that are inspired (39, 133) but the Scriptures they wrote. McGowen also makes an often overlooked but important distinction. He points out that it is not the Bible that needs’ illumination, but only human minds (45-47). Another crucial point is that one should not claim for the Bible what it does not claim for itself (121). Nor does he reject the view there are implicit or logically entailed claims in Scripture. Indeed, he says the use of logic is “appropriate” (117) and “contradictions” should be avoided (212). More could be added.

An Evaluation of McGowan’s Basic Proposals on the Nature of Scripture

McGowen’s proposal is the first direct and serious proposal by an otherwise conservative Reformed scholar since the ICBI “Chicago Statement” (in 1978) As such, McGowen’s proposals demand attention.

The Claim That the Word “Inerrancy” Should be Discarded

McGowen argues that the term inerrancy should be discarded by evangelicals (13). He offers several reasons for this, one of the most often repeated of which is that the term “inerrancy” implies scientific precision (117). He also believes it is recent in origin, not being found in early creeds but being a result of heated battle between early 20th century Fundamentalist and Liberals (121). Neither does he believe the term is biblical, but he calls it a “violent assumption” (135) of Fundamentalist thinking. “Inerrancy,” he believes, is an apologetic response to the Enlightenment (50, 115). He also argues that it does not have the weight of history behind it.

First of all, in response it is important to note that both sides of the debate can agree that there is nothing sacred about the word “inerrancy.” Indeed, it is not the term so much as the truth of inerrancy that is important to preserve. The basic question is whether or not the Bible is completely without error in all that it affirms. This can be said in more than one way. But before we hasten to throw away the term “inerrancy,” let us remind ourselves of the strength of the word and the weakness of the suggested alternative terms.

Second, we can readily discard the argument that the word “inerrancy” is not biblical. By that same logic, the word “Bible” is not biblical for it is nowhere used of the Bible in the Bible. Further, it too does not have the weight of early history behind it. So should we discard it too? Indeed, the word “Trinity” is not in the Bible and did not appear in the earliest ecumenical Creeds such as the Apostles Creed (2nd cent), the Nicene Creed (A.D. 325), or the Chalcedonian Creed (A.D. 451). Does that mean we should discard it? The answer is “No,” and the reasons are that while the term is not biblical, nonetheless, the truth is biblical, and the term is a good term to describe it. The same is true of the word “inerrancy.”

Third, the term inerrancy need not mean “scientific precision,” as is wrongly alleged by anti-inerrantists. Every term should be understood in its context and with the qualifications given to it by its users. Even McGowen agrees that the ICBI statement makes numerous qualifications on the meaning of the term (106). These qualifications clearly deny the misimplications of modern “scientific precision.” Article XIII of the ICBI “Chicago Statement” declared plainly: “We further deny that inerrancy is negated by Biblical phenomena such as a lack of modern technical precision. . ..” (Emphasis added).

Fourth, it is well to remember that the term inerrancy also has some strong features in its favor. For one, it is negative, and negative terms are powerful. Consider, the force of the Ten Commandments many of which are stated in negative terms, like: “You shall not murder” or “You shall not bear false witness” or “You shall not commit adultery. Further, “The Bible is true” is not nearly as strong as “The Bible is without error.” Even McGowen appears to commend the ICBI statement for having “denials” as well as “affirmations” (106). But denials are negative which is the reason they help in clarifying the point at hand. Inerrancy, as a negative term, does the same thing. As is readily apparent the statement “The Bible is without error” is clearer and stronger than the statement “The Bible is true.” For the latter does not make it clear whether the Bible is completely true.

Considering the Alternatives

We readily grant that no term, including inerrancy, expresses all that the Bible claims about itself. Nonetheless, by comparison the term stands tall as compared to most of the alternatives offered.

The Term Infallible

McGowen favors the word “infallible” over the word “inerrant” (48, 123, 125,162). He insists that the word “infallible” is “more dynamic (or organic) and is a less mechanical view of authority” (49). It carries with it the idea that “the Holy Spirit infallibly uses God’s Word to achieve all he intends to achieve” (49). However, this use of the word “infallible” is precisely why the term “inerrant” is also needed.

In response, we acknowledge the strength of the term “infallible,” if it is used the sense of “unerring” in connection with the word “inerrant.” However, the term “infallible” has been rendered fallible by the intentionalist sense in which it is used by non-inerrantists. My Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary gives the primary definition of “infallible” as “incapable of error; unerring.” In this sense of the term, inerrantist have no problem since it is perfectly compatible with the term inerrant. It is the secondary sense of the term which the inerrantists reject as inadequate, namely, “not liable to mislead, deceive, or disappoint.” Indeed, McGowen speaks of Scriptures which “infallibly achieves God’s purposes” (149). He quotes Bavink’s view with approval,[1] saying: “In his organic view, Bavink focuses not on the text of Scripture as such but upon its meaning and purpose” (158, emphasis added). Likewise, he affirms “that intention [of Scripture] is no other than that it should make us ‘wise unto salvation'” (159, emphasis added).

However, focusing on the intention or purpose of the Bible, rather than its affirmations and denials, does not necessitate the Bible is without all errors in all that it affirms. Many statements with good intentions, even those that achieve their intended results, contain errors. So, by that definition of “infallible” one could have an infallibly correct error. But this is nonsense. Since the term “infallible” carries these connotations for many, it is necessary to add the word “inerrant” to make clear what the Bible teaches on the topic.

Of course, in the good sense of the term “infallible”(i.e.., incapable of error), it is not an either/or situation. The Bible is both infallible and inerrant. But, unlike McGowen’s implication, the Bible is not merely infallible in itsintentions and achievements but also in its affirmations (and denials). Truth is not found in intentions because humans can, and often do, utter errors with good intentions. So, defining either infallibility or inerrancy in terms of intentions, achieved or not, does not measure up to what the Bible claims for itself which is that truth must be judged by its correspondence to the facts. Indeed, even McGowen seems to admit this elsewhere when he commends “modes of rationality that actually correspond with the nature of its objectively given reality. . . “(73, emphasis added). Indeed, ICBI clarified the meaning of “truth” as correspondence in an official authorized commentary on “The Chicago Statement,” affirming that “By biblical standards of truth and error [in Article XIII on “Truth”] is meant the view used both in the Bible and in everyday life, viz., a correspondence view of truth.”[2]

The correspondence view of truth is in fact the one which the Bible[3]embraces. For example: It is implied in the ninth command (“You shall not bear false witness”), i. e., don’t misrepresent the facts. It is also entailed in Acts 24 when it says you can “learn the truth” when you “verify [the facts]” (vs. 8, 11). Further, it is manifest in Genesis 42:16 when Joseph said they should look at the facts “so that your words may be tested to see if you are telling the truth.” In addition, it was employed in the test for a false prophet whose prophecy was considered false “if the word does not come to pass or come true” (Deut. 18:22). It is also utilized in everyday conversations when we consider something false if it misrepresents the facts (e.g., we say “check the facts” or “check it out for yourself” and the like). Indeed, the correspondence view of truth is essential to a legal oath when one promises “to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

One can and does agree that the word “inerrancy” alone is insufficient to describe what the Bible is.[4] It also has sanctity, infallibility, indestructibility, indefatigability (can’t be worn out), indefeasability (can’t be overcome). Indeed, it can save (1 Pet. 1:23), nourish (2 Pet. 2:2), wash (Psa. 119:9), purify (Jer. 23:29a), shatter (Jer. 23:29), cut deeply (Heb. 4:12), prevent sin (Psa. 119:11), illuminate (Psa. 119:105), comfort (Rom. 15:4), and predict (2 Pet. 1:19). The truth is that no one word covers all that the Bible is, just like no one attribute exhausts all that God is. However, this is not to say that the Bible is not inerrant as well. Nor is this to say we can rob it of this characteristic any more than we can strip it of infallibility.

McGowen Prefers the Word “Authentic”

McGowen prefers the word “authentic” (213) to “inerrant.” However, the term “authentic” as used of Scripture is theologically anemic. The Bible claims much more than this for itself. Jesus refers to the Bible as indestructible (Mt. 5:17-18), unbreakable (Jn. 10:35), the “Word of God” (Jn. 10:35), and as coming “out of the mouth of God” (Mt. 4:4). Paul said, it is “God-breathed” (2 Tim. 3:16). These concepts are insufficiently described by the term “authentic.” After all, one can have an authentic coin minted with mistakes on it or an authentic copy of the famous “Wicked Bible” that translated Exodus 20:14 as “Thou shalt commit adultery”! There is also “authentic” Confederate currency and persons with authenticity-all of which falls far short of what is perfect.

The same goes for terms like “trustworthy” and “reliable.” The Bible is trustworthy like a good friend, but even trustworthy friends make mistakes. It is reliable like a good map, but even good maps can have errors on them. These terms are far too weak to describe what is meant by a God-breathed book that was joint-authored by God. So, both of these terms fail to measure up to what the Bible claims for itself.

Having said all this, there are other good ways to describe what is meant by inerrancy. “Totally free from all error in everything it affirms” is a good phrase. But for a single word it is difficult to beat the word “inerrancy.” And as defined by the ICBI statement, it is clearly the best single word available in English. And it would be unwise to discard it for words like trustworthy, reliable, authentic, or even infallible in purpose. Of course, the proper use of infallible and inerrant in all it affirms is a good and powerful way to express the biblical doctrine.

The Claim That Inerrancy Does not Follow From God’s Nature

Typical of strong Calvinists, McGowen embraces a form of divine voluntarism. Ethical voluntarism declares that something is good because God wills it; God does not will it because it is good. However, this would make all the moral commands of God in Scripture arbitrary. For example, according to voluntarism, God could will that love is wrong and hate is right. But this is not only counter-intuitive, it is morally repugnant, to say nothing of being unbiblical since God is by nature Love (1 Jn. 4:16). Further, voluntarism would undermine unconditional election, a doctrine dear to the heart of a Reformed theologian. For if voluntarism were true, then God could change his mind about who the elect are or even whether the elect will ultimately be saved.

This same kind of voluntarism is evident in MeGowen’s argument against inerrancy. In one of the most important sections in the book, he writes: “inerrantists make an unwarranted assumption about God. The assumption is that, given the nature and character of God, the only kind of Scripture he could ‘breathe out’ was Scripture that is textually inerrant. If there was even one mistake in the autographa, then God cannot have been the author, because he is incapable of error” (113). Thus, MeGowen says inerrancy is not a legitimate inference from the Bible (115) but is merely an “a priori” argument (131).

McGowan goes on to say that “the argument of the inerrantists is that God is unable to produce anything other than an inerrant autographic text . . . I agree with the inerrantists that God could have brought into being inerrant autographic texts, had he chosen to do so, but I reject their argument that he must have acted in this way” (113-114). He concludes, “I think it is wrong to prejudge the nature of Scripture through some deductivist approach, based on what we believe inspiration must mean, given God’s character” (136). We cannot “assume that they must be inerrant because God cannot lie” (137). This could hardly be more clear and, in my view, more faulty. Several observations are in order in this regard.

First, MeGowen is a voluntarist on what God could or could not do in producing a God-breathed book. That is, he affirmed that God was free to make an original Bible with or without errors in it. He was under no necessity imposed upon him by his own nature to produce an errorless original. As incredible as this may sound, McGowen’s biblical voluntarism entails the claim that speaking the truth is optional, not necessary, for God! If ever there was a misdirected and over-stated view of God’s sovereignty, this is it.

Indeed, this is precisely where inerrantists sharply disagee with non-inerrantists like MeGowen. This disagreement is reflected in the basic statement on Scripture of the Evangelical Theological Society to which McGowan refers. It reads, “The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and is therefore inerrant in the autographs” (emphasis added).” The word “therefore” logically connects the word of “God” and “inerrant” to make it clear that neither God nor the Bible errs. This meaning of the word “therefore” has been confirmed by a living framer of the statement, namely, Reformed theologian Roger Nicole.

Further, and more importantly, the Bible makes it clear that God cannot choose, even if He desires to do so, to produce an imperfect original. Why? “Because it is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). Paul speaks about “the God who cannot lie” (Titus 1:2). He adds, “God cannot deny himself” (2 Tim. 2:13). Numerous other Scriptures speak of God’s unchanging nature (Num. 23:19;1 Sam. 15:29; Psa.102:25-27; Heb. 1:10-12; Mal. 3:6; James 1:17. No serious examination of all these Scriptures in context can support a voluntarist interpretation that God can change his essential nature, even if He wanted to do so. If this is so, then McGowen’s central thesis fails, and the inerrantists argument stands firm:

  1. God cannot error.
  2. The original Bible is God’s Word.
  3. Therefore, the original Bible cannot error.

To deny this conclusion, as MeGowen knows, one must deny at least one or the other of the two premises. McGowen’s attempt to deny the first premise failed. It goes against the grain of God’s very nature as truth to presume that such an unchangeably true Being can error, if He wishes. God is truth (Deut. 32:4; Psa. 31:5) by His very unchangeable nature and, as such, He “cannotlie” (Titus 1:2); “It is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). To do so, would be to deny Himself, and “he cannot deny himself” (2 Tim. 2:13).

Further, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth (Jn. 15:26). And the Word of God is the utterances of the Spirit of Truth. Jesus said, “But when He, the Spirit of truth, comes, He will guide you into all the truth” (Jn. 16:13). Peter added, “But know this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture is a matter of one’s own interpretation, for no prophecy was ever made by an act of human will, but men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God” (2 Pet. 1:20-21). David confessed, “The Spirit of the LORD spoke by me, and His word was on my tongue” (2 Sam. 23:2). Now by simple logical inference,

  1. The original Bible is the utterance of the Spirit of Truth.
  2. The Spirit of truth cannot utter error.
  3. Therefore, the original Bible cannot utter err.

Here again, to deny inerrancy one must deny at least one or more of the two premises. McGowen’s attempt to deny the first premise fails. Truth is not an option with God. It is a necessity.

MeGowen also believes that the copies of the Bible are inspired (159). Given that inspiration means “spirated” or “breathed out” of God and given that he recognizes errors in the copies, MeGowen is left with explaining just how God can breath out errors. Indeed, according to this analysis, it is not only possible for there to be errors in what God breathes out, but it may be actual as well. But this is contrary to the very nature of God as truth to breathe out error. He cannot overrule his unchangeable nature by his sovereignty any more than He can will Himself out of existence!

An Implied Accommodation Theory

Upon closer analysis MeGowen also seems to reject the second premise of the argument for inerrancy as well, namely, that “The Bible is the Word of God.” According to this view, God must accommodate Himself, not only to human finitude, but to human error in the production of Scripture. But nowhere in Scripture is there support for the view that God accommodates Himself to human error rather than merely adapts Himself to human finitude. In short, a truly human book, such as the Bible is, can still avoid errors. Were this not so, then by the same logic, one must conclude that the divine accommodation in the Incarnation means that Christ sinned. This is the way MeGowen attacks the so-called incarnational model often used by evangelicals to illustrate their view.

The err at the root of this view appears to be based on a Barthian and neo-Gnostic view of human fallenness in which any contact with this fallen human world makes sin unavoidable. It is to argue that since the Bible was written by fallen human beings in fallen human language, it too must inevitably partake of errors as well.

There is another serious problem with this radical view of divine accommodation.[5] If contact with a fallen world makes error inevitable, then not only does this mean there can be (and probably are) errors in the original Bible, it also means that the Incarnate Christ too must partake of both the same proneness to error and to sin. But the New Testament makes it very clear that Jesus did not sin (Heb. 4:15: 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 1:23; 1 Jn. 3:2). Likewise, it would mean that the very teachings which came from Jesus lips would have been tainted with error since he too was speaking in a fallen human language. But this belief would precipitate a Christological crisis unacceptable to orthodoxy. Surely, no one who believes in the union of two natures in the one Person of Christ, the Second Person of the Godhead, thereby affirms error in his human words. Hence, McGowen’s view of divine accommodation to err in the production of Scripture must be rejected. The fact is, however, that finitude does not necessitate fallenness. If it did, then not only would the Son Himself have partaken in sin and error, but the beatified saints in heaven would not be free from sin and error, as the Scriptures teach they will be (1 Cor. 13:10;1 Jn. 3:2; Rev.21:4).

Rejecting the “Incarnational” Analogy

According to this inerrantists reasoning, just as God in His Living Word (the Savior) has united with the human nature of Christ without sin, even so God is united with His written Word (the Scripture) yet without error. MeGowen objects to this analogy with two basic arguments (118-121).

First, he argues that unlike Christ whose two natures are united in one person, there is no such union of the divine and human in Scripture. But McGowan misses the point, even on his own grounds. For elsewhere he speaks of a co-authorship of Scripture (148). He cites with approval the following: “This enables Bavink faithfully and clearly to emphasize both sides of any orthodox doctrine of Scripture, namely that God is the author but yet the human beings are the authors” (148). This would mean that both the human and divine aspects of Scripture are united in one set of propositions(better, sentences) or verbal expression in like manner to the divine and human being united in Christ in one person. This conclusion is borne out also by the fact that MeGowen holds to “verbal” inspiration by affirming that “I disagree with him [James Orr] on [his denying] verbal inspiration. It seems to me that there is no good reason for arguing that the content but not the form of the Scriptures have come to us from God” (136). But if the verbal form of Scripture is “breathed-out” from God, as MeGowen claims it is, then there is a propositional (better, sentential) unity that combines both the divine and human elements of Scripture in one and the same verbal structure.

Even McGowen’s own definition of Scripture supports the Incarnational model for he says “the Holy Spirit caused men to write books and his supervisory action was such that although these books are truly the work of human beings, they are also the Word of God” (43). Again, there is a unity between the human and divine in God’s written Word (the Scripture) that is analagous with the union of the divine and human in His Living Word (the Savior).

Further, MeGowen argues wrongly that the word “divine” does not apply to Scripture, as it does to the divine nature of Christ in the Incarnation. He wrote: “Only God is divine and therefore only God can have a divine nature” (120). But in a very important sense this is not so. Even Peter affirmed that in some real sense “we are partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4). Surely, this is not in a metaphysical sense (e.g., we can’t be infinite) but in a moral sense (we can be true). MeGowen seems to unwittingly answer his own question when he admits that “I am not denying that the Scriptures (like human beings) can share some of the divine attributes” (120). But that is all that is necessary for the analogy to be a good one, namely to have strong similarities which it has.

As for the Bible not being God, of course it is not. That is why the Incarnational model is an analogy (similar but not identical). No informed evangelical ever held that the Bible was God and should be worshiped. The Bible is like God in his moral attributes (like the necessity to be truth and holiness), not in his non-moral (metaphysical) attributes (like infinite and eternal). In view of this, the Incarnational reasoning can be stated as follows:

  1. God’s Living Word (Christ) and His Written Word (the Savior) are similar in that:
    1. They have a divine and human dimension;
    2. These two dimensions are combined in one unity.
    3. Thus, both are without flaw.
  2. Hence, both God’s Living Word and His Written Word are without flaw morally in that:
    1. God’s Living Word is without sin:
    2. Written Word is without error.[6]

The remaining question is: How can the effect (an inerrant Bible) be greater than the cause (errant humans)? Of course, it cannot, but the ultimate (primary) Cause is God; the human writers are only the secondary causes. Their imperfection and tendency to err does not bleed through to the effect because God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick! Or, in biblical terms: “No prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit.” (2 Pet. 1:21). In theological terms, to cite MeGowen himself, “the Holy Spirit caused men to write books and his supervisory action was such that although these books are truly the work of human beings, they are also the Word of God” (43). Since the Scriptures did not originate from “the will of man,” but of God, and since the superintending Spirit of truth “cannot lie,” then what He uttered in these human words cannot err.

McGowen’s Neo-Barthian Implication

Although MeGowen rightly disowns some neo-orthodox beliefs such as a denial of objective propositional revelation and revelation coming only in acts and not words, nonetheless, he is not without Barthian influence in this matter. In fact, I would call his view neo-Barthian in some significant respects. First, as already noted (and discussed more fully below), MeGowen allows for the possibility of errors in the original text of the Bible-the one breathed-out by God. Second, he speaks of the Bible as an instrument through which God speaks-rather than the Bible being the voice of God itself. As to the first he says, “The Scriptures are the record of the revelation that God has given to his church . . . ” (21). He adds, “Our knowledge of the love of God in Christ comes to us through the voice of God speaking in the Scriptures” (31). Again, “God’s Word came to us in the form of human witness” (112). Finally, he cites James Orr with approval, saying, “God has given a historical, supernatural revelation and . . . the Scriptures are the ‘record’ of this revelation” (132). But what is this but a more euphemistic way to affirm Barth’s scratched record analogy of one hearing his master’s voice through an imperfect recording. This is contrary to Scripture which describes itself as “perfect” (Psa. 19:7) (Hebrew: tamiym, without flaw) which is the same word used of the Passover lamb (Ex. 12:5) that was to be “without blemish.” But the Bible speaks of itself as the revelation of God itself (the very Word of God), not a faulty record of it.

This conclusion is also supported by McGowen’s claim that the Bible has no authority in itself, only God does (45). But if the Bible is the Word of God written, then it has the authority of God in it since it is God’s voice speaking in the words of Scripture. One would think that with McGowen’s emphasis on the “dynamic” nature of inspiration (49), to wit that God is continually speaking through His Word (155), that he would not have fallen into the Barthian error of claiming the Bible is not the revelation of God but merely a human record of it through which God speaks to us. This is undoubtedly why MeGowen also claims there is some truth in the Barthian claim that “the Bible becomes the Word of God” to us or is “a subjective revelation” to us (156).

Finally, this neo-Barthianism in MeGowen is also supported by his contention that the Bible is only an instrumental revelation. He writes, “the purpose of Scripture is instrumental to the work of the Spirit” (24). Likewise, he speaks with approval that “Barth was arguing that our knowledge of the love of God in Christ comes to us through the voice of God speaking in the Scriptures” (31). Thus, God speaks “by His Spirit through His Word” (31). So, the Bible is “the means” by which he communicates with us (31). In short, the Bible is not the revelation of God; it is the instrument through which God’s revelation comes to us. But once this distinction is made and the wedge is driven between the words of the men who wrote the Scriptures and the voice of God that speaks through these fallible human voices, then we cannot have a true revelation from God.

Faulty Logic in the MeGowen Analysis

Part of the reason MeGowen is able to come to these wrong conclusions about inerrancy is the faulty logic he employs. A few examples will suffice. Many of them are forms of the notorious “Straw Man” fallacy. First, hee false charges that inerrantist hold to mechanical dictation is even rejected by the Fundamentalist John R. Rice repudiated who admits to holding “verbal dictation”.[7] Indeed, no Calvinist, like McGowen, who believes in iresistable grace should have any problem believing that God can work on different persons with their unique styles to produce exactly what God wanted to say.

Second, he alleges a “straw man”of atomistic view “that every isolated word of Holy Scripture is inerrant”” (65). This word-by-word revelation which is found primarily in cultic dictation or in orthodox Muslim’s beliefs about the origin of the Qur’an, not in an evangelical view of inspiration who believe is in wholistic inspiration. That is a word taken properly in the context of a whole sentence and a sentence taken in the whole context of a literary unity (and ultimately that taken in the context of the whole Scripture) is inspired and inerrant. In brief, a whole sentence (with all of its parts) is an inerrant revelation from God if understood in its proper contexts. Paul stressed the importance of a singular “seed” in contrast to “seeds” (Gal. 3:16). The absence of a letter can change the whole meaning of a doctrine, as the early Creed discovered. The Greek word for “same” (homoousion) differed from the word for “similar” (homoiousion) by only one letter, the letter “I” (the letter iota in Greek). This one tiny letter was the difference between orthodoxy and heresy on whether Christ was the same or only similar to God. So, in this sense, even letters are inspired, not in isolation from words, sentences and the overall context but as a crucial part of the whole-the wholistic meaning.

Another “straw man” created by MeGowen is what he calls “inflexible literalism” (65, 103). He equated ICBI with fundamentalists (103, 123). However, the ICBI “Chicago Statement” on inerrancy went to great lengths to deny this charge-so detailed were the statements that, strangely, MeGowen criticized it for being so careful to define its meaning this precisely. Article XIII declared: “We further deny that inerrancy is negated by Biblical phenomena such as a lack of modern technical precision, irregularities of grammar or spelling, observational descriptions of nature, the reporting of falsehoods, the use of hyperbole and round numbers, the topical arrangement of material, variant selections of material in parallel accounts, or the use of free citations.” Article XVIII adds, “We affirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by grammatical-historical exegesis; taking account of its literary forms and devices, and that Scripture is to interpret Scripture.” Likewise, Article VI declares: “We affirm that the whole of Scripture and all its parts, down to the very words of the original, were given by divine inspiration. We deny that the inspiration of Scripture can rightly be affirmed of the whole without the parts, or of some parts but not the whole” (emphasis added). What is this but a whole-istic inspiration?

McGowen also contends that God’s revelation “can never become mere data to be processed by the theologian, rather than the means by which God confronts and communicates to us.” But once again, whoever said that the Bible is “mere data” for us to process. The Word of God is not merely an object to be studied (73). It also the Word of God to be obeyed (Js. 1:22). The very ICBI statements (which MeGowen rejects) states the contrary in its very first statement, saying:”God, who is Himself Truth and speaks the truth only, has inspired Holy scripture in order to reveal Himself to lost mankind Jesus Christ . . . Holy scripture is God’s witness to Himself.” (No. 1). Article III declares: “We affirm that the written Word in its entirety is revelation given by God.” How can one conclude from this, as MeGowen does (117), that inerrantists believe the Bible is viewed merely as an object to be studied, rather than a revelation to be obeyed?

Fourth, it does not seem to concern MeGowen admits to logical fallacy of “circular reasoning” in his apologetic (32). This begs the question by saying in essence: “We know the Bible is the Word of God because the Bible (as the Word of God) tells us so.” MeGowen cites Bavink with approval that “Holy Scripture is self-attested (autopistos) and therefore the final ground of faith. No deeper ground can be advanced. To the question ‘Why do you believe Scripture?’ The only answer is: ‘Because it is the word of God.’ But if the next question is ‘Why do you believe that Holy Scripture is te word of God’ a Christian cannot answer?” (31) Even Van Til, whom MeGowen cites favorably (37), could offer a transcendental argument in response, namely, because nothing else in the world makes sense apart from positing that the Triune God is revealed in canonical Scripture. However, one can be sure that neither MeGowen nor any other fideist would accept this reasoning when a Muslim says, “Why should we believe the Qur’an is the Word of God? The only answer is: Because the Qur’an says it is the Word of God.” I am sure MeGowen would want some good evidence and reasons before he accepted the Qur’an as the Word of God, regardless of what the Qur’an says about itself.

As for the claim that in such an answer “we are setting these things as a higher authority than the voice of God speaking in Scripture” we point out that besides confusing epistemology and ontology, he is overlooking the fact that the Bible itself commands us to use “reason” (1 Peter 3:15) and evidence (Acts 1:3) to test truth claims. Moses gave tests for a false prophet (Deut. 13 and 18). John exhorted us to “test the spirits to see whether they are from God” (1 Jn. 4:1), and Paul “reasoned” (Acts 17:2, 17) with the Jews and Greeks to demonstrate that Jesus was the Messiah. Indeed, Jesus himself used reason and evidence to substantiate his claims to be God.[8] As Augustine said, “Who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. . . . ?”[9]

Fifth, MeGowen is also guilty of taking a text out of its context. He does this with a statement made by B. B. Warfield, the great Princetonian defender of inerrancy. Warfield is careful to stress the humanity of Scripture as well as its divine origin. In so defending the humanity of the biblical authors, Warfield and Hodge state that the authors of Scripture were dependent on human languages that “bear everywhere indelible traces of error” and on human “sources and methods in themselves fallible” and personal knowledge that was “defective, or even wrong” (211). But using this to support McGowen’s errant view of inerrancy is totally unjustified for two reasons. First, it omits the crucial point, namely, that God in his providence overrules these human weaknesses and produces an inerrant product through their human pens. To repeat, this only proves the point that God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick. Second, even in this quote McGowen overlooks the fact that Warfield is not saying that these human sources always err. Indeed, he qualifies it by the phrases “in large measure” and “in many maters.” Finally, Hodge and Warfield clearly say that they are referring to these human sources “in themselves,” not as superintended by a God who cannot err.

Sixth, MeGowen sometimes throws the baby out with the bathwater. For example, he lumps “propositional” revelation with the alleged necessity of “scientific precision” and rejects them both together. Thus, propositional truth gets thrown out with modern “scientific accuracy.” But most inerrantists, indeed all who signed the ICBI or ETS statements as defined by ICBI, do not believe that one has to believe in “scientific accuracy” in order to believe in propositional revelation (117). This same unnecessary lumping occurs with “inerrancy” and “fundamentalism” (103, 123) as well as inerrancy and “literalism.” This, in spite of the fact that inerrancy proponents explicitly deny such implications (see above).

Answering Other Objections to Inerrancy Raised by MeGowen

There are many other objections MeGowen raises to inerrancy. Several call for a brief response since they are held by many as significant obstacles to belief in inerrancy.

Death of Inerrancy by a Thousand Qualifications

Strangely enough MeGowen criticizes the ICBI and ETS inerrantist for having so many qualifications to their view. This is odd in view of the fact that the non-inerrantist holds the opposite on all these points and yet they are not criticized for all their qualifications. Further, MeGowen actually commends the ICBI statement for making things clearer by having “denials” as well as “affirmations.” But these additional negative qualifications make the doctrine, even clearer.

Basically, inerrancy does not die a death by “a thousand” qualifications for two reasons. First of all, the so-called qualifications do not kill it but enhance it and, thus, keep it alive. In short, they do not negate all meaning in the original claim; they clarify it by negating things from it that do not belong to it.

Second, there are not “a thousand” qualifications; there really are only two: 1) Only the original text is inerrant; and 2) Only what is affirmed as true in the text, is true and not any thing else. The rest of the so-called “qualifications” are not really qualifications by inerrantists but misunderstandings by non-inerrantists. Hence, the re-wording is necessary only because opponents have misunderstood or mischaracterized the doctrine. This calls for a denial by inerrantists that helps one to understand what was implied in the original affirmation that everything affirmed as true in the text, is true (and everything affirmed as false, is false). Just as the early Creeds had to grow in order to explain what they meant in earlier more simple forms because later heretics misunderstood, distorted, or challenged it, even so later inerrantists have had to add more “qualifications” to explicate the original meaning as opposed to the heretical challenges of their day.

For instance, it should have been sufficient to simply say: (1) The Bible is the Word of God. This really should be sufficient, but because some have denied the obvious, it is necessary to add (2) the Bible is the inspired Word of God. However, when some use inspired in a human sense, it is necessary to say (3) The Bible is the strong>divinely inspired Word of God. But since some deny such a book is infallibly true, it is necessary to add (4) the Bible is the divinely inspired infallible Word of God. Likewise, when some claim it is only infallible in intent but not in fact, then it is necessary to clarify that it means (5) the Bible is the divinely inspired infallible and inerrant Word of God. Even here some have argued that it is only inerrant in redemptive matters, hence it is necessary to add (6) the Bible is the divinely inspired infallible and inerrant word of God in all that it affirms on any topic. And so on. There is no apparent end to this process. Why? Because when someone denies the obvious, it is necessary to affirm the redundant. It is the not inerrantists’ fault that he seems to be adding when he is explicating what the original statement meant. So, the inerrantist cannot be blamed for the alleged “qualifications” (really, further of the original meaning in the light of later denials). It is the opponents of inerrancy that should be blamed for denying the obvious. If “(1) The Bible is the Word of God,” then of course it is divinely inspired, infallible, inerrant, etc. But if one denies the obvious, then inerrantists must affirm the redundant to make our view clear.

There is No Mention of Inspiration and Inerrancy in the early Creeds

In response to this charge, it is crucial to remember that the belief in a divinely authoritative Bible is everywhere presupposed by the Creeds. Almost the entire The Apostles’ Creed (2nd cent.) is made up phases that are dependent on the Bible. Likewise, the Nicene Creed (A.D. 325) uses many of the same phrases and adds explicitly states that these truths were “spoken through the Prophets.” The Chalcedonian Creed (A. D. 451) uses many of the same phases from the previous Creeds and adds explicitly that “we have the prophets of the old” (in the Old testament) and what “the Lord Jesus Christ Himself taught” through the apostolic writings in the New Testament. The divinely authoritative basis for the teaching of the Christian Church is evident both implicitly and explicitly in the earliest general Creeds of the Church.

Second, there was little need to mention the Bible more explicitly since it was not seriously challenged. The Creeds grew out of needs. The needs of the day were centered more on the deity and humanity of Christ, the Trinity, and the resurrection. Hence, they were highlighted. Creeds grew out of controversy, and there was no serious controversy in the early church on the divine origin of Scripture.

Third, it is well established that the view of the early Fathers were strongly in favor of inerrancy. Noted authority on the early Fathers, J. N. D. Kelly, characterized the view of the early Fathers when speaking of Tertullian’s view that “Scripture has absolute authority; whatever it teaches is necessarily true, and woe betide him who accepts doctrines not discoverable in it.”[10] St. Augustine summed up the early Fathers well when he declared: “If we are perplexed by any apparent contradiction in Scripture, it is not allowable to say, The author of this book is mistaken; but either [1] the manuscript is faulty, or [2] the translation is wrong, or [3] you have not understood.”[11]What is this but an affirmation of the inerrancy of the original text of the Bible.

Why Did God Not Preserve the Autographs?

McGowen asks: “If textual inerrancy is so vital to the doctrine of Scripture, why did God not preserve the autographs of precise copies of the same?” (109). He adds, “What was the point of God acting supernaturally to provide an inerrant text providentially if it ceased to be inerrant as soon as the first or second copy was made?” (109).

In response, evangelical scholars have long pointed out several things which McGowen nowhere addresses at any length or refutes. First, there are important reasons to have a perfect autograph, the foremost of which is that the God of absolute truth cannot utter error (see above). For “It is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). The “Spirit of truth” (Jn. 16:13) cannot utter untruths.

Second, since God did not breathe-out the copies, it is possible for them to error. However, God has providentially preserved them as a whole from any substantial error. In short, we have good copies of the original autographs. Noted scholars have substantiated this. Professor Frederic Kenyon stated, “The interval between the dates of original composition and the earliest extant evidence becomes so small as to be in fact negligible, and the last foundation for any doubt that the Scriptures have come down substantially as they were written has now been removed. Both the authenticity and the general integrity of the books of the New Testament may be regarded as finally established.”[12] The great Greek scholar A. T. Robinson stated that “The real concern is with a thousandth part of the entire text.”[13] That would make it 99.9% free of significant variants. Others have noted that these minor variants do not affect an essential teaching of the Christian Church. Even agnostic Bible critic Bart Ehrman admits: “In fact, most of the changes found in early Christian manuscripts have nothing to do with theology or ideology. Far and away the most changes are the result of mistakes pure and simple slips of the pen, accidental omissions, inadvertent additions, misspelled words, blunders of one sort or another.”[14] So, we have 99+ percent of the text and 100% of the essential truths of the Christian Faith. Hence, we do not need the autographs.

Third, there may be a good reason why God did not preserve the autographs. Knowing the human tendency to worship relics, imagine what would happen to the original Bible breathed-out by God! Look what happened to the brazen serpent in the wilderness years later (2 Kgs. 18:4). Further, knowing the human tendency to distort truth and corrupt doctrine with an alleged divine authority, think of what could happen to the autographs if they fell into human hands. But with the autographs preserved in some 5700 mss. that are spread all over the world there is no human way possible that any essential truth of the Christian Faith could be distorted in all these copies.

If Imperfect Copies are Adequate, Why not Imperfect Originals?

Perhaps an illustration will help answer this question. It is not difficult to understand the biblical story of God making a perfect Adam, allowing him to fall and reproduce other imperfect copies of the original Adam. Now all these copies (descendants) of Adam are 100 percent human and imperfect as we all are. So, essential humanity has been preserved even through generations of imperfect copies. Likewise, with Scripture it was essential to have an original that was perfect since a perfect God cannot make an imperfect original. For example, it is inconceivable that a perfect God could have made the first man with a deformed body with cancer growths already on it. But it is not inconceivable that he would make a perfect original man, endow him with free choice, allow him to sin and bring imperfections to his posterity while God, nonetheless, preserves his essential human nature in his posterity. It is for this same reason that God produced a perfect original Bible, and yet preserved the copies of all minor errors so as to protect all the essential truths for posterity.

In short, an adequate but imperfect original is not possible for a perfect God to make. There are many things that God cannot do, even by His sovereignty. He cannot change (Mal. 3:6; Js. 1:13, 17). He cannot deny Himself (2 Tim. 2:13). He cannot cease being God (Heb. 1:10-12). He cannot break an unconditional promise (Rom. 11:29). He cannot lie (Heb. 6:17-18). And, as an absolutely perfect God, He cannot produce an imperfect product either in the realm of truth or morals-because it is contrary to His very nature to do so.

Calling arguments like this “a priori” (111) or purely “deductive” (136) do not make them invalid or false. They are based on the very revealed nature of God in Scripture, and there is nothing wrong with making logical deductions from biblical truths. The Trinity is such a deduction since nowhere does the Bible explicitly teach in any text that there is one God in essence who is three in Persons. Rather, it teaches: (1) There is only one God, and (2) There are three Persons who are God (i.e., who share this one nature). The doctrine of the Trinity is a necessary logical inference from these two clearly biblical premises. Inerrancy, fits into this same category. There are two premises clearly taught in Scripture: (1) God cannot error and (2) The original Bible is the Word of God. The necessary logical conclusion to draw from this is: (3) The original Bible cannot err.

The Argument from Alleged Errors and Contradictions in Scripture

MeGowen is believe that there could be errors in the autographs. He says, “if God is able to use the errant copies . . . that we do have . . . why invest so much theological capital in hypothetical originals that we do not have?” (113). He adds, “The autographs (if we could view them) might very well look just like our existing manuscripts, including all the difficulties, synoptic issues, discrepancies and apparent contradictions . . . ” (119).

Elsewhere, he concludes with Bavink that “the guidance of the Holy Spirit promised to the church does not exclude the possibility of human error”(158). He seems to be fearful of saying there are “actual contradictions and errors,” but it follows from the very logic of his comparison. For the copies have actual errors and contradictions and God uses them for His purposes. Further, since he claims that the copies are inspired (159), he is faced with the contradictory belief in God-breathed errors anyway. Again, he says that he “reject[s] the implication that thereby the autographs must be inerrant” (124). That certainly means that they can be errant. Again, there is not a “third way.” Either the original can have errors or else they cannot have errors. The undeniable Law of Non-Contradiction (see above) demands this conclusion

Before concluding it will be instructive to examine McGowen’s example of an alleged error in the Bible which he gets from I. Howard Marshall (112). He calls it “a very good example” of an error in the biblical text. He alleges that Jairus told Jesus in Matthews 9:18 that his daughter was dead. But in Mark and Luke Jairus told Jesus she was only “at the point of death” (Mk 5:23) but not dead. Luke said she was only “dying” but not yet dead (Lk. 8:42). MeGowen hastily concludes that “there is a clear contradiction between the initial words of Jairus as recorded by Matthew and the other Evangelists” (113).

However, there is in actuality no contradiction between anything Jairus is recorded to have said. For this apparent discrepancy can be explained by the fact “while he [Jairus] was still speaking, someone from the ruler’s house came and said, Your daughter is dead'”(Lk. 8:49). Matthew did not mention that detail, but included the report of the girl’s death in Jairus’ request.[15]The fact is that Matthew did not say Jarius said anything that in fact he did not say. He merely combines the two parts of the conversation, thus stressing the point that the girl actually died by that time.[16] Having analyzed some 800 alleged contradictions in Scripture in The Big Book of Bible Difficulties,[17] I have concluded after a half century of study that the Bible is without error but the critics are not.

Conclusion

McGowen offers many positive insights into the nature of Scripture that are worth pondering (see above). However, in attempting to offered a “middle way between inerrantist and errantist he falls into serious errors. For one, he adopts a radical voluntaristic view of God being sovereignly able to utter error in the original mss. This is combined with an unbiblical view of divine accommodation to error, rather than divine adaptation to finitude without error. This is connected with his rejection of an “incarnational” model of inerrancy which rejection, if applied consistently to Christ, would lead to the conclusion that even the human words and actions of Christ would not be without sin and error.

As for his offer that Americans forsake their long-standing commitment to inerrancy for the weaker European non-inerrancy view, we would remind him of the decline of a vital European church based on the latter and the greater vitality of the American church based on the former. In brief, McGowen’s proposal to reject the term (and concept) of inerrancy should be graciously but firmly rejected because of its unbiblical, unreasonable, and unorthodox implications. In spite of the above stated positive aspects of his view, his central theses may seem more broad and attractive (neither of which is a test for truth), but in the end it is a dangerous deviation from the orthodox view of inerrancy taught in the Bible, affirmed by the church down through the centuries, demanded by orthodox theology from time immemorial, and which has provided a fruitful basis for a vital Christian church. Hence, rather than tempt one to give up either the concept or term inerrancy to describe God-breathed Scripture, McGowen’s gives us more reason to hold on to them.

[1] McGowen agrees with Herman Bavink more than almost any other author, saying, “My argument, then, is that Herman Bavink . . .[who] offers the finest model for an evangelical doctrine of Scripture” (212).

[2] See R.C. Sproul, Explaining Inerrancy: A Commentary (ICBI, 1980), 31.

[3] For a defense of the correspondence view of truth see the article titled “Truth, Nature of” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics” (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999) by N. L. Geisler..

[4] N. L. Geisler, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2002),Vol. 1.

[5] It is acknowledged that many orthodox theologians have used the word “accommodation” to mean adaptation to finitude, but it is denied that they meant this to include error or sin. However, since the term “accommodation” now carries this connotation for many, I recommend that we speak of divine “adaptation” to finitude and leave the word “accommodation” for the neo-orthodox (and neo-Gnostic) view of God acquiescing to error.

[6] I would argue that the Bible “cannot” err insofar as its divine dimension is concerned and “did not” err insofar as its human dimension is concerned.

[7] See John R. Rice, The God-Breathed Book: The Bible (Murfreesboro, TN; 1969), 9.

[8] For a treatment of the many ways in which Jesus used reason and evidence to substantiate his claims see our book, The Apologetics of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2009).

[9] St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, 5.

[10] J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine (NY: Harper & Row, 1960), 39.

[11] See St. Augustine, Reply to Faustus 11.5.

[12] Sir Frederic Kenyon, The Bible and Archaeology (NY: Harper, 1940), 288.

[13] ” Archibald T. Robertson, An Intro to Textual Criticism of the New Testament (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1925), 22.

[14] Bart Ehrman, Misquoting Jesus (NY: HarperOne), 55.

[15] See The Bible Knowledge Commentary, New Testament (Wheaton, Il: Victor Books, 1983), 40.

[16] For McGowen’s to insist that it is an error because Matthew’s record represents the ruler saying it at a different time is and example of the very “literalistic” view he elsewhere deplores in inerrantists. Further, it begs the question by assuming that conflation is not a legitimate literary style which the ICBI view on Inerrancy allows.

[17] Baker Books (2008).

Explaining Hermeneutics: A Commentary on The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics


Explaining Hermeneutics was the official ICBI sponsored commentary on the Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutic. We combined it with R. C. Sproul’s Explaining Inerrancy, the official ICBI sponsored commentary on the Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, and titled it Explaining Biblical Inerrancy.

It may be downloaded for free as a PDF file from here:  http://bastionbooks.com/explaining-biblical-inerrancy/

What does the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy *really* mean? We’re excited to announce that the newest e-book at Bastion Books, titled Explaining Biblical Inerrancy, is a combination of two classic, priceless, hard-to-find, strategic, profound, must-have resources! In it we’ve got forty pages by Dr. R.C. Sproul explaining the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, twenty-two pages by Dr. Norman Geisler explaining the articles of the Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, and ten pages by Dr. Geisler outlining the challenges to and misunderstandings of the ICBI standards of inerrancy that have been common in the last thirty years. Please spread the word and help us get this e-book onto the computers and e-readers of every seminary professor, Bible teacher, and Bible student. Link:

A Review of Five Views on Biblical Inerrancy, Eds. J. Merrick and Stephen Garrett


A Review of Five Views on Biblical Inerrancy,
Eds. J. Merrick and Stephen Garrett

by Dr. Norman L. Geisler

 

Introduction

The Zondervan general editor of the Counterpoint series, Stanley Gundry, together with his chosen editors, J. Merrick and Stephen Garrett, have produced a provocative book on Five Views on Biblical Inerrancy (2013). The five scholar participants are Albert Mohler, Peter Enns, Kevin Vanhoozer, Michael Bird, and John Franke.  This Counterpoints series has produced many stimulating dialogues on various topics, and they no doubt intended to do the same on this controversial topic of inerrancy.  However, there is a basic problem in the dialogue format as applied to biblical inerrancy.

There is Madness in the Method

The “dialogue” method works well for many intramural evangelical discussions like eternal security, the role of women in the ministry, and the like.  However, when it is applied to basic issues which help define the nature of evangelicalism, like the nature of Scripture, the method has some serious drawbacks.  For if inerrancy is a doctrine that is essential to consistent evangelicalism, as most evangelicals believe that it is, then it seems unfitting to make it subject to the dialogue method for two reasons.  First, for many evangelicals the issue of inerrancy is too important to be “up for grabs” on the evangelical dialogue table.  Second, just by providing non-inerrantists and anti-inerrantists a “seat at the table” gives a certain undeserved legitimacy to their view. If, as will be shown below, the non-inerrancy view is not biblical, essential, or in accord with the long history of the Christian Church, then the dialogue method fails to do justice to the topic because it offers an undeserved platform to those who do not really believe the doctrine.  To illustrate, I doubt if one were setting up a conference on the future of Israel that he would invite countries who don’t believe in the existence of Israel (like Iran) to the table.

Stacking the Deck

Not only can the staging of the inerrancy discussion in the Five Views book be challenged, but so can the choice of actors on the stage.   For the choice of participants in this Five Views “dialogue” did not fit the topic in a balanced way.  Since the topic was inerrancy and since each participant was explicitly asked to address the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (CSBI), the choice of participants was not appropriate.  For only one participant (Al Mohler) states his unequivocal belief in the CSBI view of inerrancy produced by the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI).  Some participants explicitly deny inerrancy (Enns, 83f.).[1]

Others prefer to redefine the CSBI statement before agreeing with it.  Still others claim to agree with it, but they do so based on a misunderstanding of what the framers meant by inerrancy, as will be shown below.
What is more, an even greater problem is that none of the framers of the CSBI, whose statement was being attacked, were represented on the panel.  Since three of them (J. I. Packer, R. C. Sproul, and N. L. Geisler) are still alive and active, the makeup of the panel was questionable.  It is like convening a panel on the First Amendment to the US Constitution while Washington, Adams, and Madison were still alive but not inviting any of them to participate!  Further, only one scholar (Al Mohler) was unequivocally in favor of the CSBI view, and some were known to be unequivocally against it (like Peter Enns).  This is loading the dice against positive results.  So, with a stacked deck in the format and the dice loaded in the choice of participants, the probabilities of a positive result were not high, and understandably the result confirms this anticipation.

Understanding Inerrancy

To be sure, whether inerrancy is an essential doctrine is crucial to the point at hand.  In order to answer this question more fully, we must first define inerrancy and then evaluate its importance.

Definition of Inerrancy

Unless otherwise noted, when we use the word “inerrancy” in this article, we mean inerrancy as understood by the ETS framers and defined by the founders of the CSBI, namely, what is called total or unlimited inerrancy.  The CSBI defines inerrancy as unlimited inerrancy, whereas many of ETS participants believe in limited inerrancy. Unlimited inerrancy affirms that Bible is true on whatever subject is speaks—whether it is redemption, ethics, history, science, or anything else.  Limited inerrancy affirms that the Bible’s inerrancy is limited to redemptive matters.
The Evangelical Theological Society (ETS), the largest of any society of its kind in the world, with some 3000 members, began in 1948 with only one doctrinal statement: “The Bible alone and the Bible in its entirety is the Word of God written, and therefore inerrant in the autographs.”  After a controversy in 2003 (concerning Clark Pinnock’s view) which involved the meaning of inerrancy, the ETS voted in 2004 to accept “the CSBI as its point of reference for defining inerrancy” (Merrick, 311).  It states: “For the purpose of advising members regarding the intent and meaning of the reference to biblical inerrancy in the ETS Doctrinal Basis, the Society refers members to the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (1978)” (see J. Merrick, 311).  So, for the largest group of scholars believing in inerrancy the officially accepted definition of the term “inerrancy” is that of the CSBI.
The CSBI supports unlimited or total inerrancy, declaring: “The holy Scripture…is of divine authority in all matters upon which it touches” (A Short Statement, 2).  Also, “We deny that Biblical infallibility and inerrancy are limited to spiritual, religious, or redemptive themes, exclusive of assertions in the fields of history and science” (Art. 12).  It further declares that:  “The authority of Scripture is inescapably impaired if this total divine inerrancy is in any way limited or disregarded, or made relative to a view of truth contrary to the Bible’s own” (A Short Statement, 5,emphasis added).  As we shall see below, unlimited inerrancy has been the historic position of the Christian Church down through the centuries.  Thus, the history supporting the doctrine of inerrancy is supporting unlimited inerrancy.

The Importance of Inerrancy

The question of the importance of inerrancy can be approached both doctrinally and historically.  Doctrinally, inerrancy is an important doctrine because: (1) it is attached to the character of God; (2) It is foundational to other essential doctrines; (3) it is taught in the Scriptures, and (4) it is the historic position of the Christian Church.

The Doctrinal Importance of Inerrancy

First of all, as the ETS statement declares, inerrancy is based on the character of God who cannot lie (Heb. 6:18; Titus 1:2).   For it affirms that the Bible is “inerrant” because (note the word “therefore”) it is the Word of God.  This makes a direct logical connection between inerrancy and the truthfulness of God.
Second, inerrancy is fundamental to all other essential Christian doctrines.  It is granted that some other doctrines (like the atoning death and bodily resurrection of Christ) are more essential to salvation.  However, all soteriological (salvation-related) doctrines derive their divine authority from the divinely authoritative Word of God.  So, in an epistemological (knowledge-related) sense, the doctrine of the divine authority and inerrancy of Scripture is the fundamental of all the fundamentals.  And if the fundamental of fundamentals is not fundamental, then what is fundamental?  Fundamentally nothing!  Thus, while one can be saved without believing in inerrancy, the doctrine of salvation has no divine authority apart from the infallibility and inerrancy of Scripture.  This is why Carl Henry (and Al Mohler following him) affirmed correctly that while inerrancy is not necessary to evangelical authenticity, it is nonetheless, essential to evangelical consistency (Mohler, 29).
Third, B. B. Warfield correctly noted that the primary basis for believing in the inerrancy of Scripture is that it was taught by Christ and the apostles in the New Testament.  And he specified it as unlimited inerrancy (in his book Limited Inspiration, Presbyterian & Reformed reprint, 1962).  Warfield declared: “We believe in the doctrine of plenary inspiration of the Scriptures primarily because it is the doctrine of Christ and his apostles believed, and which they have taught us (cited by Mohler, 42).  John Wenham in Christ and the Bible (IVP, 1972) amply articulated what Christ taught about the Bible, including its inerrancy, for Wenham was one of the international signers of the 1978 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (see Geisler, Defending Inerrancy, 348).   Indeed, to quote Jesus himself, “the Scripture cannot be broken” (John 10:35) and “until heaven and earth pass away not an iota, not a dot, will pass away from the Law until all is accomplished” (Matt 5:18).  A more complete discussion of what Jesus taught about the Bible is found in chapter 16 of our Systematic.
Fourth, inerrancy is the historic position of the Christian Church. As Al Mohler pointed out (Mohler, 48-49), even some inerrantists have agreed that inerrancy has been the standard view of the Christian Church down through the centuries.  He cites the Hanson brothers, Anthony and Richard, Anglican scholars, who said, “The Christian Fathers and the medieval tradition continued this belief [in inerrancy], and the Reformation did nothing to weaken it.  On the contrary, since for many reformed theologians the authority of the Bible took the place which the Pope had held in the medieval scheme of things, the inerrancy of the Bible became more firmly maintained and explicitly defined among some reformed theologians than it had even been before.”  They added, “The beliefs here denied [viz., inerrancy] have been held by all Christians from the very beginning until about a hundred and fifty years ago” (cited by Mohler, 41).
Inerrancy is a fundamental doctrine since it is fundamental to all other Christian doctrines which derive their authority from the belief that the Bible is the infallible and inerrant Word of God.  Indeed, like many other fundamental doctrines (e.g., the Trinity), it is based on a necessary conclusion from biblical truths.  The doctrine of inerrancy as defined by CSBI is substantially the same as the doctrine held through the centuries by the Christian Church (see discussion below). So, even though it was never put in explicit confessional form in the early Church, nevertheless, by its nature as derived from the very nature of God and by its universal acceptance in the Christian Church down through the centuries, it has earned a status of tacit catholicity (universality).  It thus deserves high regard among evangelicals and has rightly earned the status of being essential (in an epistemological sense) to the Christian Faith.  Thus, to reduce inerrancy to the level of non-essential or even “incidental’ to the Christian Faith, reveals ignorance of its theological and historical roots and is an offense to its “watershed” importance to a consistent and healthy Christianity.  As the CSBI statement declares: “However, we further deny that inerrancy can be rejected without grave consequences, both to the individual and to the Church” (Art. 19).

Unjustified Assumptions about Inerrancy.
A careful reading of the Five Views dialogue reveals that not only were the dice loaded against the CSBI inerrancy view by format and by the choice of participants, but there were several anti-inerrancy presuppositions employed by one or more of the participants.  One of the most important is the nature of truth.
The Nature of Truth.  The framers of the CSBI strongly affirmed a correspondence view of truth.  This is not so of all of the participants in the Five Views dialogue.  In fact there was a major misreading by many non-inerrantists of Article 13 which reads in part: “We deny that it is proper to evaluate Scripture according to standards of truth and error that are alien to its usage or purpose.”  Some non-inerrantists were willing to subscribe to the CSBI based on their misinterpretation of this statement.  Franke claims that “This opens up a vast arena of interpretive possibilities with respect to the ‘usage or purpose’ of Scripture in relation to standards of ‘truth or error’” (Franke, 264).  Another non-inerrantist (in the CSBI sense), Clark Pinnock , put it this way: “I supported the 1978 “Chicago Statement on the International council on Biblical Inerrancy,” noting that it “made room for nearly every well-intentioned Baptist” (Pinnock, Scripture Principle, rev., 266).
However, the framers of the CSBI anticipated this objection, and R.C. Sproul was commissioned to write an official ICBI commentary on the Chicago Statement which, straight to the point in Article 13, reads: “‘By biblical standards of truth and error’ is meant the view used both in the Bible and in everyday life, viz., a correspondence view of truth.  This part of the article is directed at those who would redefine truth to relate merely to redemptive intent, the purely personal, or the like, rather than to mean that which corresponds to reality.”  Thus, “all the claims of the Bible must correspond with reality, whether that reality is historical, factual, or spiritual” (see Geisler and Roach, Defending Inerrancy, 31, emphasis added).  So, non-inerrantists, like Pinnock and Enns, misunderstand the Chicago Statement which demands that truth be defined as correspondence with reality.  This is important since to define it another way, for example, in terms of redemptive purpose is to open the door wide to a denial of the factual inerrancy of the Bible as espoused by CSBI.
Purpose and Meaning.  Another serious mistake of some of the non-inerrantists in the Five Views dialogue is to believe that purpose determines meaning.  This emerges in several statements in the book and elsewhere.  Vanhoozer claims “I propose that we indentify the literal sense with the illocutionary act the author is performing” (Enns, 220).  The locutionary act is what the author is saying, and the illocutionary act is why (purpose) he said it.  The what may be in error; only the why (purpose) is without error.  This is why Vanhoozer comes up with such unusual explanations of Biblical texts.  For example, when Joshua commanded the sun to stand still (Josh 10), according to Vanhoozer, this does not correspond to any actual and unusual phenomena involving an extra day of daylight.  Rather, it simply means, as he believes that the purpose (illocutionary act) indicates, that Joshua wants “to affirm God’s covenant relation with his people” (Vanhoozer, Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology, 106).  Likewise, according to Vanhoozer, Joshua is not affirming the literal truth of the destruction of a large walled city (Joshua 6).  He contends that “simply to discover ‘what actually happened’” is to miss the main point of the discourse, which is to communicate a theological interpretation of what happened (that is, God gave Israel the land) and to call for right participation in the covenant” (Vanhoozer, Five Views, 228).  That is why Joshua wrote it, and that alone is the inerrant purpose of the text.
However, as we have explained in detail elsewhere (Geisler, Systematic, chap. 10), purpose does not determine meaning.  This becomes clear when we examine crucial texts.  For example, the Bible declares “Do not cook a young goat in its mother’s milk” (Ex. 23:19).  The meaning of this text is very clear, but the purpose is not, at least not to most interpreters.  Just scanning a couple commentaries from off the shelf reveals a half dozen different guesses as to the author’s purpose.  Despite this lack of unanimity on what the purpose is, nonetheless, virtually everyone understands what the meaning of the text is. An Israelite could obey this command, even if he did not know the purpose for doing so (other than that God had commanded him to do so).  So, knowing meaning stands apart from knowing the purpose of a text.  For example, a boss could tell his employees, “Come over to my house tonight at 8 p.m.”  The meaning (what) is clear, but the purpose (why) is not.  Again, understanding the meaning is clear apart from knowing the purpose.
This does not mean that knowing the purpose of a statement cannot be interesting and even enlightening.  If you knew your boss was asking you to come to his house because he wanted to give you a million dollars, that would be very enlightening, but it would not change the meaning of the statement to come over to his house that night.  So, contrary to many non-inerrantists, purpose does not determine meaning.  Further, with regard to biblical texts, the meaning rests in what is affirmed, not in why it is affirmed.  This is why inerrantists speak of propositional revelation and many non-inerratists tend to downplay or deny it (Vanhoozer, 214).  The meaning and truth of a proposition (affirmation or denial about something) is what is inspired, not in the purpose.  Inerrancy deals with truth, and truth resides in propositions, not in purposes.
At the CSBI conference on the meaning of inerrancy (1982), Carl Henry observed the danger of reducing inerrancy to the purpose of the author, as opposed to the affirmations of the author as they correspond with the facts of reality.  He wrote: “Some now even introduce authorial intent or cultural context of language as specious rationalizations for this crime against the Bible, much as some rapist might assure me that he is assaulting my wife for my own or for her good.  They misuse Scripture in order to champion as biblically true what in fact does violence to Scripture” (Henry in Earl Radamacher ed., Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible [1984], 917).  This is precisely what has happened with some of the participants in the Five Views book when they reduced meaning to purpose and then read their own extra-biblical speculations into the author’s supposed intention or purpose.  This will be discussed more when the genre presupposition is discussed below.
Limited inerrantists and non-inerrantists often take advantage of an ambiguity in the word “intention” of the author in order to insert their own heterodox views on the topic.  When traditional unlimited inerrantists use the phrase “intention of the author” they use it in contrast to those who wish to impose their own meaning on the text in contrast to discovering what the biblical author intended by it.  So, what traditional unlimited inerrantists mean by “intention” is not purpose (why) but expressed intention in the text, that is, meaning. They were not asking the reader to look for some unexpressed intention behind, beneath, or beyond the text.  Expressed intention refers to the meaning of the text.  And it would be better to use the word meaning than the world intention. In this way the word intention cannot be understood as purpose (why), rather than meaning or expressed intention (what) which is found in the text. To put it simply, there is a meaner (author) who expresses his meaning in the text so that the reader can know what is meant by the text. If one is looking for this objectively expressed meaning (via historical-grammatical hermeneutics) it limits the meaning to the text and eliminates finding the meaning beyond the text in some other text (i.e., in some alien extra-biblical genre).
Mike Licona is a case in point.  He redefines “error” to include genre that contains factual errors.  He claims that “intentionally altering an account” is not an error but is allowed by the Greco-Roman genre into which he categorizes the Gospels, insisting that an CSBI view cannot account for all the data (MP3 recording of his ETS lecture 2013).
Propositional Revelation. It is not uncommon for non-inerrantists to attempt to modify or deny propositional revelation.  Vanhoozer cites John Stott as being uncomfortable with inerrancy because the Bible “cannot be reduced to a string of propositions which invites the label truth or error” (Vanhoozer, 200).  Similarly, he adds. “Inerrancy pertains directly to assertions only, not to biblical commands, promises, warnings, and so on. We would therefore be unwise to collapse everything we want to say about biblical authority into the nutshell of inerrancy” (Vanhoozer, 203).
Carl Henry is criticized by some for going “too far” in claiming that “the minimal unit of meaningful expression is a proposition” and that only propositions can be true or false (Vanhoozer, 214).  However, it would appear that it is Vanhoozer’s criticisms that go too far.  It is true that there are more than propositions in the Bible.  All propositions are sentences, but not all sentences are propositions, at least not directly.  However, the CSBI inerrantist is right in stressing propositional revelation.  For only propositions express truth, and inerrancy is concerned with the truthfulness of the Bible.  Certainly, there are exclamations, promises, prophecies, interrogations, and commands that are not formally and explicitly propositions.  But while not all of the Bible is propositional, most of the Bible is propositionalizable.  And any text in the Bible which states or implies a proposition can be categorized as propositional revelation.  And inerrantists claim that all propositional revelation is true.  That is to say, all that the Bible affirms to be true (directly or indirectly) is true.  And all that the Bible affirms to be false is false.  Any attack on propositional revelation that diminishes or negates propositional truth has denied the inerrancy of the Bible. Hence, inerrantists rightly stress propositional revelation.
The fact that the Bible is many more things than inerrant  propositions is irrelevant.  Certainly, the Bible has other characteristics, such as infallibility (John 10:35), immortality (Ps 119:160), indestructibility (Matt 5:17-18), indefatigability (it can’t be worn out—Jer 23:29), and indefeasibility (it can’t be overcome—Isa 55:11).  But these do not diminish the Bible’s inerrancy (lack of error).  In fact, if the Bible were not the inerrant Word of God, then it would not be all these other things.  They are complementary, not contradictory to inerrancy.  Likewise, the Bible has commands, questions, and exclamations, but these do not negate the truth of the text.  Instead, they imply, enhance, and compliment it.
Accommodationism.  Historically, most evangelical theologians have adopted a form of divine condescension to explain how an infinite God could communicate with finite creatures in finite human language.  This is often called analogous language (see Geisler, Systematic, chap. 9).  However, since the word “accommodation” has come to be associated with the acceptance of error, we wish to distinguish between the legitimate evangelical teaching of God’s adaptation to human finitude and the illegitimate view of non-inerrantists who assert God’s accommodation to human error.  It appears that some participants of the inerrancy dialogue fit into the latter category.   Peter Enns believes that accommodation to human error is part of an Incarnational Model which he accepts. This involves writers making up speeches based on what is not stated but is only thought to be “called for,” as Greek historian Thucydides admitted doing (Enns, 101-102).  This accommodation view also allows for employing Hebrew and Greco-Roman literary genres which include literature with factual errors in them (Enns, 103).
The following chart draws a contrast between the two views:
ADAPTATION VIEW
ACCOMMODATION VIEW
GOD ADAPTS TO FINITUDE
GOD ACCOMMODATES TO ERROR
BIBLE USES ANALAGOUS LANGUAGE
IT USES EQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE
BIBLE STORIES ARE FACTUAL
SOME STORIES ARE NOT FACTUAL

Peter Enns believes that “details” like whether Paul’s companions heard the voice or not (Acts 9, 22) were part of this flexibility of accommodation to error.  In brief, he claims that “biblical writers shaped history creatively for their own theological purposes” (Enns, 100).  Recording “what happened” was not the “primary focus” for the Book of Acts but rather “interpreting Paul for his audience” (Enns, 102).  He adds, “shaping significantly the portrayal of the past is hardly an isolated incident here and there in the Bible; it’s the very substance of how biblical writers told the story of their past” (Enns, 104).  In brief, God accommodates to human myths, legends, and errors in the writing of Scripture.  Indeed, according to some non-inerrantists like Enns, this includes accommodation to alien worldviews.
However, ETS/CSBI inerrantists emphatically reject this kind of speculation.  The CSBI declares: “We affirm the unity and internal consistency of Scripture” (CSBI, Art. 14). Further, “We deny that Jesus’ teaching about scripture may be dismissed by appeals to accommodation or to any natural limitation of His humanity” (CSBI, Art. 15).  “We affirm that inspiration, though not conferring omniscience, guaranteed true and trustworthy utterances on all matters of which the Biblical authors were moved to speak and write.  We deny that finitude or fallenness of these writers, by necessity or otherwise, introduced distortion or falsehood into God’s Word” (CSBI, Art. 9).  Also, “We deny that human language is so limited by our creatureliness that it is rendered inadequate as a vehicle for divine revelation.  We further deny that the corruption of human culture and language through sin has thwarted God’s work in inspiration” (CSBI, Art. 4).

Reasons to Reject the Accommodation to Error View
There are many good reasons for rejecting the non-inerrantist accommodation to error theory.  Let’s begin with the argument from the character of God.
First, it is contrary to the nature of God as truth that He would accommodate to error.  Michael Bird states the issue well, though he wrongly limits God to speaking on only redemptive matters.  Nevertheless, he is on point with regard to the nature of inerrancy in relation to God.  He writes: “God identifies with and even invests his own character in his Word…. The accommodation is never a capitulation to error.  God does not speak erroneously, nor does he feed us with nuts of truth lodged inside shells of falsehood” (Bird, 159).  He cites Bromley aptly, “It is sheer unreason to say that truth is revealed in and through that which is erroneous” (cited by Bird, 159).
Second, accommodation to error is contrary to the nature of Scripture as the inerrant Word of God.  God cannot err (Heb 6:18), and if the Bible is His Word, then the Bible cannot err.  So, to affirm that accommodation to error was involved in the inspiration of Scripture is contrary to the nature of Scripture as the Word of God.  Jesus affirmed that the “Scripture” is the unbreakable Word of God (John 10:34-35) which is imperishable to every “iota and dot” (Matt 5:18).  The New Testament authors often cite the Old Testament as what “God said” (cf. Matt 19:5; Acts 4:24-25; 13:34.35; Heb 1:5, 6, 7).  Indeed, the whole Old Testament is said to be “God-breathed” (2 Tim 3:16).  Bird wrongly claimed “God directly inspires persons, not pages” (Enns, 164).  In fact, the New Testament only uses the word “inspired” (theopneustos) once (2 Tim 3:16) and it refers to the written Scripture (grapha, writings).  The writings, not the writers, are “breathed out” by God.  To be sure, the writers were “moved by” God to write (2 Peter 1:20-21), but only what they wrote as a result was inspired.  So if the Scriptures are the very writings breathed out by God, then they cannot be errant since God cannot err (Titus 1:2).
Third, the accommodation to error theory is contrary to sound reason. Anti-inerrantist Peter Enns saw this logic and tried to avoid it by a Barthian kind of separation of the Bible from the Word of God.  He wrote, “The premise that such an inerrant Bible is the only kind of book God would be able to produce…, strikes me as assuming that God shares our modern interest in accuracy and scientific precision, rather than allowing the phenomena of Scripture to shape our theological expectations” (Enns, 84).  But Enns forgets that any kind of error is contrary, not to “modern interest” but to the very nature of the God as the God of all truth.  So, whatever nuances of truth there are which are borne out by the phenomena of Scripture cannot, nevertheless, cannot negate the naked truth that God cannot err, nor can his Word.  The rest is detail.

The Lack of Precision
The doctrine of inerrancy is sometimes criticized for holding that the Bible always speaks with scientific precision and historical exactness.  But since the biblical phenomena do not support this, the doctrine of inerrancy is rejected.  However, this is a “straw man” argument.  For the CSBI states clearly: “We further deny  that inerrancy is negated by biblical phenomena such as a lack of modern technical precision…, including ‘round numbers’ and ‘free citations’” (CSBI. Art. 13). Vanhoozer notes that Warfield and Hodge (in Inspiration, 42) helpfully distinguished “accuracy” (which the Bible has) from “exactness of statement” (which the Bible does not always have) (Vanhoozer, 221).  This being the case, this argument does not apply to the doctrine of inerrancy as embraced by the CSBI since it leaves room for statements that lack modern “technical precision.”  It does, however, raise another issue, namely, the role of biblical and extra-biblical phenomena in refining the biblical concept of truth.
With regard to the reporting of Jesus’ words in the Gospels, there is a strong difference between the inerrantist and non-inerrantist view, although not all non-inerrantists in the Five Views book hold to everything in the “non-inerrantist” column:

USE OF JESUS’ WORDS AND DEEDS IN THE GOSPELS
INERRANTIST VIEW
NON-INERRANTIST VIEW
REPORTING THEM
CREATING THEM
PARAPHRASING THEM
EXPANDING ON THEM
CHANGE THEIR FORM
CHANGE THEIR CONTENT
GRAMMATICALLY EDITING THEM
THEOLOGICALLY REDACTING THEM

Inerrantists believe that there is a significant difference between reporting Jesus words and creating them.  The Gospel writings are based on eye-witness testimony, as they claim (cf. John 21:24; Luke 1:1-4) and as recent scholarship has shown (see Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses).  Likewise, they did not put words in Jesus’ mouth in a theological attempt to interpret Jesus in a certain way contrary to what He meant by them.  Of course, since Jesus probably spoke in Aramaic (cf. Matt 27:46) and the Gospels are in Greek, we do not have the exact words of Jesus (ipsissima verba) in most cases, but rather an accurate rendering of them in another language.  But for inerrantists the New Testament is not a re-interpretation of Jesus words; it is an accurate translation of them.  Non-inerrantists disagree and do not see the biblical record as an accurate report but as a reinterpreted portrait, a literary creation.  This comes out clearly in the statement of Peter Enns that conquest narratives do not merely “report events” (Enns, 108).  Rather, “Biblical history shaped creatively in order for the theological purposes” to be seen (Enns, 108).
Vanhoozer offers a modified evangelical version of this error when he speaks of not “reading Joshua to discover ‘what happened’[which he believes] is to miss the main point of the discourse, which is to communicate a theological interpretation of what happened (that is, God gave Israel the land) and to call for right participation in the covenant” (Vanhoozer, 228).  So, the destruction of Jericho (Josh 6), while not being simply a “myth” or “legend,” Vanhoozer sees as an “artful narrative testimony to an event that happened in Israel’s past” (ibid.).  A surface reading of Vanhoozer’s view here may appear to be orthodox, until one remembers that he believes that only the “main point” or purpose of a text is really inerrant, not what it affirms.  He declares, “I propose that we identify the literal sense with the illocutionary act an author is performing” (Vanhoozer, 220).  That is, only the theological purpose of the author is inerrant, not everything that is affirmed in the text (the locutionary acts).  He declared elsewhere, “the Bible is the Word of God (in the sense of its illocutionary acts)…” (Vanhoozer, First Theology, 195).
The implications of his view come out more clearly in his handling of another passage, namely, Joshua 10:12: “Sun, stand still….” This locution (affirmation) he claims is an error.  But the illocution (purpose of the author) is not in error—namely, what God wanted to say through this statement which was to affirm his redemptive purpose for Israel (Vanhoozer, Lost in Interpretation, 138).  This is clearly not what the CSBI and historic inerrancy position affirms.  Indeed, it is another example of the fallacious “purpose determines meaning” view discussed above and rejected by CSBI.

The Role of Biblical and Extra-Biblical Data
The claim that in conflicts between them one should take the Bible over science is much too simplistic.  Space does not permit a more extensive treatment of this important question which we have dealt with more extensively elsewhere (see our Systematic, chapters 4 and 12).  Al Moher was taken to task by Peter Enns for his seemingly a priori biblical stance that would not allow for any external evidence to change ones view on what the Bible taught about certain scientific and historical events (Mohler, 51, 60). Clearly the discussion hinges on what role the external data have (from general revelation) in determining the meaning of a biblical text (special revelation).
For example, almost all contemporary evangelicals scholars allow that virtually certain scientific evidence from outside the Bible shows that the earth is round, and this must take precedence over a literalistic interpretation of the phrase “four corners of the earth” (Rev 20:8).  Further, interpretation of the biblical phrase “the sun set” (Josh 1:4) is not be taken literalistically to mean the sun moves around the earth.  Rather, most evangelical scholars would allow the evidence for a helio-centric view of modern astronomy (from general revelation) to take precedence over a literalistic pre-Copernican geo-centric interpretation of the phrase the “Sun stood still” (Josh 10:13).
On the other hand, most evangelicals reject the theistic evolutionary interpretation of Genesis 1‒2 for the literal (not literalistic) interpretation of the creation of life and of Adam and Eve.  So, the one million dollar question is: when does the scientist’s interpretation of general revelation take precedent over the theologian’s interpretation of special revelation?
Several observations are in order on this important issue.  First, there are two revelations from God, general revelation (in nature) and special revelation (in the Bible), and they are both valid sources of knowledge.  Second, their domains sometimes overlap and conflict, as the cases cited above indicate, but no one has proven a real contradiction between them.  However, there is a conflict between some interpretations of each revelation. Third, sometimes a faulty interpretation of special revelation must be corrected by a proper interpretation of general revelation.  Hence, there are few evangelicals who would claim that the earth is flat, despite the fact that the Bible speaks of “the four corners of the earth” (Rev 20:8) and that the earth does not move: “The world is established; it shall never be moved” (Ps 93:1, emphasis added).
However, most evangelical theologians follow a literal (not literalistic) understanding of the creation of the universe, life, and Adam (Gen 1:1, 21, 27) over the Darwinian macro-evolution model.  Why? Because they are convinced that the arguments for the creation of a physical universe and a literal Adam outweigh the Darwinian speculations about general revelation.  In brief, our understanding of Genesis (special revelation) must be weighed with our understanding of nature (general revelation) in order to determine the truth of the matter (see our Systematic, chapters 4 and 12.).  It is much too simplistic to claim one is taking the Bible over science or science over the Bible—our understanding about both are based on revelations from God, and their interpretations of both must be weighed in a careful and complimentary way to arrive at the truth that is being taught on these matters.
To abbreviate a more complex process which is described in more detail elsewhere (ibid.): (1) we start with an inductive study of the biblical text; (2) we make whatever necessary deduction that emerges from two or more biblical truths; (3) we do a retroduction of our discovery in view of the biblical phenomena and external evidence from general revelation; and then (4) we draw our final conclusion in the nuanced view of truth resulting from this process.   In brief, there is a complimentary role between interpretations of special revelation and those of general revelations. Sometimes, the evidence for the interpretation of one revelation is greater than the evidence for an interpretation in the other, and vice versa.  So, it is not a matter of taking the Bible over science, but when there is a conflict, it is a matter of taking the interpretation with the strongest evidence over the one with weaker evidence.

The Role of Hermeneutics in Inerrancy
The ICBI (International Council on Biblical Inerrancy) framers of the “Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy” (CSBI) were aware that, while inerrancy and hermeneutics  are logically distinct, hermeneutics cannot be totally separated from inerrancy.  It is for this reason that a statement on historical-grammatical hermeneutics was included in the CSBI presentation (1978).  Article 18 reads: “We affirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by the grammatico-historical exegesis, taking account of its literary forms and devices, and that Scripture is to interpret Scripture.  We deny the legitimacy of any treatment of the text or quest for sources lying behind it leads to relativizing, dehistoricizing, or discounting its teaching, or rejecting its claim to authorship” (emphasis added).
The next ICBI conference after the CSBI in 1978 was an elaboration on this important point in the hermeneutics conference (of 1982).  It produced both a statement and an official commentary as well.  All four documents are placed in one book, titled Explaining Biblical Inerrancy: Official Commentary on the ICBI Statements (available at www.BastionBooks.com).  These four statements contain the corpus and context of the meaning of inerrancy by nearly 300 international scholars on the topic of inerrancy.  Hence, questions about the meaning of the CSBI can be answered by the framers in the accompanying official ICBI commentaries.
Many of the issues raised in the Five Ways are answered in these documents. Apparently, not all the participants took advantage of these resources.  Failure to do so led them to misunderstand what the ICBI framers mean by inerrancy and how historical-grammatical hermeneutics is connected to inerrancy.  So-called genre criticism of Robert Gundry and Mike Licona are cases in point.
The Role of Extra-Biblical Genre
Another aspect of non-inerrantist’s thinking is Genre Criticism.  Although he claims to be an inerrantist, Mike Licona clearly does not follow the ETS or ICBI view on the topic.  Licona argues that “the Gospels belong to the genre of Greco-Roman biography (bios)” and that “Bioi offered the ancient biographer great flexibility for rearranging material and inventing speeches…, and the often include legend.”  But, he adds “because bios was a flexible genre, it is often difficult to determine where history ends and legend begins” (Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 34). This led him to deny the historicity of the story of the resurrection of the saints in Matthew 27:51-53 (ibid.,527-528; 548; 552-553), and to call the story of the crowd falling backward when Jesus claimed “I am he” (John 14:5-6) “a possible candidate for embellishment” (ibid., 306) and the presence of angels at the tomb in all four Gospels may be “poetic language or legend” (ibid., 185-186).
Later, in a debate with Bart Ehrman (at Southern Evangelical Seminary, Spring, 2009), Licona claimed there was a contradiction in the Gospels as to the day of Jesus’ crucifixion.  He said, “I think that John probably altered the day [of Jesus’ crucifixion] in order for a theological—to make a theological point here.”   Then in a professional transcription of a YouTube video on November 23, 2012 (see http://youtu.be/TJ8rZukh_Bc), Licona affirmed the following:  “So um this didn’t really bother me in terms of if there were contradictions in the Gospels.  I mean I believe in biblical inerrancy but I also realized that biblical inerrancy is not one fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The resurrection is.  So if Jesus rose from the dead, Christianity is still true even if it turned out that some things in the Bible weren’t. So um it didn’t really bother me a whole lot even if some contradictions existed” (emphasis added).
This popular Greco-Roman genre theory adopted by Licona and others is directly contrary to the CSBI view of inerrancy as clearly spelled out in many articles.  First, Article 18 speaks to it directly: “We affirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by grammatico-historical exegesis, taking account of its literary forms and devices, and that Scripture is to interpret Scripture” (emphasis added).  But Lincona rejects the strict “grammatico-historical exegesis” where “Scripture is to interpret Scripture” for an extra-biblical system where Greco-Roman genre is used to interpret Scripture.  Of course, “Taking account” of different genres within Scripture, like poetry, history, parables, and even allegory (Gal 4:24), is legitimate, but this is not what the use of extra-biblical Greco-Roman genre does.  Rather, it uses extra-biblical stories to determine what the Bible means, even if using this extra-biblical literature means denying the historicity of the biblical text.
Second, the CSBI says emphatically that “We deny the legitimacy of any treatment of the text or quest for sources lying behind it that leads to relativizing, dehistoricizing, or discounting its teaching, or rejecting its claim to authorship” (Art. 18, emphasis added).  But this is exactly what many non-inerrantists, like Licona, do with some Gospel events.  The official ICBI commentary on this Article adds, “It is never legitimate, however, to run counter to express biblical affirmations” (emphasis added).   Further, in the ICBI commentary on its1982 Hermeneutics Statement (Article 13) on inerrancy, it adds, “We deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual. Some, for instance, take Adam to be a myth, whereas in Scripture he is presented as a real person.  Others take Jonah to be an allegory when he is presented as a historical person and [is] so referred to by Christ” (emphasis added).  Its comments in the next article (Article 14) add, “We deny that any event, discourse or saying reported in Scripture was invented by the biblical writers or by the traditions they incorporated” (emphasis added).  Clearly, the CSBI Fathers rejected genre criticism as used by Gundry, Licona, and many other evangelicals.
Three living eyewitness framers of the CSBI statements (Packer, Sproul, and Geisler) confirm that authors like Robert Gundry were in view when these articles were composed. Gundry had denied the historicity of sections of the Gospel of Matthew by using a Hebrew “midrashic” model to interpret Matthew (see Mohler on Franke, 294).  After a thorough discussion of Gundry’s view over a two year period and numerous articles in the ETS journal, the matter was peacefully, lovingly, and formally brought to a motion by a founder of the ETS, Roger Nicole, in which the membership, by an overwhelming 70% voted and asked Gundry to resign from the ETS.  Since Licona’s view is the same in principle with that of Gundry’s, the ETS decision applies equally to his view as well.
Mike Licona uses a Greco-Roman genre to interpreting the Gospels, rather than Jewish midrash which Gundry used.  The Greco-Roman genre permits the use of a contradiction in the Gospels concerning the day Jesus was crucified.  However, the ICBI official texts cited above reveal that the CSBI statement on inerrancy forbids “dehistoricing” the Gospels (CSBI Art. 18). Again, living ICBI framers see this as the same issue that led to Gundry’s departure from ETS.  When asked about the orthodoxy of Mike Licona’s view, CSBI framer R.C. Sproul wrote: “As the former and only President of ICBI during its tenure and as the original framer of the Affirmations and Denials of the Chicago Statement on Inerrancy, I can say categorically that Dr. Michael Licona’s views are not even remotely compatible with the unified Statement of ICBI” (Personal Correspondence, 5/22/2012, emphasis added).
The role of extra-biblical genre in Gospel interpretation can be charted as follows:

THE USE OF EXTRA-BIBLICAL GENRE
LEGITIMATE USE
ILLEGITIMATE USE
A MATERIAL CAUSE
THE FORMAL CAUSE

HELP PROVIDE PARTS
DETERMINE THE WHOLE
ILLUMINATES SIGNIFICANCE
DETERMINES MEANING

The formal cause of meaning is in the text itself (the author is the efficient cause of meaning).  No literature or stories outside the text are hermeneutically determinative of the meaning of the text.  The extra-biblical data can provide understanding of a part (e.g., a word), but it cannot decide what the meaning of a whole text is.  Every text must be understood only in its immediate or more remote contexts.  Scripture is to be used to interpret Scripture.
Of course, as shown above, general revelation can help modify our understanding of a biblical text, for the scientific evidence based on general revelation demonstrates that the earth is round and can be used to modify one’s understanding of the biblical phrase “for corners of the earth.”  However, no Hebrew or Greco-Roman literature genre should be used to determine what a biblical text means since it is not part of any general revelation from God, and it has no hermeneutical authority.
Further, the genre of a text is not understood by looking outside the text.  Rather, it is determined by using the historical-grammatical hermeneutic on the text in its immediate context, and the more remote context of the rest of Scripture to decide whether it is history, poetry, parable, an allegory, or whatever.
Furthermore, similarity to any extra-biblical types of literature does not demonstrate identity with the biblical text, nor should it be used to determine what the biblical text means.  For example, the fact that an extra-biblical piece of literature combines history and legend does not mean that the Bible also does this.  Nor does the existence of contradictions in similar extra-biblical literature justify transferring this to biblical texts.  Even if there are some significant similarities of the Gospels with Greco-Roman literature, it does not mean that legends should be allowed in the Gospels since the Gospel writers make it clear that they have a strong interest in historical accuracy by an “orderly account” so that we can have “certainty” about what is recorded in them (Luke 1:1‒4).  And multiple confirmations of geographical and historical details confirm that this kind of historical accuracy was achieved (see Colin Patterson, The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenic History, 1990).

The Issue of Gospel Pluralism
Another associated error of some non-inerrantism is pluralism.  Kenton Sparks argues that the Bible “does not contain a single coherent theology but rather numerous theologies that sometimes stand in tension or even contradiction with one another” (Cited by Mohler, 55).   So, God accommodates Himself and speaks through “the idioms, attitudes, assumptions, and general worldviews of the ancient authors” (Enns, 87).  But he assures us that this is not a problem, because we need to see “God as so powerful that he can overrule ancient human error and ignorance, [by contrast] inerrancy portrays as weak view of God” (Enns, 91). However, it must be remembered that contradictions entail errors, and God cannot err.
By the same logical comparison, Christ must have sinned.  For if the union of the human and divine in Scripture (God’s written Word) necessarily entails error, then by comparison the union of the human and divine in Christ must result in moral flaws in Him.  But the Bible is careful to note that, though Christ, while being completely human, nonetheless, was without sin (Heb 4:15; 2 Cor 5:21).  Likewise, there is no logical or theological reason why the Bible must err simply because it has a human nature to it.  Humans do not always err, and they do not err when guided by the Holy Spirit of Truth who cannot err (John 14:26; 16:13; 2 Peter 1:20‒21).  A perfect Book can be produced by a perfect God through imperfect human authors.  How?  Because God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick!  He is the ultimate cause of the inerrant Word of God; the human authors are only the secondary causes.
Enns attempts to avoid this true incarnational analogy by arguing the following: (1) This reasoning diminishes the value of Christ’s Incarnation.  He tried to prove this by noting that the Incarnation of Christ is a unique “miracle” (Enns, 298).  However, so is the union of the human and divine natures of Scripture miraculous (2 Sam 23:2; 2 Peter 1:20-21).  In effect, Enns denies the miraculous nature of Scripture in order to exalt the miraculous nature of the Incarnation of Christ.  (2) His comparison with the Quran is a straw man because it reveals his lack of understanding of the emphatic orthodox denial of the verbal dictation theory claimed by Muslims for the Quran, but denied vigorously by orthodox Bible scholars about the Bible.  (3) His charge of “bibliolatry” is directly opposed to all evangelical teaching that the Bible is not God and should not be worshiped.
Of course, Christ and the Bible are not a perfect analogy because there is a significant difference: Christ is God, and the Bible is not.  Nonetheless, it is a good analogy because there are many strong similarities: (1) both Christ and the Bible have a divine and human dimension; 2) both have a union of the two dimensions; (3) both have a flawless character that in Christ is without sin and in the Bible is without error; and (4) both are the Word of God, one the written Word of God and other the incarnate Word of God.  Thus, a true incarnational analogy calls for the errorlessness of the Bible, just as it calls for the sinlessness of Christ.

The Acceptance of Conventionalism
Some non-inerrantists hold the self-defeating theory of meaning called conventionalism. Franke, for example, argues that “since language is a social construct…our words and linguistic conventions do not have timeless and fixed meanings…” (Franke, 194).  There are serious problem with this view which Franke and other contemporary non-inerrantists have adopted.
Without going into philosophical detail, the most telling way to see the flaws of this view is to reflect on its self-defeating nature.  That is, it cannot deny the objectivity of meaning without making an objectively meaningful statement.  To claim that all language is purely conventional and subjective is to make a statement which is not purely conventional and subjective.  In like manner, when Franke claims that truth is perspectival (Franke, 267), he seems to be unaware that he is making a non-perspectival truth claim.  This problem is discussed more extensively elsewhere (see Geisler, Systematic, chap. 6).  We would only point out here that one cannot consistently be an inerrantist and a conventionalist.  For if all meaning is subjective, then so is all truth (since all true statements must be meaningful).  But inerrancy claims that the Bible makes objectively true statements.  Hence, an inerrantist cannot be a conventionalist, at least not consistently.
The Issue of Foundationalism
The CBSI statement is taken to task by some non-inerrantists for being based on an unjustified theory of foundationalism.  Franke insists that “the Chicago Statement is reflective of a particular form of epistemology known as classic or strong foundationalism” (Franke, 261).  They believe that the Bible is “a universal and indubitable basis for human knowledge” (Franke, 261).  Franke believes that: “The problem with this approach is that it has been thoroughly discredited in philosophical and theological circles” (ibid.,262).
In response, first of all, Franke confuses two kinds of foundationalism: (1) deductive foundationalism, as found in Spinoza or Descartes where all truth can be deduced from certain axiomatic principles.  This is rejected by all inerrantist scholars I know and by most philosophers; (2) However, reductive foundationalism which affirms that truths can be reduced to or are based on certain first principles like the Law of Non-contradiction is not rejected by most inerrantists and philosophers.  Indeed, first principles of knowledge, like the Law of Non-contradiction, are self evident and undeniable.  That is, the predicate of first principles can be reduced to it subject, and any attempt to deny the Law of Non-contradiction uses the Law of Non-contradiction in the denial.  Hence, the denial is self defeating.
Second, not only does Franke offer no refutation of this foundational view, but any attempted refutation of it self-destructs.  Even so-called “post-foundationalists” like Franke cannot avoid using these first principles of knowledge in their rejection of foundationalism.  So, Franke’s comment applies to deductive foundationalism but not to reductive foundationalism as held by most inerratists.  Indeed, first principles of knowledge, including theological arguments, are presupposed in all rational arguments, including theological arguments.
Third, Franke is wrong in affirming that all inerrantists claim that “Scripture is the true and sole basis for knowledge on all matters which it touches.” (Franke, 262, emphasis added).  Nowhere does the CSBI statement or its commentaries make any such claim.  It claims only that the “Scriptures are the supreme written norm” “in all matters on which it touches” (Article 2 and A Short Statement, emphasis added).  Nowhere does it deny that God has revealed Himself outside His written revelation in His general revelation in nature, as the Bible declares (Rom 1:1‒20; Ps 19:1; Acts 14, 17).
As for “falliblism” which Franke posits to replace foundationalism, CSBI explicitly denies creedal or infallible basis for its beliefs, saying, “We do not propose this statement be given creedal weight” (CSBI, Preamble).  Furthermore, “We deny creeds, councils, or declarations have authority greater than or equal to the authority of the Bible” (CSBI, Art. 2).  So, not only do the ICBI framers claim their work is not a creed nor is it infallible, but they claim that even the Creeds are not infallible.  Further, it adds. “We invite response to this statement from any who see reason to amend its affirmations about Scripture by the light of Scripture itself, under whose infallible authority we stand as we speak” (CSBI, Preamble).  In short, while the doctrine of inerrancy is not negotiable, the ICBI statements about inerrancy are revisable.  However, to date, no viable revisions have been proposed by any group of scholars such as those who framed the original CSBI statements.

Dealing with Bible Difficulties
As important as the task may be, dealing with Bible difficulties can have a blinding effect on those desiring the clear truth about inerrancy because they provide a temptation not unlike that of a divorce counselor who is faced with all the problems of his divorced counselees.  Unless, he concentrates on the biblical teaching and good examples of many happy marriages, he can be caught wondering whether a good marriage is possible.  Likewise, one should no more give up on the inerrancy (of God’s special revelation) because of the difficulties he finds in explaining its consistency than he should give up on the study of nature (God’s general revelation) because of the difficulties he finds in it.
There are several reasons for believing that both of God’s revelations are consistent: First, it is a reasonable assumption that the God who is capable of revealing Himself in both spheres is consistent and does not contradict Himself.  Indeed, the Scriptures exhort us to “Avoid… contradictions” (Gk: antheseis—1 Tim 6:20 ESV).  Second, persistent study in both spheres of God’s revelations, special and general revelation (Rom 1:19‒20; Ps 19:1), have yielded more and more answers to difficult questions.  Finally, contrary to some panelists who believe that inerrancy hinders progress in understanding Scripture (Franke, 278), there is an investigative value in assuming there is no contradiction in either revelation, namely, it prompts further investigation to believe that there was no error in the original.  What would we think of scientists who gave up studying God’s general revelation in nature because they have no present explanation for some phenomena?  The same applies to Scripture (God’s special revelation).  Thus, assuming there is an error in the Bible is no solution.  Rather, it is a research stopper.
Augustine was right in his dictum (cited by Vanhoozer, 235).  There are only four alternatives when we come to a difficulty in the Word of God: (1) God made an error, 2) the manuscript is faulty, 3) the translation is wrong, or 4) we have not properly understood it.  Since it is an utterly unbiblical presumption to assume the first alternative, we as evangelicals have three alternatives.  After over a half century of studying nearly 1000 such difficulties (see The Big Book of Bible Difficulties, Baker, 2008), I have discovered that the problem of an unexplained conflict is usually the last alternative—I have not properly understood.
That being said, even the difficult cases the participants were asked to respond to are not without possible explanations.  In fact, some of the participants, who are not even defenders of inerrancy, offered some reasonable explanations.
Acts 9 and 22. As for the alleged contradiction in whether Paul’s companions “heard”  (Acts 9:4) and did not “hear” (Acts 22:9) what the voice from heaven said, two things need to be noted. First, the exact forms of the word “hear” (akouo) are not used in both case.  First, Vanhoozer (229) notes that Acts 9:4 says akouein (in the accusative) which means hear a sound of a voice.  In the other text (Acts 22:9) akouontes (in the genitive) can mean understand the voice (as the NIV translates it).  So understood, there is no real contradiction.  Paul’s companions heard the sound of the voice but did not understand what it said.
Second, we have exactly the same experience with the word “hear” today.  In fact, at our house, hardly a day or two goes by without either my wife or I saying from another room, “I can’t hear you.”  We heard their voice, but we did not understand what they said.
One thing is certain, we do not need contorted attempts to explain the phenomenon like Vanhoozer’s suggestion that this conflict serves “Luke’s purpose by progressively reducing the role of the companions, eventually excluding them altogether from the revelatory event” (230).  It is totally unnecessary to sacrifice the traditional view of inerrancy with such twisted explanations.
Joshua 6.  This text records massive destruction of the city with its large walls falling down, which goes way beyond the available archaeological evidence.  Peter Enns insists that “the overwhelmingly dominant scholarly position is that the city of Jericho was at most a small settlement and without walls during the time of Joshua” (Enns, 93).  He concludes that “these issues cannot be reconciled with how inerrancy functions in evangelicalism as articulated in the CSBI” (92).  He further contends that the biblical story must be a legendary and mythological embellishment (96).
In response, it should be noted that: (1) This would not be the first time that the “dominant scholarly position” has been overturned by later discoveries.  The charge that there was no writing in Moses’ day and that the Hittites mentioned in the Bible (Gen 26:34; 1 Kings 11:1) never existed, are only two examples.  All scholars know that both of these errors were subsequently revealed by further research. (2) There is good archaeological evidence that other events mentioned in the Bible did occur as stated.  The plagues on Egypt and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah are examples in point.  The first fits well with the Uperwer Papyrus and the second with the recent discoveries at the Tall el Hamman site in Jordan (see Joseph Holden, A Popular Handbook of Archaeology and the Bible, Harvest House, 2013, 214‒24).
Indeed, Enns admits that the Joshua description of some other cities around Jericho fits the archaeological evidence (Enns, 98).  He even admits that “a trained archaeologist and research director” offers a minority view that fits with the Joshua 6 record (Enns, 94), only the alleged time period is different.  However, since the dating issue is still unresolved by scholars, a date that fits the biblical record is still possible.
The fact that the belief in the full historicity of Joshua 6 is in the minority among scholars poses no insurmountable problem.  Minority views have been right before.  Remember Galileo?  As for the alleged absence of evidence for a massive destruction of a walled city of Jericho, two points are relevant: 1) the absence of evidence is not necessarily the evidence of absence since other evidence may yet be found; 2) the main dispute is not over whether something like the Bible claimed to have happened actually did happen to Jericho, but whether it happened at the alleged time.  However, the dating of this period is still disputed among scholars.  Hence, nothing like “overwhelmingly” established evidence has disproven the biblical picture of Joshua 6.  Certainly there is no real reason to throw out the inerrantist’s view of the historicity of the event. On the contrary, the Bible has a habit of proving the critics wrong.
Deuteronomy 20 and Matthew 5. Again, this is a difficult problem, but there are possible explanations without sacrificing the historicity and inerrancy of the passages.  The elimination of the Canaanites and the command to love one’s enemies are not irreconcilable.  Even Enns, no friend of inerrancy, points out that an “alternate view of the conquest that seems to exonerate the Israelites” (Enns, 108), noting that the past tense of the Leviticus statement that “the land vomited [past tense] out its inhabitants” (Lev. 18:25) implies that “God had already dealt with the Canaanite problem before the Israelites left Mt. Sinai” (ibid.).
But even the traditional view that Israel acted as God’s theocratic agent in killing the Canaanites poses no irreconcilable problem for many reasons.  First of all, God is sovereign over life and can give and take it as He wills (Deut 32:39; Job 1:21).  Second, God can command others to kill on his behalf, as He did in capital punishment (Gen 9:6).  Third, the Canaanites were wildly wicked and deserved such punishment (cf. Lev 18).  Fourth, this was a special theocractic act of God through Israel on behalf of God’s people and God’s plan to give them the Holy Land and bring forth the Holy One (Christ), the Savior of the world.  Hence, there is no pattern or precedent here for how we should wage war today.  Fifth, loving our enemy who insults us with a mere “slap on the right cheek” (Matt 5:39) does not contradict our killing him in self defense if he attempts to murder us (Exod 22:2), or engaging him in a just war of protecting the innocent (Gen 14). Sixth, God gave the Canaanites some 400 years (Gen 15:13‒15) to repent before He found them incorrigibly and irretrievably wicked and wiped them out.  Just as it is sometimes necessary to cut off a cancerous limb to save one’s life, even so God knows when such an operation is necessary on a nation which has polluted the land.  But we are assured by God’s words and actions elsewhere that God does not destroy the righteous with the wicked (Gen 18:25).  Saving Lot and his daughters, Rahab, and the Ninevites are examples.
As for God’s loving kindness on the wicked non-Israelites, Nineveh (Jonah 3) is proof that God will save even a very wicked nation that repents (cf. 2 Peter 3:9).  So, there is nothing in this Deuteronomy text that is contradictory to God’s character as revealed in the New Testament.  Indeed, the judgments of the New Testament God are more intensive and extensive in the book of Revelation (cf. Rev 6‒19) than anything in the Old Testament.

Responding to Attacks on Inerrancy
We turn our attention now to some of the major charges leveled against CSBI inerrancy. We begin with two of the major objections: It is not biblical and it is not the historical view of the Christian Church.  But before we address these, we need to recall that the CSBI view on inerrancy means total inerrancy, not limited inerrancy.  Total or unlimited inerrancy holds that the Bible is inerrant on both redemptive matters and all other matters on which it touches, and limited inerrancy holds that the Bible is only inerrant on redemptive matters but not in other areas such as history and science.  By “inerrancy” we mean total inerrancy as defined by the CSBI.

The Charge of Being Unbiblical
Many non-inerrantists reject inerrancy because they claim that it is not taught in the Bible as the Trinity or other essential doctrines are.  But the truth is that neither one is taught formally and explicitly.  Both are taught in the Bible only implicitly and logically. For example, nowhere does the Bible teach the formal doctrine of the Trinity, but it does teach the premises which logically necessitate the doctrine of the Trinity.  And as The Westminster Confession of Faith declares, a sound doctrine must be “either set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequences may be deduced from Scripture” (Chap. I, Art. 6).  Both the Trinity and inerrancy of Scripture fall into the latter category. Thus, the Bible teaches that there are three Persons who are God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Matt 29:18‒20).  Furthermore, it teaches that there is only one God (1 Tim 2:5).  So, “by good and necessary consequences” the doctrine of the Trinity may be deduced from Scripture.
Likewise, while inerrancy is not formally and explicitly taught in Scripture, nonetheless, the premises on which it is based are taught there.  For the Bible teaches that God cannot err, and it also affirms that the Bible is the Word of God.  So “by good and necessary consequences [the doctrine of inerrancy] may be deduced from Scripture.”
Of course, in both cases the conclusion can and should be nuanced as to what the word “person” means (in the case of the Trinity), and what the word “truth” means (see below) in the case of inerrancy.  Nevertheless, the basic doctrine in both cases is biblical in the sense of a “good and necessary consequence” of being logically “deduced from Scripture.”

The Charge of Being Unhistorical
Many non-inerrantists charge that inerrancy has not been the historic doctrine of the Church.  Some say it was a modern apologetic reaction to Liberalism.  Outspoken opponent of inerrancy, Peter Enns, claims that “…‘inerrancy,’ as it is understood in the evangelical and fundamentalist mainstream, has not been the church’s doctrine of Scripture through its entire history; Augustine was not an ‘inerrantist” (Enns, 181).  However, as the evidence will show, Enns is clearly mistaken on both counts.  First of all, Augustine (5th century) declared emphatically, “I have learned to yield respect and honour only to the canonical books of Scripture: of these alone do I most firmly believe that the authors were completely free form error” (Augustine, Letters 82, 3).
Furthermore, Augustine was not alone in his emphatic support of the inerrancy of Scripture.  Other Fathers both before and after him held the same view.  Thomas Aquinas (13th century) declared that “it is heretical to say that any falsehood whatever is contained either in the gospels or in and canonical Scripture” (Exposition on Job 13, Lect. 1).  For “a true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth in whom there is no trace of falsehood, and he never utters untruths: (Summa Theologica 2a2ae, 172, 6 ad 2).
The Reformer Martin Luther (16th century) added, “When one blasphemously gives the lie to God in a single word, or say it is a minor matter, …one blasphemes the entire God…” (Luther’s Works, 37:26).  Indeed, whoever is so bold that he ventures to accuse God of fraud and deception in a single word…likewise certainly ventures to accuse God of fraud and deception in all His words. Therefore it is true, absolutely and without exception, that everything is believed or nothing is believed (cited in Reu, Luther and the Scriptures, 33).
John Calvin agreed with his predecessors, insisting that “the Bible has come down to us from the mouth of God (Institutes, 1.18.4).  Thus “we owe to Scripture the same reverence which we owe to God; because it has proceeded from Him alone….The Law and the Prophets are…dictated by the Holy Spirit (Urquhart, Inspiration and Accuracy, 129‒130).  Scripture is “the certain and unerring rule” (Calvin, Commentaries, Ps 5:11).  He added that the Bible is “a depository of doctrine as would secure it from either perishing by neglect, vanishing away amid errors, of being corrupted by the presumptions of men (Institutes, 1.6.3).
Furthermore, it is nit-picking to claim, as some non-inerrantists suggest (Franke, 261), that the Church Fathers did not hold precisely the same view of Scripture as contemporary evangelicals. Vanhoozer claims they are “not quite the same” (73).  Bird asserted, “The biggest problem I have with the AIT [American Inerrancy Tradition] and the CSBI [Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy] are their lack of catholicity.  What Christians said about inerrancy in the past might have been similar to the AIT and CSBI, but they were never absolutely the same!” (Bird, 67).  However, identical twins are not absolutely the same in all “details,” but, like the doctrine of inerrancy down through the years, both are substantially the same.  That is, they believed in total inerrancy of Scripture, that it is without error in whatever it affirms on any topic.
The basic truth of inerrancy has been affirmed by the Christian Church from the very beginning.  This has been confirmed by John Hannah in Inerrancy and the Church (Moody, 1984).  Likewise, John Woodbridge provided a scholarly defense of the historic view on inerrancy (Biblical Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal, Zondervan, 1982) which Rogers never even attempted to refute.  Neither Rogers nor anyone else has written a refutation of the standard view on inerrancy, as defended by Woodbridge, expressed in the ETS and explained by the ICBI.
Of course, other difficulties with the historic doctrine of inerrancy can be raised, but B. B. Warfield summed up the matter well, claiming: “The question is not whether the doctrine of plenary inspiration has difficulties to face.  The question is, whether these difficulties are greater than the difficulty of believing that the whole Church of God from the beginning has been deceived in her estimate of Scripture committed to her charge—are greater than the difficulties of believing that the whole college of the apostles, yes and of Christ himself at their head were themselves deceive as to the nature of those Scripture….” (cited by Mohler, 42).

The Charge of the “Slippery Slope Argument”
An oft repeated charge against inerrancy is that it is based on a “Slippery Slope” argument that it should be accepted on the basis of what we might lose if we reject it (Enns, 89). The charge affirms that if we give up the inerrancy of the Bible’s authority on historical or scientific areas, then we are in danger of giving up on the inerrancy of redemptive passages as well.  In brief, it argues that if you can’t trust the Bible in all areas, then you can’t trust it at all.  Enns contends this is “an expression of fear,” not a valid argument but one based on “emotional blackmail” (ibid.).  Franke states the argument in these terms: “If there is a single error at any place in the Bible, [then] none of it can be trusted” (Franke, 262).
One wonders whether the anti-inerrantist would reject Jesus’ arguments for the same reason when He said, “If I have told you earthly things and you do not believe, how can you believe if I tell you heavenly things” (John 3:12)?  The truth is that there are at least two different forms of the “slippery slope” reasoning: one is valid and the other is not.  It is not valid to argue that if we don’t believe everything one says, then we cannot believe anything he says.  For example, the fact that an accountant makes an occasional error in math does not mean that he is not reliable in general.  However, if one claims to have divine authority, and makes one mistake, then it is reasonable to conclude that nothing he says has divine authority in it.  For God cannot make mistakes, therefore, anyone who claims to be a prophet of God who does make mistakes (cf. Deut 18:22) cannot be trusted to be speaking with divine authority on anything (even though he may be right about many things).  So, it is valid to say, if the Bible errs in anything, then it cannot be trusted to be the inerrant Word of God in anything (no matter how reliable it may be about many things).

The Charge of being Parochial
Vanhoozer poses the question: “Why should the rest of the world care about North American evangelicalism’s doctrinal obsession with inerrancy (Vanhoozer, 190). There are no voices from Africa, Asia, or South America that had “any real input into the formation of the CSBI” (Franke, 194).  “Indeed, it is difficult to attend a meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society and not be struck by the overwhelming white and male group it is” (Franke, 195).
However, “It is a genetic fallacy to claim that the doctrine of inerrancy can’t be right because it was made in the USA” (Vanhoozer, 190).  While it is true that “in the abundance of  counselors there is wisdom” (Prov 11:14), it is not necessarily true that universality and inter-ethnicity is more conducive to orthodoxy.   Would anyone reject Newton’s Laws simply because they came from a seventeenth-century Englishman?  Vanhoozer rightly asks, “Is it possible that the framers of the Chicago statement, despite the culturally conditioned and contingent nature of the North American discussion, have discovered a necessary implication of what Christians elsewhere might have to say about Scripture’s truth?” (Vanhoozer, 190).  Is it not possible that inerrancy represents a legitimate development of the doctrine of Scripture that arose in response to the needs and challenges of our twentieth-century context?  I don’t see why not.” (Vanhoozer, 191).
The early Christian Creeds on the deity of Christ and the Trinity were all time-bound, yet they rightly attained the status of a Creed—an enduring and universal statement which is accepted by all major sections of Christendom.  Although the CSBI statement does not claim creedal status, nonetheless, being time-bound does not hinder its deserved wide representation and acceptance in historic evangelical churches.
Franke claims that one of the problems with claiming inerrancy as a universal truth is that “it will lead to the marginalization of other people who do not share in the outlooks and assumptions of the dominant group. Inerrancy calls on us to surrender the pretensions of a universal and timeless theology” (Franke, 279).  However, he seems oblivious to the universal and timeless pretension of his own claim.  As a truth claim, the charge of parochialism is self-defeating since it too is conditioned by time, space, and ethnic distinctiveness.  Indeed, it is just another form of the view that all truth claims are relative.  But so is that claim itself relative.  Thus, the proponent of parochialism is hanged on his own gallows.

The Charge of being Unethical
The alleged unethical behavior of inerrantists seems to have been the hot-button issue among most of the participants in the dialogue, including the editors.  They decry, sometimes in strong terms, the misuse of inerrancy by its proponents.  In fact, this issue seems to simmer beneath the background of the anti-inerrancy discussion as a whole, breaking forth from time-to-time in explicit condemnation of its opponents.  In fact, the editors of the Five Views book appear to trace the contemporary inerrancy movement to this issue (see Merrick, 310).
Both the editors and some participants of the Five Views book even employ extreme language and charges against the inerrancy movement, charging it with evangelical “fratricide” (Merrick, 310). The word “fratricide” is repeated a few pages later (317). Three participants of the dialogue (Franke, Bird, and Enns) seem particularly disturbed about the issue, along with the two editors of the book.  They fear that inerrancy is used as “a political instrument (e.g., a tool for excluding some from the evangelical family)” (Vanhoozer, 302) in an “immoral” way (Enns, 292).  They speak of times “when human actions persist in ways that are ugly and unbecoming of Christ…” (Merrick, 317).
Enns, for example, speaks strongly to the issue, chiding “those in positions of power in the church…who prefer coercion to reason and demonize to reflection.”  He adds, “Mohler’s position (the only one explicitly defending the CSBI inerrancy view) is in my view intellectually untenable, but wielded as a weapon, it becomes spiritually dangerous” (Enns, 60).  He also charges inerrantists with “manipulation, passive-aggressiveness, and…emotional blackmail” (Enns, 89).  Further, he claims that “inerrancy regularly functions to short-circuit rather than spark our knowledge of the Bible” (Enns, 91).  In spite of the fact that he recognizes that we cannot “evaluate inerrancy on the basis of its abusers,” Enns hastens to claim that “the function of inerrancy in the funamentalist and evangelical subculture has had a disturbing and immoral partnership with power and abuse” (Enns, 292).
Franke joins the chorus against inerrantists more softy but nonetheless strongly expresses his disappointment, saying, “I have often been dismayed by many of the ways in which inerrancy has commonly been used in biblical interpretation, theology, and the life of the church…. Of even greater concern is the way in which inerrancy has been wielded as a means of asserting power and control” over others (Franke, 259).

A Response to the Ethical Charges

Few widely read scholars will deny that some have abused the doctrine of inerrancy.  The problem is that while we have a perfect Bible, there are imperfect people using it—on both sides of the debate.
Misuse Does Not Bar Use
However, the misuse of a doctrine does not prove that it is false.  Nor does the improper use of Scripture prove that there is no proper way to use it.  Upon examination of the evidence, the abuse charge against inerrantists is overreaching.  So far as I can tell, virtually all the scholars I know in the inerrancy movement were engaged in defending inerrancy out of a sincere desire to preserve what they believed was an important part of the Christian Faith.  Often those who speak most vociferously about the errors of another are unaware of their own errors.  Ethics is a double-edged sword, as any neutral observer will detect in reading the above ethical tirade against inerrantists.  Certainly, the charges by non-inerrantists are subject to ethical scrutiny themselves.  For example, is it really conducive to unity, community, and tranquility to charge others with a form of evangelical fratricide, a political instrument for excluding some from the evangelical family, ugly and unbecoming of Christ, a means of asserting power and control, a means of coercion, spiritually dangerous, manipulation, a passive-aggressiveness attack, emotional blackmail, and a disturbing and immoral partnership with power and abuse?  Frankly, I have never seen anything that approaches this kind of unjustified and unethical outburst coming from inerrancy scholars toward those who do not believe in the doctrine.  So, as far as ethics is concerned, the charge of abuse looks like a classic example of the kettle calling the pot black!

The Log in One’s Own Eye
Non-inerrantists are in no position to try to take the ethical speck out of the eye of inerrantists when they have an ethical log in their own eye.  Harold Lindsell pointed out (in The Battle for the Bible) the ethical inconsistency of the Fuller faculty in voting inerrancy out of their doctrinal statement which they had all signed and was still in effect when they were voting it out of existence.  But how could they be against it, if they were on record as being for it.  We know they were for it before they were against it, but how can they be against it when they were for it?  Is there not an ethical commitment to keep a signed document?  When one comes to no longer believe in a doctrinal statement he has signed, then the ethical thing to do is to resign one’s position.  Instead, at Fuller, in ETS, and in organization after organization, those who no longer believe what the framers meant will stay in the group in an attempt to change the doctrinal statement to mean what they want it to mean.  This is a serious ethical breach on the part of non-inerrantists.
Let me use an illustration to make the point.  If one sincerely believes in a flat earth view and later comes to change his mind, what it the ethical thing to do?  It is to resign and join the Round Earth Society.  To stay in the Flat Earth Society and argue that (1) it all depends on how you define flat; (2) from my perspective it looks flat; (3) I have a lot of good friends in the Flat Earth Society with whom I wish to continue fellowship, or (4) the Flat Earth Society allows me to define “flat” the way I would like to do so—to do any of these is disingenuous and unethical.  Yet it is what happened at Fuller and is currently happening at ETS and in many of our Christian institutions today.
An important case in point was in1976 when the ETS Executive Committee confessed that “Some of the members of the Society have expressed the feeling that a measure of intellectual dishonesty prevails among members who do not take the signing of the doctrinal statement seriously.”  Later, an ETS Ad Hoc Committee recognized this problem when it posed the proper question in 1983: “Is it acceptable for a member of the society to hold a view of biblical author’s intent which disagrees with the Founding Fathers and even the majority of the society, and still remain a member in good standing?” (emphasis added).  The Society never said no, leaving the door open for non-inerrantists to come in.  This left a Society in which the members could believe anything they wished to believe about the inerrancy statement, despite what the Framers meant by it.
The ETS Committee further reported that other “members of the Society have come to the realization that they are not in agreement with the creedal statement and have voluntarily withdrawn. That is, in good conscience they could not sign the statement” (1976 Minutes, emphasis added).   This is exactly what all members who no longer believed what the ETS framers believed by inerrancy should have done.  A member who is now allowed to sign the ETS statements but “disagrees with the Founding Fathers” is not acting in “good conscience.”   Thus, it is only a matter of time before the majority of the members disagree with the ETS Founders, and the majority of the Society then officially deviates from its founding concept of inerrancy.  As someone rightly noted, most religious organizations are like a propeller-driven airplane: they will naturally go left unless you deliberately steer them to the right.

No Evidence for Any Specific Charges Ever Given
The Five Views dialogue book contains many sweeping claims of alleged unethical activity by inerrantists, but no specific charges are made against any individual, nor is any evidence for any charges given. Several points should be made in response.
First, even secular courts demand better than this.  They insist on due process.  This means that: (1) Evidence should be provided that any persons who have allegedly violated an established law.  This is particularly true when the charge is murder of a brother!—“fratricide.”  In the absence of such evidence against any particular person or group, the charge should be dropped, and the accusers should apologize for using the word or other words like demonize, blackmail, or bullying.  (2) Specifics should be given of the alleged crime.  Who did it?  What did they do?  Does it match the alleged crime?  The failure of non-inerrantists to do this is an unethical, divisive, and destructive way to carry on a “dialogue” on the topic, to say nothing of doing justice on the matter.  Those who use such terms about other brothers in Christ, rather than sticking to the issue of a valid critique of deviant views, are falling far short of the biblical exhortation to speak the truth in love (Eph 4:15).

The Robert Gundy Case
The so-called “Gundry—Geisler” issue is a case in point.  First, ethical charges by non-inerrantists reveal an offensive bias in narrowing it down to one inerrantist in opposition to Gundry when in fact there were was a massive movement in opposition to Gundry’s position, including founders of ETS.  Indeed, the membership vote to ask him to leave the society was an overwhelming 70%.  Even though I was an eyewitness of the entire process, I never observed hard feelings expressed between Gundy and those asking for his resignation before, during, or after the issue.
Long-time Dean of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Dr. Kenneth Kantzer was the first one to express concern about the issue to me.  An ETS founder, Roger Nicole made the motion for Gundry’s resignation with deep regret.  Knowing I was a framer of the CSBI statement, Gundry personally encouraged me to enter the discussion, saying, he did not mind the critique of his view because he had “thick skin” and did not take it personally.  So, to make charges of ethical abuse against those who opposed Gundry’s “dehistoricizing” (see CSBI, Article 18) of the Gospel record is to turn an important doctrinal discussing into a personal attack and it is factually unfounded and ethically unjustified.
Second, the CSBI principles called for an ethical use of the inerrancy doctrine. CSBI framers were careful to point out that “Those who profess faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior are called to show the reality of their discipleship humbly and faithfully obeying God’s written Word.  To stray from Scripture in faith or conduct is disloyalty to our Master” (Preamble to CSBI).  It also acknowledges that “submission to the claims of God’s own Word…marks true Christian faith.”  Further, “those who confess this doctrine often deny it in life by failing to bring our thoughts and deeds, our traditions and habits, into true subjection to the Divine Word” (ibid.).  The framers of CSBI added, “We offer this statement in a spirit, not of contention, but of humility and love, which we purpose by Gods’ grace to maintain in any future dialogue arising out of what we have said” (ibid.).  To my knowledge, the ETS procedure on the Gundry issue was in accord with these principles, and none of the participants of the Five Views book provided any evidence that anyone violated these procedures.
Third, in none of the ETS articles, papers, or official presentations was Robert Gundry attacked personally or demeaned. The process to ask him to resign was a lawful one of principle and not a personal issue, and the parties on both sides recognized and respected this distinction.  Anyone who had any evidence to the contrary should have come forward a long time ago or forever held his peace.
Fourth, as for all the parties on the inerrancy discussion over Gundry’s views, I know of none who did not like Gundry as a person or did not respect him as a scholar, including myself.  In fact, I later invited him to participate with a group of New Testament scholars in Dallas (which he accepted), and I have often cited him in print as an authority on the New Testament and commended his excellent book defending, among other things, the physical nature of the resurrection body (Gundry, Soma in Biblical Theology, Cambridge, 1976).
Fifth, the decision on Gundry’s views was not an unruly act done in the dark of night with a bare majority.  It was done by a vast majority in the light of day in strict accordance with the rules stated in the ETS policies.  It was not hurried since it took place over a two year period.  It involves numerous articles pro and con published in the ETS journal (JETS) as well as dozens of ETS papers and discussions.  In short, it was fully and slowly aired in an appropriate and scholarly manner.
Sixth, the final decision was by no means a close call by the membership.  It passed with a decisive majority of 70% of the members.   So, any charge of misuse of authority in the Gundry case is factually mistaken and ethically misdirected.
Since there are no real grounds for the ethical charges against those who opposed Gundry’s views on inerrancy, one has to ask why the non-inerrantists are so stirred up over the issue as to make excessive charges like blackmail, demonize, or fratricide?  Could it be that many of them hold similar views to Gundry and are afraid that they may be called on the carpet next?  As the saying goes, when a stone is tossed down an alley, the dog that squeals the loudest is the one that got hit!  We do know this: there is some circumstantial evidence to support this possibility, for many of the most vociferous opponents are the ones who do not accept the ICBI statement on inerrancy or they called for either modification or destruction of it.  For example, Enns argues “inerrancy should be amended accordingly or, in my view, scrapped altogether” (Enns, 84).  But it has been reported that he himself left Westminster Theological Seminary under a cloud involving a doctrinal dispute that involved inerrancy.  And as fellow participant of the Five Ways book, John Franke, put it: “His title makes it clear that after supporting it [inerrancy] for many years as a faculty member at Westminster Theological Seminary…. In reading his essay, I can’t shake the impression that Enns is still in reaction to his departure from Westminster and the controversy his work has created among evangelicals” (Franke, 137)
Putting aside the specifics of the Gundry case, what can be said about ethics of inerrantists as charged by the participants of the Five Views dialogue?  Allow me to respond to some specific issues that have been raised against inerrancy by non-inerrantists.

Does the Abuse of Inerrancy Invalidate the Doctrine of Inerrancy?
Most scholars on both sides of this debate recognize that the answer is “No.”  Abusing marriage does not make marriage wrong.  The evil use of language does not make language evil.  And abusing inerrancy by some does not make it wrong for all to believe it.  Even if one would speak truth in an unloving way, it would not make it false.  Likewise, one can speak error in a loving way, but it does not make it true.  Of course, we should always try to “speak the truth in love” (Eph 4:15).  But when the truth is not spoken in love it does not transform the truth into an error.  Accordingly, Vanhoozer rightly wondered whether “Enns, too quickly identifies the concept of inerrancy itself with its aberrations and abuses” (Vanhoozer, 302).

Is Animated Debate Necessarily Contrary to Christian Love?
Even the editors of the Five Ways book, who spent considerable time promoting harmony in doctrinal discussions, admit that the two are not incompatible.  They claim: “There is a place for well-reasoned, lucid, and spirited argumentation” (Merrick, 312). They add, “Certainly, debate over concepts and ideas involve[s] description, analysis, and clear reasoning” (Merrick, 316).  Indeed, the apostle Paul “reasoned’ with the Jews from the Scriptures (Acts 17:2) and tried to “persuade Jews and Greek” (Acts 18:4).  He taught Church leaders “to rebuke” those who contradict sound doctrine (Titus 1:9).  Jude urged believes to “contend for the Faith” (v.3).  In view of Peter’s defection, Paul “opposed him to his face” (Gal 2:11). Indeed, Paul and Barnabas “had no small dissension and debate” with the legalists from Judea (Acts 15:2). Sometimes, a refutation or even a rebuke is the most loving thing one can do to defend the truth.
Our supreme example, Jesus, certainly did not hesitate to use strong words and to take strong actions against his opponent’s views and actions (Matt 23; John 2:15‒17).  There are in fact times when a vigorous debate is necessary against error.  Love—tough love—demands it.  All of these activities can occur within the bound of Christian.  John Calvin and Martin Luther were certainly no theological pansies when it came to defending the truth of the Christian Faith.  But by the standards of conduct urged by non-inerrantists, there would have been no orthodox creeds and certainly no Reformation. And should any knowledgeable evangelical charge the Reformers with being unethical because they vigorously defended Scripture or salvation by faith alone?  Of course not!
Should Unity Be Put Above Orthodox?
One of the fallacies of the anti-inerrancy movement is the belief that unity should be sought at all cost.  Apparently no one told this to the apostle Paul who defended Christianity against legalism or to Athanasius who defended the deity of Christ against Arius, even though it would split those who believed in the deity of Christ from those, like Arius and his followers, who denied it.  The truth is, when it comes to essential Christian doctrine, it would be better to be divided by the truth than to be united by error.  If every doctrinal dispute, including those on the Trinity, deity of Christ, and inspiration of Scripture, used the unity over orthodoxy principle that one hears so much about in current inerrancy debate, then there would be not much orthodox Christian Faith left.  As Rupertus Meldinius (d. 1651) put it, “in essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty, and in all things, charity.”  But as we saw above, the inerrancy of Scripture is an essential doctrine of the Christian Faith because all other doctrines are based on it.  So, it is epistemologically fundamental to all other biblical teachings.

Is it Improper to Place Scholarly Articles on the Internet?
Some have objected to carrying on a scholarly discussion on the Internet, as opposed to using scholarly journals.   My articles on Mike Licona’s denial of inerrancy (see www.normgeisler.com/articles) were subject to this kind of charge.  However, given the electronic age in which we live, this is an archaic charge.  Dialogue is facilitated by the Internet, and responses can be made much more quickly and by more people.  Further, much of the same basic material posted on the Internet was later published in printed scholarly journals.
In a November 18, 2012 paper for The Evangelical Philosophical Society, Mike Licona speaks of his critics saying “bizarre” things like “bullying” people around, of having “a cow” over his view, and of engaging in a “circus” on the Internet.  Further, he claims that scholarly critics of his views were “targeting” him and “taking actions against” him. He speaks about those who have made scholarly criticisms of his view as “going on a rampage against a brother or sister in Christ.” And he compares it to the statement of Ammianus Marcellinus who wrote, “no wild beasts are such dangerous enemies to man as Christians are to one another.”   Licona complained about critics of his view, saying, “I’ve been very disappointed to see the ungodly behavior of a few of my detractors. The theological bullying, the termination and internal intimidation put on a few professors in SBC…all this revealed the underbelly of fundamentalism.”  He charged that I made contacts with seminary leaders in an attempt to get him kicked out of his positions on their staff.  The truth is that I made no such contacts for no such purposes.  To put it briefly, it is strange that we attack those who defend inerrancy and defend those who attack inerrancy.
While it is not unethical to use the Internet for scholarly articles, it wrong to make the kind of unethical response that was given to the scholarly articles such as that in the above citations. Such name-calling has no place in a scholarly dialogue.  Calling the defense of inerrancy an act of “bullying” diminishes their critic, not them.  Indeed, calling one’s critic a “tar baby” and labeling their actions as “ungodly behavior” is a classic example of how not to defend one’s view against its critics.
What is more, while Licona condemned the use of the Internet to present scholarly critiques of his view as a “circus,” he refused to condemn an offensive YouTube cartoon produced by his son-in-law and his friend that offensively caricatured my critique of his view as that of a theological “Scrooge.”  Even Southern Evangelical Seminary (where Licona was once a faculty member before this issue arose) condemned this approach in a letter from “the office of the president,” saying, “We believe this video was totally unnecessary and is in extremely poor taste” (Letter, 12/9/2011).  One influential alumnus wrote the school, saying, “It was immature, inappropriate and distasteful” and recommended that “whoever made this video needs to pull it down and apologize for doing it” (Letter, 12/21/2011). The former president of the SES student body declared: “I’ll be honest that video was outright slander and worthy of punishment. I was quite angry after watching it” (Letter, 12/17/2011).  This kind of unapologetic use of the Internet by those who deny the CSBI view of inerrancy of the Bible is uncalled for and unethical.  It does the perpetrators and their cause against inerrancy no good.

Is Disciplinary Action Sometimes called for in Organizations like ETS?
“Judge not” is a mantra of our culture, and it has penetrated evangelical circles as well.  But ironically, even that statement is a judgment.  Rational and moral people must make judgments all the time.  This is true in theology as well as in society.  Further, discipline on doctrinal matters is not unprecedented in ETS.  Indeed, the ETS By Laws provide for such action, saying: “A member whose writings or teachings have been challenged at an annual business meeting as incompatible with the Doctrinal Basis of the Society, upon majority vote, shall have his case referred to the executive committee, before whom he and his accusers shall be given full opportunity to discuss his views and the accusations. The executive committee shall then refer his case to the Society for action at the annual business meeting the following year.  A two-thirds majority vote of those present and voting shall be necessary for dismissal from membership” (Article 4, Section 4). This procedure was followed carefully in the Robert Gundry case.
In point of fact, the ETS has expressed an interest in monitoring and enforcing its doctrinal statement on inerrancy from the beginning.  The official ETS minutes record the following:
1.  In 1965, ETS Journal policy demanded a disclaimer and rebuttal of Dan Fuller’s article denying factual inerrancy published in the ETS Bulletin. They insisted that, “that an article by Dr. Kantzer be published simultaneously with the article by Dr. Fuller and that Dr. Schultz include in that issue of the Bulletin a brief explanation regarding the appearance of a view point different from that of the Society” (1965).
2.  In 1965, speaking of some who held “Barthian” views of Scripture, the Minutes of the ETS Executive Committee read: “President Gordon Clark invited them to leave the society.”
3. The 1970 Minutes of ETS affirm that “Dr. R. H. Bube for three years signed his membership form with a note on his own interpretation of infallibility. The secretary was instructed to point out that it is impossible for the Society to allow each member an idiosyncratic interpretation of inerrancy, and hence Dr. Bube is to be requested to sign his form without any qualifications, his own integrity in the matter being entirely respected” (emphasis added). This reveals efforts by ETS to protect and preserve the integrity of its doctrinal statement.
4. In 1983, by a 70% majority vote of the membership, Robert Gundry was asked to resign from ETS for his views based on Jewish midrash genre by which he held that sections of Matthew’s Gospel were not historical, such as the story of the Magi (Matt 2:1‒12).
5. In the early 2000s, while I was still a member of the ETS Executive Committee, a majority voted not to allow a Roman Catholic to join ETS largely on the testimony of one founder (Roger Nicole) who claimed that the ETS doctrinal statement on inerrancy was meant to exclude Roman Catholics.
6. In 2003, by a vote of 388 to 231 (nearly 63%) the ETS expressed its position that Clark Pinnock’s views were contrary to the ETS doctrinal statement on inerrancy.  This failed the needed two-third majority to expel him from the society, but it revealed a strong majority who desired to monitor and enforce the doctrinal statement.
Finally, preserving the identity and integrity of any organization calls for doctrinal discipline on essential matters.  Those organizations which neglect doing this are doomed to self-destruction.

Should an Inerrantist Break Fellowship with a Non-Inerrantist over Inerrancy?
The ICBI did not believe that inerrancy should be a test for evangelical fellowship.  It declared: “We deny that such a confession is necessary for salvation” (CSBI, Art. 19).  And “we do not propose that his statement be given creedal weight” (CSBI, Preamble).  In short, it is not a test of evangelical authenticity, but of evangelical consistency.  One can be saved without believing in inerrancy.  So, holding to inerrancy is not a test of spiritual fellowship; it is a matter of theological consistency.  Brothers in Christ can fellowship on the basis of belonging to the same spiritual family, without agreeing on all non-salvific doctrines, even some very important ones like inerrancy.  In view of this, criticizing inerrantist of evangelical “fratricide” seriously misses the mark and itself contributes to disunity in the body of evangelical believers. Indeed, in the light of the evidence, the ethical charge against inerrantists seriously backfired.

Conclusion
In actuality, the Five Views book is basically a two views book: only one person (Al Mohler) unequivocally supports the standard historic view of total inerrancy expressed in the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (CSBI), and the other four participants do not.  They varied in their rejection from those who presented a more friendly tone, but undercut inerrancy with their alien philosophical premises (Kevin Vanhoozer) to those who are overtly antagonistic to it (Peter Enns).
There was little new in the arguments against the CSBI view of total inerrancy, most of which has been responded to by inerrantists down through the centuries into modern times.  However, a new emphasis did emerge in the repeated charge about the alleged unethical behavior of inerrantists.  But, as already noted, this is irrelevant to the truth of the doctrine of inerrancy.  Further, there is some justification for the suspicion that attacks on the person, rather than the issue, are because non-inerrantists are running out of real ammunition to speak to the issue itself in a biblical and rational way.
In short, after careful examination of the Five Views book, the biblical arguments of the non-inerrantists were found to be unsound, their theological arguments were unjustified, their historical arguments were unfounded, their philosophical arguments were unsubstantiated, and their ethical arguments were often outrageous.  Nevertheless, there were some good insights in the book, primarily in Al Mohler’s sections and from time to time in the other places, as noted above.  However, in its representation of the ETS/ICBI view of total inerrancy, the book was seriously imbalanced in format, participants, and discussion.  The two professors who edited the book (J. Merrick and Stephen Garrett) were particularly biased in the way the issue was framed by them, as well in many of their comments.

Were the Gospel Writers Reporting or Creating the Words of Christ?


Were the Gospel Writers Reporting or Creating the Words of Christ?

Photo Model or Portrait Model

               

By Norman L. Geisler

 

Imagery can be helpful or dangerous.  Until relatively recent times most New Testament scholars believed the Gospel writers were giving something like snap shot images of the words and deeds of Christ.  However, contemporary literary criticism rejects the “Photo” model and has replaced it with a “Portrait” model.  This, they think, fits better with data and the creativity of the Gospel writers who, they believe, were not strictly reporting but were interpreting, even creating, the words and deeds of Christ.

 

The Difficulties of the Photo Model

Several lines of evidence have been used to support this change of images from the snap shot to the portrait image.  Together, they are used to reject the strict reporting model for a more flexible model which they believe fits the biblical evidence better.

First, there is the obvious fact that the various Gospels do not present the same material (words and deeds) about Christ.  There are many significant differences.  With the exception of some main events like the death and resurrection narratives, there are few events mentioned in all four Gospels and many events are recorded only in one Gospel.

Second, there are known conflicts between the different Gospel presentations.  Jesus’ cleansing of the temple is presented at different times in his ministry, one early (Jn. 2:13-17) and one late (Mt. 21:12-13).  The order of the three temptations of Christ are different between Matthew 4 and Luke 4.  How Judas died is presented as by hanging in Matthew 27:5, but by falling and bursting open in Acts 1:18.  The number of angels at the tomb is one in Matthew (27:5) but two in John (20:12).  Different words come from the thieves on the cross, one railing at him (Mt. 27:44) and the other defending him (Lk. 24:4-42).

Third, the actual quotations of Jesus on the same occasion are often listed differently in different Gospels.  This includes important events like the inscription on the Cross which is reported four different ways in the four Gospels.  Also, the confession of Peter which is stated three different ways.  So, it is argued that if the Gospel writers were giving us photographs of the events, then these would all be the same, but they are not.

Some words appear to be added to Jesus’ sayings.  For example, John uses “verily, verily” (e.g., 1:51; 3:3, 5, 11 [KJV] or “truly, truly” [ESV] or many sayings of Jesus which are not found in the first three Gospels.  Since it is widely believed that John wrote last, it is argued that Jesus never used this phrase (or these sayings) but that John put it into Jesus’ mouth.

The Dangers of the Portrait Model

            Problems like these have led many scholars to think that the Gospel writers were painting a portrait, rather than giving snaps shots.  However, when the “portrait” model is examined closely, it has some serious difficulties of its own.

First, the portrait image does not account well for the many parts of the Gospel that are virtually identical.  This is true, not only of the order and nature of many events, but also of the actual words that Jesus and others used.  Many scholars point to the similarities of the first three Gospels (called Synoptic Gospels).  For example of the 1068 verses in Matthew about 500 overlap with Mark’s 661 verses.  Of Luke’s 1149 verses about 320 overlap with Mark.  In fact, there are only 50-55 verses unique to Mark (W.G. Scroggie, A Guide to the Gospels, 86).  Why would different portraits have so many overlaps that are the same?

Second, the Gospel writers were careful to distinguish their own words from the words of Jesus.  This is what makes it relatively easy to produce a red letter edition of the Gospels (with Jesus’ words in red).  The distinction is clear enough that almost all red-letter editions of the Gospels are the same with only minor exceptions.

Third, the portrait image leaves room for contradictions in the Gospel (which many NT scholars believe) since different portraits done by different persons do not always complement each other in every detail.  But if the Gospels are the divinely inspired Word of God, then how can they have contradictions and errors in them?  God cannot err (Heb. 6:18), and if the Gospels are the Word of God, then they cannot err either. So, the portrait model is in conflict with the inerrancy of Scripture.

Fourth, the portrait image lends to the view that the Gospel writers were not really reporting but rather were creating Jesus’ words and deeds.  But if this is so, then how can we know what Jesus really said and did?

  Ipsissima Verba (Same Words) vs. Ipsissima Vox (Same Meaning)?

If the Gospels are neither snap shots nor portraits, then what are they?  And how accurately do they portray the real Jesus and his actual words and deeds?  Before we attempt to answer this specifically, we need to speak to the matter of the Gospel’s reliability.  Several lines of evidence lead us to believe that the Gospels are historically reliable:

(1) We have some early records by eye-witnesses of the events.  John and Peter were eyewitnesses of events in Jesus’ life.  John said: “The man who saw it [the crucifixion] has given testimony, and his testimony is true” (Jn. 19:35). “This is the disciple who testifies to these things and who wrote them down. We know that his testimony is true” (Jn. 21:24).  “That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked at and our hands have touched—this we proclaim concerning the Word of life” (1John 1:1). This is about as clear an eye-witness testimony as one can give.

Peter reported: “We did not follow cleverly invented stories [myths] when we told you about the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty” (2 Peter 1:16). “We did not follow cleverly invented stories [myths] when we told you about the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty” (2 Peter 1:16).  “To the elders among you, I appeal as a fellow elder, a witness of Christ’s suffering and one who also will share in the glory to be revealed” (1 Peter 5:1). Peter and John said, “God has raised this Jesus to life, and we are all witnesses of the fact” (Acts 2:32).Peter and John replied…. For we cannot help speaking about what we have seen and heard” (Acts 4:19-20). “We are witnesses of everything he did in the country of the Jews and Jerusalem.  They killed him by hanging him on a tree, but God raised him from the dead on the third day and caused him to be seen” (Acts 10:39-40).

Paul, an apostle and eye witness of the resurrection of Christ (1 Cor. 9:1; 15:8) wrote many New Testament books, including four that even most Bible critics accept as authentic (1and 2 Corinthians, Romans, and Galatians).  He declared:  For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures,  that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve.  Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep.  Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles.  Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me” (1 Cor. 15:3-8).  Even critical scholars believe this was written by A.D. 55-57 when almost all the apostles and chief eyewitness were still alive who could verify the main events of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.  Given this fact, this text is a powerful testimony to the fact that Paul was reporting, not creating, the events of which he spoke.

(2) Further, there were multiple eye-witnesses for many of the events, including the most crucial ones like the death and resurrection of Christ.  Indeed, there are 27 New Testament books which have traditionally been ascribed to nine different authors (Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Paul, Peter, James, Jude, and the writer of Hebrews (though some believe Paul wrote it). Jesus’ death, for example, is listed in every Gospel (Mt. 27; Mk. 15; Luke 23; John 19) and in most of the NT books, as is his resurrection (e.g., Mt. 28; Mk. 16; Lk. 24; John 20-21; 1 Cor. 15).  But having two or more reliable witnesses of the same discourse or event is accepted in court as sufficient evidence to convict the accused of the crime.  Indeed, the Law of Moses records that at the mouth of two or three witnesses one can be sentenced to death (Deut. 17:6).

(3) We have other NT books that were written by contemporaries of the eyewitnesses.  Luke wrote: “Inasmuch as many have undertaken to compile a narrative of the things that have been accomplished among us, just as those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word have delivered them to us, it seemed good to me also, having followed all things closely for some time past, to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, that you may have certainty concerning the things you have been taught” (Lk. 1:1-4). Clearly Luke claimed to be reporting actual history.  

The writer of Hebrews said, “How shall we escape if we neglect such a great salvation? It was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard [him],  while God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his will” (Heb. 2:3-4 cf.  13:23, emphasis added).

(4) Numerous persons mentioned in the New Testament are known to have lived during that time period.  Luke provided historical crosshairs for a first-century eye-witness setting when he wrote:   “In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar—when Pontius Pilate was governor of Judea, Herod tetrarch of Galilee, his brother Philip tetrarch of Iturea and Traconitis, and Lysanias tetrarch of Abilene—during the high priesthood of Annas and Caiaphas, the word of God came to John son of Zechariah in the desert” (Luke 3:1-2). It is noteworthy that: 1) An exact date is given–A. D. 29.  2)  All eight people are known from history.  3)  All were known to live at this exact time. 4) Clearly this is not a “once-upon-a-time” legend but real history based on contemporary eye-witness testimony.  All together there are some 30 persons mentioned in the NT that are known from extra-biblical sources to have lived at that time (see Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels).

(5) Many legal authorities have supported the credibility of the Gospel writers.  After applying the principles for testing the validity of a witness testimony to the New Testament, one of the greatest attorney’s in early America, Simon Greenleaf, Professor of Law at Harvard University, wrote:“The narratives of the evangelists are now submitted to the reader’s perusal and examination, upon the principles and by the rules already stated…. If they had thus testified on oath, in a court of justice, they would be entitled to credit; and whether their narratives, as we now have them, would be received as ancient documents, coming from the proper custody.  If so, then it is believed that every honest and impartial man will act consistently with that result, by receiving their testimony in all the extent of its import” (see Simon Greenleaf, The Testimony of the Evangelists, 53-54).

Many other attorneys have had similar experiences, including Thomas Sherlock, The Tryal of the Witnesses of the Resurrection; Frank Morrison,Who Moved the Stone? John Montgomery, Christianity and History; Lee Strobel, The Case for Christ; J.W. Wallace, Cold-Case Christianty.

(6) Early non-Christian writers have confirmed the historicity of many of the main events mentioned in the Gospels such as:  (1)  Jesus was from Nazareth;  (2)  He lived a virtuous life; (3)  He performed unusual feats;  (4)  He introduced new teaching contrary to Judaism;  (5)  He was crucified under Pontius Pilate;  (6)  His disciples believed He rose from the dead; (7)  His disciples denied polytheism; (8)  His disciples worshiped Him; (9)  His teachings and disciples spread rapidly; (10)  His followers believed they were immortal; (11)  His followers had contempt for death; (12)  His followers renounced material goods (see F.F. Bruce, Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New Testament).

The following chart summarizes the non-Christian source and the events of Jesus’ life that were confirmed:

Non-Christian Sources within 150 Years of Jesus

 

 

 

 

Source

 

 

 

 

AD

Existed Virtuous Worship Disciples Teacher Crucified Empty Tomb Disciples’

Belief in Resurrection

Spread Persecution
Tacitus 115 X X X X X X
Suetonius 117-138 X X X X X X
Josephus 90-95 X X X X X X X X X
Thallus 52 X X*
Pliny 112 X X X X X* X X
Trajan 112? X* X X X X
Hadrian 117-138 X* X X X
Talmud 70-200 X X X
Toledoth Jesu 5thCentury X X
Lucian 2ndCentury X X X X X X
Mara Bar-Scrapion 1st – 3rdCenturies X X X X X X*
Phlegon 80? X X X X

* implied

 

7)  Roman historians, who are experts in first century events, have confirmed the reliability of the Gospels.  Noted Roman historian, A. N. Sherwin-White, wrote: “So it is astonishing that while Greco-Roman historians have been growing confidence, the twentieth-century study of the gospel narratives, starting from no less promising material, have taken so gloomy a turn in the development of form-criticism…that the historical Christ is unknowable and the history of his mission cannot be written. This seems very curious.”  He calls the mythological view “unbelievable” (A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Society and Roman Law in the NT, 187, 189).

Another first century scholar, Colin Hemer, demonstrated the accuracy of Luke on nearly 100 details of history and geography in his book, Acts in the Setting of Hellenic History (1990).  These included (1) Minute geographical details known to the readers; (2) Specialized details known only to special groups; (3) Specifics of not widely known routes, places, and officials; (4)  Correlation of dates in Acts with general history; ( 5) Details appropriate to that period but not others; (6)  Events which reflects a sense of “immediacy”; (7) Idioms and culture that bespeak of a first-hand awareness; (8) Verification of numerous details of times, people, and  events of that period best known by contemporaries.  This same author (Luke), known for his historical accuracy, also wrote the Gospel of Luke (cf. Luke 1:1 and Acts 1:1).

(8) Archaeology has supported many New Testament events (see Joe Holden,The  Popular Handbook of Archaeology and the Bible, 2013).  Noted biblical archaeologist, Nelson Glueck wrote: “As a matter of fact, however, it may be stated categorically that no archaeological discovery has ever controverted a biblical reference.  Scores of archaeological findings have been made which confirm in clear outline or exact detail historical statements in the Bible” (Nelson Glueck, Rivers in the Desert, 31). Some of the NT places or events confirmed by archaeology include: (1) Bethlehem, the birthplace of Jesus; (2) A coin of Caesar Augustus, during whose reign Jesus was born; (3) Tomb of King Herod who attempted to kill baby Jesus; (4) Pool of Siloam where Jesus performed a miracle; (5) Foundation wall of outer court of the temple where Jesus taught; (6) A bone of a crucifixion victim (with a nail in it) who died like Jesus did; (7) Inscription of Pontius Pilate who condemned Jesus to death; (8) Ossuary of Caiaphas the high priest who tried Jesus; (9) Ossuary box of  “James, son of Joseph, brother of Jesus”;[1] (10) Arch of Titus who destroyed Jerusalem in A.D. 70 showing the Jewish minora being carried away.

Reviewing the archaeological evidence for the Bible, even a secular magazine wrote:  “In extraordinary ways, modern archaeology has affirmed the historical core of the Old and New Testaments—corroborating key portions of the stories of Israel’s patriarchs, the Exodus, the Davidic monarchy, and the life and times of Jesus” (Jeffery Sheler “Is the Bible True,” US News & World Report, October 25, 1999, p. 52).

The Accuracy of the Gospel Records

Now some of these testimonies speak only to the credibility of the overall history of the main events in the New Testament (namely, points 5-9 above).  However, some of them speak directly to the accuracy of the words of Jesus (namely, points 1-4).  But even here the question remains as to whether we have the exact words of Jesus?  Before we can answer this specifically, we must remember that Jesus probably spoke Aramaic (cf. Mt. 27:46 cf. Mk. 7:34) and the New Testament was penned in Greek.  So, at best we have only a translation of most of the words of Jesus.  So, the question boils down to this: Do we have a good translation of the words of Jesus in the Gospels?   

Many Reasons the Records are Accurate.—Admittedly, while we do not in most cases have the exact words of Jesus (ipsissima verba), there is good reason to believe that we do have the true meaning of them (ipsissima vox) for several reasons: 1) the NT documents were based on eye-witness accounts by persons who knew both Aramaic and Greek  so they would know if they were translated correctly; 2) we have multiple accounts of many of the same discourses to cross-check their accuracy; 3) Luke claims to be giving an accurate account of the events (Lk. 1:1-4), and his account in Acts has been confirmed to be accurate in multiple details (see Colin Hemer, ibid.); 4) Many of the accounts were written within the memories of the eyewitnesses (c. A.D. 55-70); 5) Some of the New Testament writers were trained in keeping records (Matthew was a tax collector; Luke was a physician; Paul was highly educated);  6) Many in the non-literary New Testament culture had well developed memories (see Richard Bauckham,Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, chaps. 11-13);  7) Jesus’ words and deeds were impact events that would have been etched on the memories of those who heard him. 8) Jesus promised he would guide the memories of his disciples in recalling what he said to them: “But the Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you” (John 14:26).  This cumulative evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the New Testament provides an accurate report of what Jesus actually said and did.

What About Different Words for the Same Events?–  As for cases where the Gospel records the same event in slightly different words, the differences are accounted for by (a) selection of material, (b) partial reports, (c) abbreviations, (d) paraphrase, or (e) collation in the text.  But in no case are there demonstrated distortions present. A few examples will illustrate the points.  For instance, the words on the Cross are reported four different ways, but merged together they give a harmonious message:

Matthew-   THIS IS JESUS                           THE KING OF THE JEWS.

Mark –                                                            THE KING OF THE JEWS.

Luke –          THIS IS                                       THE KING OF THE JEWS.

John –                      JESUS OF NAZARETH THE KING OF THE JEWS.

[Together]  THIS IS JESUS OF NAZARETH THE KING OF THE JEWS.

 

Another example of differences is Peter’s confession which is given in three different sets of words:

Mt. 16:16:  “You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God.”

Mark 8:29:  “You are the Christ.”

Luke 9:20:   “[You are] the Christ of God

Here Matthew gives the whole statement and Mark and Luke only the main part of it. But there is no distortion of the message, each one presented the part that he wanted to emphasize.

What About Phrases and Sayings Found only in John. As noted above, John uses phrases like “verily, verily” [or “truly, truly”] that are not found in the other three Gospels. But this posed no real problem since: 1) there are no parallels in the other Gospels; 2) Jesus used the term “verily” in other Gospels (e.g., Mt.5:18, 26; 6:2, 5, 16). 3) He may have used the doubling effect on these other occasions for emphasis; 4) when there is a direct parallel between what Jesus said in John and in another Gospels the words of Jesus are identical.  For example, Jesus said, “Take up your bed and walk” in Mark 2:11 and John 5:8).  He said, “It is I.  Do not be afraid” in both Mark 6:50 and Jn. 6:20).  And in both Luke and John Jesus said to the disciples, “Peace be with you” (Lk. 24:36 cf. Jn. 20:19).  5) Final, if phases and saying must e rejected because they do not appear in two or more Gospels, then whole stories must be rejected because they are mentioned only in one Gospel (e.g., Turning water to wine—Jn. 2; Nicodemus—Jn. 3; the Samaritan woman—Jn. 4; the raising of Lazarus—Jn. 11; Zacchaeus—Lk. 19; the visit of the Wise men—Mt. 2; the resurrection of the saints–Mt. 27, and many others.

So What is It: Photos or Portraits?

Strictly speaking it is neither one since neither photos nor portraits since the New Testament is a written record and not a visual one.  However, granted the differences in these two types of representations, the Gospel record is more like a series of snap shots than it is like different portraits.   However, on occasion the snap shots are at different angles with different lighting or through different lenses.

(1) For example, an eye witness of Jesus’ tomb standing at one place may have seen only one angel (Mt. 24:5), namely, the one angel who was at the head of corpse, but another eyewitness standing farther into the tomb was able to see both of them (Jn. 20:12). To be sure, the snap shots are from different angles and reveal different perspectives, but they are still accurate pictures of what Jesus actually said and did and what the witnesses saw.  They are not interpretive creations of different writers (artists) who are creating the “Christ” they want the audience to see.  Rather, by selective photographs at different angles, each Gospel writer reported (not created) the real Christ in a manner that emphasizes a different aspect of his multi-faceted mission.

In the case of Judas, the snap shots were at different times.  The first snap shot was when he hanged himself (Mt. 27:5), and the second snap shot was later after his body had fallen from the place of hanging to the rocky ground and burst open (Acts 1:18).

The different words came from the thieves on the cross at different times. At first both thieves were railing at Christ (Mt. 27:44).  However, later on, after seeing how Jesus forgave those who were crucifying him (“Father forgive them…,”—Lk. 23:34), one thieves repented and defended Christ (Lk. 23:40-42).  His request to be remembered when Jesus came into Jesus’ kingdom was granted to him that very day (Lk. 23:43).

(2) Sometimes a different lens is used.  For example, from a Jewish time perspective (lens), Jesus was crucified on the “third hour” (Mark 15:25) which was 9 a.m. Roman time.  But John mentions that Jesus was still before Pilate at the “sixth hour” (Jn. 19:14) which twelve noon Jewish time but was 6 a.m. Roman time (see A.T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the NT: The Fourth Gospel, vol. 5, p. 299) before the crucifixion started.  A conflict occurs only when one is looking through the wrong time-lens.  In reality there is no conflict.

(3) In Matthew 9:18 Jairus told Jesus that “My daughter has just died.” But in Mark and Luke Jairus told Jesus she was only “at the point of death” (Mk 5:23) but not yet dead.  Luke said she was only “dying” but not yet dead (Lk. 8:42). Then, “while he [Jairus] was still speaking, someone from the ruler’s house came and said, ‘Your daughter is dead’” (Lk. 8:49). The fact is that they were all right but were speaking about different times.  Matthew just combines the snap shots given by Mark and Luke in one frame, but what he said was literally true.

(4) Sometimes there is a topical rearrangement of the snapshots in order to fit the theme of the Gospel writer.  For example, Luke gives a different order of the temptation events than is found in Matthew. Matthew lists them as the temptation (1) to turn stones into bread, (2) to jump from the pinnacle of the temple, and (3) to worship Satan.  But Luke reverses the last two.  This fits both the grammar of the text and the purpose of Luke.  Matthew uses the words “then” and “again” (4:5, 8) which indicate a chronological order, while Luke uses only “and” (Lk. 4:5, 9) to connect the events.  So, Matthew lists them chronologically but Luke puts them climactically or topically, possibly to end on the high note of Jesus’ victory over Satan.

(5) Sometimes there are repeated events like the cleansing of the temple.  One occurred at the beginning of Jesus’ ministry (Jn. 2), and the other happened nearer to the end of his ministry (Mt. 21) several years later.  The fact that different reasons are given for Jesus’ action may indicate that they are two different events.  In John (2:16) it is because they made his Father’s house “a house of trade.”  But in Matthew (21:13) it was because they made it “a den of robbers.”  And in each case a different verse is quoted.  Matthew speaks of it being “a house of prayer” (21:13), but John cites the verse, “The zeal for your House will consume me” (2:17).  As one commentator pointed out, it is not unlikely that a similar condition and response of the Lord of the temple should have occurred again several years later (See Elliott’s Commentary on the Bible, vol. 6, p. 129).  Other noted commentators have lent support to this view of two cleansings of the temple (see Henderickson, Morris, and D. A. Carson).  So, there is no reason to believe that John created a second cleansing, as opposed to reported it.

 

  A Fatal Flaw—Genre Criticism

It is common today, even among many evangelical scholars, to accept that the Gospels were written in a Greco-Roman literary genre.  One such scholar argues that “the Gospels belong to the genre of Greco-Roman biography (bios)” and that “Bioi offered the ancient biographer great flexibility for rearranging material and inventing speeches…, and they often include legend.”  But, he adds “because bios was a flexible genre, it is often difficult to determine where history ends and legend begins” (M. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 34, emphasis added). This led him to deny the historicity of the story of the resurrection of the saints in Matthew 27:51-53 (ibid.,527-528; 548; 552-553), and to doubt the authenticity of other events (ibid., 185-186, 306).

Later, in a debate with Bart Ehrman (at Southern Evangelical Seminary in the Spring 2009), Licona claimed there was a contradiction in the Gospels as to the day of Jesus’ crucifixion.  He said, “I think that John probably altered the day [of Jesus’ crucifixion] in order for a theological—to make a theological point here.”   Then in a professional transcription of a YouTube video on November 23, 2012 (see http://youtu.be/TJ8rZukh_Bc), Mike Licona affirmed the following:  “So um this didn’t really bother me in terms of if there were contradictions in the Gospels.  I mean I believe in biblical inerrancy but I also realized that biblical inerrancy is not one [of the] fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The resurrection is.  So if Jesus rose from the dead, Christianity is still true even if it turned out that some things in the Bible weren’t. So um it didn’t really bother me a whole lot even if some contradictions existed” (emphasis added).  More recently in a paper at The Evangelical Theological Society (November, 2013) Licona claimed that“intentionally altering an account” is not an error but is allowed by the Greco-Roman genre into which he categorizes the Gospels, insisting that the CSBI view cannot account for all the data (MP3 recording of his ETS lecture 2013, emphasis added).

This popular Greco-Roman genre theory adopted by Licona and others is directly contrary to the standard view on inerrancy as clearly stated by The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (CSBI) and signed by nearly 300 scholars (in 1978).  Also, it was later adopted by the CSBI statement by the Evangelical Theological Society, the largest group of evangelical scholars in the world (with over 3000 members).  It reads (in Article 18): “We deny the legitimacy of any treatment of the text or quest for sources lying behind it that leads to relativizing, dehistoricizing, or discounting its teaching, or rejecting its claim to authorship” (Art. 18, emphasis added).  But this is exactly what many non-inerrantists, do with some Gospel events.  The official ICBI commentary on this Article adds, “It is never legitimate, however, to run counter to express biblical affirmations” (Article 18, emphasis added).   It adds,“We affirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by grammatico-historical exegesis, taking account of its literary forms and devices, and that Scripture is to interpret Scripture” (emphasis added).  But many NT scholars rejects the strict “grammatico-historical exegesis” where “Scripture is to interpret Scripture” for an extra-biblical system where Greco-Roman genre is used to interpret Scripture (seeExplaining Biblical Inerrancy, www.BastionBooks.com).

Of course, “Taking account” of different genres within Scripture, like poetry, history, parables, and even allegory (Gal. 4:24), is legitimate, but this is not what the use of extra-biblical Greco-Roman genre claims to do.  Rather, it uses extra-biblical stories to determine what the Bible means, even when using this extra-biblical literature means denying the historicity of the biblical text.  Indeed, the CSBI commentary on its1982 Hermeneutics Statement (Article 13) on inerrancy adds, “We deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual. Some, for instance, take Adam to be a myth, whereas in Scripture he is presented as a real person.  Others take Jonah to be an allegory when he is presented as a historical person and [is] so referred to by Christ” (emphasis added).  Its adds in the next article (Article 14), “We deny that any event, discourse or saying reported in Scripture was invented by the biblical writers or by the traditions they incorporated” (emphasis added).  Clearly, the CSBI standard view on inerrancy reject the Portrait view that the Gospel writers were creating, rather than reporting the words of Jesus.

 

Conclusion

Admittedly, it is not easy to explain all the biblical phenomena on the snap shot analogy, but two things should be kept in mind. First, it is only an analogy, and no analogy is perfect.   Second, it is closer to the truth than the portrait analogy.  Third, the most important thing to keep in mind is that, while we do not always have the exact words of Jesus, nonetheless, the evidences shows that we have an accurate representation of them.  For this there is strong and multiple evidence.

Many of the differences in the Gospels flow from the author’s selection of material to fit his theme.  Following the traditional understanding, Matthew presents Christ as King to the Jews; Mark as servant to the Romans; Luke as man to the Greeks, and John as the Son of God to the whole world.  But when their different thematic emphases are covering the same event, it does so in a compatible way with the other Gospels.  And when the same discourse is given in different Gospels, the words are often the same.  The bottom line is that the Gospels are a reliable, non-contradictory presentation of the words and deeds of Jesus.  This has been the standard view down through the centuries of the Christian Church, and there is no good reason to give it up now.

[1]   According to the Biblical Archeological Review, the inscription on the James Ossuary has been shown to be authentic. Some had challenged that the words “brother of Jesus” were not in the original inscription, but Yuval Goren, former chairman of Tel Aviv University’s institute of archaeology, was forced to admit on cross-examination that the phrase was in the original inscription on the Ossuary (Oct 2008).  Professor Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University determined that there we not even two chances (actually 1.7) that these three names would be mentioned together. Further, of thousands of ossuaries examined he knew of only one that had the name of a brother on it.  This indicates that such a reference must have been of a very important person.

From Apologist to Atheist: A Critical Review


From Apologist to Atheist: A Critical Review
Norman L. Geisler, Ph.D.

This is a review of Why I Rejected Christianity: A Former Apologist Explainsby John W. Loftus (Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford Publishing, 2007), a 278 page paperback. The book has four parts: Part 1: My Changing Years; Part 2: The Cumulative Case; Part 3: What I Believe Today; Part 4: Appendices of published writings and a photo of Loftus and two former professors, Dr. William Lane Craig and Dr. James Strauss.

Introductory Appreciation

So that my evaluation of the book does not obscure my appreciation of it, let me briefly point out some of the values of this book. First, it is an honest and open account of how a Christian became an atheist. Seldom are unbelievers so candid and open. Second, every Christian–let alone Christian apologists – can learn some valuable lessons from it on how to treat wayward believers. Third, it is a thoughtful and intellectually challenging work, presenting arguments that every honest theist and Christian should face. Indeed, some of his criticisms are valid. In particular I would single out his critique of the subjective argument from the alleged self-authenticating “witness of the Holy Spirit” by Loftus’ former teacher William Lane Craig (in chap. 15).

An Exposition and Evaluation of the Book

The book is too long to cover every argument contained in it. Since the vast majority, if not all of them, have been treated elsewhere in our writings (see Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics ), we will be content to highlight some important points Loftus made. The first part is best summarized by selecting the author’s own words.

Part 1
: “My Changing Years” is an open and illuminating account of how he became an atheist. This is best reported in his own words. “I was born in 1954 and grew up in Ft. Wayne, Indiana, in a Catholic home. . . . I never experienced true faith growing up, but I did learn that whenever I was in need I should call out to God. And that’s exactly what I did at 18 years old when I felt I had nowhere to turn for help. I was not always a good boy, being a middle child in a home with three boys. . . . I seemed to be in almost every fight in the household. . . . They [his parents] thought it would be good for everyone if I considered attending Howe Military School . . .” (9). “I was a problem teenager. . . . I spent many weeks in the Wood Youth Center, in Ft. Wayne. I dropped out of school. Most of my law breaking occurred during the time my mother and father were separated and divorced. . . . I was arrested six different times as a juvenile offender for various offenses!” (10). “Eventually I began to feel as if I was possessed by some demonic being. So one night . . . I went over to see a woman named Cathy . . . who had earlier spoken to me earlier [sic] about Jesus. She led me to accept the sacrifice Jesus made on the cross for my sins. . . . I felt free and forgiven for the first time in my life” (11).

After being baptized in a Church of Christ, “by the fall of that year, I had read completely through the Bible twice!” (12). After graduating from Great Lakes Bible College (GLBC), Loftus attended Lincoln Christian Seminary (both Church of Christ schools). Then he notes, “I attended Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (TEDS), and graduated in 1985 with a Th.M degree, under the mentoring of Dr. William Lane Craig . . .” (7). Subsequently, “I was in the [Church of Christ] ministry for about fourteen years, or so. . . . I am now an atheist” (7-8).

Loftus summarized, “There are three major things that happened in my life that changed my thinking. They all happened in the space of about five years, from 1991-1996. These things are associated with three people: 1) Linda, 2) Larry, and 3) Jeff. Linda brought a major crisis in my life. Larry brought new information in my life. Jeff took away my sense of a loving Christian community. . . . In the midst of these things, I felt rejected by the Church of Christ in my local area. For me it was an assault of major proportions. If I still believed in the devil, I would say it was orchestrated by the legions of Hell” (emphasis in original, 20-21).

Linda
was the director of Operation Shelter Loftus founded to help people in need. He said, “She practically idolized me. She did everything I said to do. . . . What man doesn’t want to be worshiped? I guess I did. I was having problems with my own relationship with my wife at the time, and Linda made herself available. I succumbed and had an affair with her” (21). “But there is more. After a few months I decided I could no longer reconcile the affair with my faith or my family life. So I told Linda that it was over.” (22). She became angry and accused him of rape. “I received a phone call from someone who threatened my life. . . . All this devastated me; my sin, the strange mitigating factors, the Christian people who wouldn’t forgive even though I repented of this sin, the potential charge of rape, and God not seeming to care about his wayward soldier” (22).

Larry
, his cousin, was a bio-chemistry teacher in the Air Force. Loftus tried unsuccessfully to convince him of the truth of creation over evolution. Instead, he said, “He did convince me of one solid truth; the universe is as old as scientists say it is, and the consensus is that it is 12-15 billion years old. Now that by itself isn’t too harmful of an idea, . . . but it was the first time I really considered the theological implications of it. Two corollaries of that idea started me down the road to being the honest doubter I am today. The first is that in Genesis chapter 1 we see that the earth existed before the sun, moon, and stars, which were all created on the fourth day. This does not square with Astronomy. . . . The second corollary for me at the time was this. If God took so long to create the universe, then why would he all of a sudden snap his fingers, so to speak, and create human beings?” (22-23) “Nearly two years later, I came to deny the Christian faith. There were just too many individual problems that I had to balance, like spinning several plates on several sticks, in order to keep my faith. At some point they just all came crashing down” (emphasis in original, 23). Subsequently, “The Angola Christian Church asked for my resignation in December 1990.” Further, “at this point, neither one of the Christian Churches in our area wanted me. The truth is that not enough of the right people thought I should be in ministry” (24). “What bothered me was that Jerry Paul, my home minister in Ft. Wayne at the time, didn’t bother to call me. . . . Jerry never called me to talk to me, or pray with me, or comfort me. . . . I’m the sort of person who has a very hard time asking for help, and I was hurting badly” (24-25).

Loftus
got a job teaching philosophy and wrote a friend: “I have settled down to teaching strictly secular philosophy courses at secular colleges. I actually enjoy this much more than at GLCC (where “the watchdogs of brotherhood doctrinal purity” are on the beat). . . . I am now freed of the internal censors. I can now write as I think. Watch out now” (emphasis in original, 25-26).

Jeff, was pastor of another church in the Pleasant Lake area that Loftus felt more comfortable in attending. He wrote, “I felt rejected by the Church of Christ in my local area. After my experience with Linda, I didn’t even go to church for several months. . . . As best as I can tell, Jeff was suspicious of my motives–my own cousin! Without going into great detail, he and his wife Lurleen suspected that I was secretly trying to oust him to become the pastor there. . . . I began to doubt that people with our passions and living in our day and age so removed from the Bible, could properly understand that book, when people living in the same age and as close to one another as he and I couldn’t understand each other” (26). “I wonder to myself how these consciences can differ so widely, especially when Christianity is the only faith that claims God the Holy Spirit actually takes up residence in their being. I often ask myself why Christians don’t seem to act any better than others when they alone claim to have the power, wisdom and guidance of God right there within them. Apparently, the Holy Spirit didn’t properly do his job here. This was the last blow to my faith and one of the reasons why I am an atheist today” (emphasis in original, 27).

By way of response to Loftus’ sad story, my first inclination is to say, “Thanks, we needed that!” In fact, every Christian needs to take seriously what John has said. Several things are very apparent: there was a tremendous lack of God’s grace, forgiveness, and love manifest in this situation by other professing Christians. Apologists beware! There is more than reason, arguments, and evidence involved in people coming to faith as well as in people leaving the faith. Jesus said, “By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another” (Jn. 13:35).

My second thought is that becoming an atheist, by Loftus’ own admission, involves more than rational arguments. It involves a free choice by a sinful human being who the Bible says is in rebellion with God (Psa. 14:1; Rom. 1:18). Loftus admits the same in his above testimony. It is noteworthy that his first step away from God was adultery. Then, he began to doubt God’s Word. To be sure, an unloving Christian community did not help matters. But how he responded to this was his personal responsibility. And since we are more than rational and volitional creatures, we must be mindful of the role human emotion plays in a person’s decisions.

Part 3
: “What I Believe Today”

At this point it will be more instructive to hear the rest of the story. Loftus did not jump directly from theism to atheism. First, he chose to become a Deist. He wrote: “I previously chose to believe in Deism and the philosopher’s God who created this universe. . . . I struggled to believe in God. It was probably a Kierkegaardian leap of faith for me, which also made me an Existentialist, a Deistic Existentialist. But this wasn’t satisfying, for according to Marcus Borg: ‘There is little difference between a distant and absent God and no God at all’” (26, emphasis added).

Then The Answer Hit Me.
“When we seek for a cause of it all we run into absurdities, precisely because blind chancistic events cannot be figured out! Chance events can produce order. We know this. Even if the odds are extremely unlikely for this universe to exist, once there is some order in the universe and someone to look upon the order that’s there, it cries out for an explanation. . . . But when we reflect on why we can’t figure it all out, the best reason I can offer is that random chance events can’t be figured out [in] hindsight. So in the end, I do have a reason for what I believe. Nature is ultimate. According to the late Carl Sagan, ‘The cosmos is all there is, was, or ever will be.’ According to Bertrand Russell the universe is simply ‘a brute fact.’ I am an atheist. There is no God. And there is at least one reason for me not to believe in God, and that is because the universe is absurd when we try to figure it out. . . . According to Jacques Monad, ‘our number came up in a Monte Carlo game’” (266).

What is Life Without God?
This is the logical and last question with which Loftus deals. His answer is brief and to the point: Life, without God can be happy and meaningful because “while there may be no ultimate reasons for being a good person [apart from God] . . . , there are plenty of non-ultimate reasons for being good” (272). Reminiscent of the atheist Ayn Rand, Loftus contends that “the values of tolerance, family, and friendship in a political democracy under democratic capitalism provide a society with the best chance to avoid pain for most people in it”(272). He adds, “You don’t need an ‘ultimate’ anything to live life in this world. There just aren’t any ultimacies” (273). Strangely, just two sentences later he says, “So it makes what I do here what ultimately matters–it’s all there is. . .” (273). Then he adds, “And while life is ultimately meaningless, I am living life to the hilt everyday. I’m living without the guilt that Christianity threw on me, too! Life is good–very good! I feel better about it now than I ever have!” (273). One can only wonder how someone can feel better about things when they are really so bad. There is no real purpose for life; the world is absurd, and there is nothing after this–nothing! It would appear that this is a good example of what Freud defined as an illusion, namely, something one wishes to be true, even if there is no rational ground for believing it is.

Why then do so many people believe in God? Loftus answers, “In my opinion, this human need may be the reason why people believe in God in the first place, not because of arguments pro and con. As humans we simply cannot bear to believe we have no ultimate purpose in life, and that our existence is absurd” (270). Of course, we may ask why we cannot. Is it not possible that this God-sized vacuum was created by God, and that the soul is restless until it finds its rest in God? Loftus also has problems with why Christianity is so widely accepted in the world, particularly if there is no reality behind it. His answer also rings hollow in view of the strong historical evidence for the Christian Faith . He says, “In my opinion, Christianity is a legendary development from a person named Jesus that lucked its way into political power” (emphasis in original, 271). This, however, overlooks the fact that the great early spread of Christianity, as well as its greatest spread today, is under oppression of anti-Christian governments (like China).

As for the criticism that “Christians don’t have a good track record when it comes to slavery, wars, . . . scientific progress, and so on” (271). Loftus seems blissfully unaware that the Christian view of God and creation is the very foundation of science. Further, most of the founders of modern science believed in the biblical doctrine of creation. What is more, the strong influence of Christianity through people like Wilberforce in England and the Wesleys in America was crucial in the liberation of slaves. Of course, there have been people who claimed to be Christian who engaged in witch hunts, inquisitions, KKK, and the like. But there have also been leaders (like Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and others) who were atheists and/or evolutionists and who killed multi-millions of people. Certainly, no atheists would consider that this is a legitimate argument against atheism.

What If I’m Wrong?

In an enlightening statement, Loftus faces the final question and gives a brutally frank answer to it. “What if I’m wrong about Christianity? What then? Well, then I will go to hell, however conceived, when I die. And what did I do to deserve to go to hell? I ‘sinned,’ I didn’t believe in Jesus’ atonement, or in his bodily resurrection from the grave. Whose fault would this be? Mine?” (275). Again, his response has an empty sound. “I have honest doubts. Am I to be blamed because I couldn’t understand Christianity?” (275). “But what if I’m deceived by the traditional devil to have these doubts? Maybe he is playing tricks on me, making me think my doubts are honest ones, when they are not?” (275). Again, his question is good and his answer disappointing, shifting the blame to God rather than to take responsibility for his own decision. He asks instead: “The question is why an all-powerful God didn’t help me. The devil wouldn’t have a chance against God, but why does God do nothing to help me overcome my doubt?” (275). Of course, this is to assume, contrary to Scripture (1 Cor. 10:13; Phil. 4:13), that God does not provide this help for those who are willing. Further, it is to assume that God will overpower a human will to accomplish His desire, but this is also contrary to Scripture and good reasons. Jesus said, “How often I wanted to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing” (Mt. 23:37, emphasis added).

Part 2: “
The Cumulative Case”

This section deals with the reasons Loftus gives against Christianity and for atheism which, admittedly, were not the initial reasons that brought on His unbelief (see Part 1). The discussion here need not be long for several reasons. First, his unbelief was not initiated by reason, as he admits. Rather, it was his rejection by friends and the lack of Christian love (see above).
Second, there is nothing really new here that has not already been answered elsewhere (see my Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics). None of his arguments is definitive, either alone or as part of a whole “cumulative argument,” and many are so easily answered that they demonstrate the initial trigger for his unbelief was not really rational. For example, the initial problem he had with Genesis 1 (see above) being allegedly contrary to astronomy is only high school level apologetics. Since there was light from the first day (Gen. 1:3), there is no problem with the sun not appearing until the fourth day. Further, time does not help evolution nor hinder creation. No matter how much time one posits, natural laws and random processes do not produce the irreducible complexity and specified complexity we find in living things. Red, white, and blue confetti dropped from an airplane will never produce the America Flag on your lawn. And giving it more time to fall (by going up higher to drop it) only accentuates the problem by mixing the falling confetti up more. That these kinds of problems furthered the process of his early skepticism only goes to show that it was not a rationally based decision. Indeed, Loftus described it (above) as a “leap of faith” that lead him to reject theism. He said, “I previously chose to believe in Deism and the philosopher’s God who created this universe. . . . I struggled to believe in God. It was probably a Kierkegaardian leap of faith for me . . .” (265, emphasis added). Likewise, it was a leap of faith (or disbelief) that made him an atheist. No rational argument compelled or even demanded it.

One thing is certain: it was not evidence and rational arguments that led him to atheism.  Even his best argument against God–the argument from evil–which he considers to be the “Achilles heel” of Christianity– is circular reasoning. For how can one know God is ultimately in-just for allowing evil unless he knows what is ultimately just. And how can he know there is an ultimate standard of justice (i.e., absolute moral law), unless there is an absolute Moral Law Giver? Indeed, other great atheists, such as C. S. Lewis and Jay Budzisziewski, were converted to theism from atheism because of the existence of evil in the world.

The So-Called Cumulative Argument

Loftus declared: “I consider this book to be one single argument against Christianity, with each section a subset of that one argument. Each section of this argument depends upon the others for its force, since no single one of them alone can bear the whole weight of showing that the Christian world-view is false.” Thus, “it’s proper and fitting to do so as a whole, especially since this is the only way to properly evaluate world-views” (emphasis in original, 56). While there may be general agreement on this point, the disagreement emerges in two areas.

First, the atheist weighs the specific evidence differently than the theist, and his bias affects the way he weighs it. What Loftus views as improbable (say, the resurrection of Christ) is because of his bias against miracles, not because there is not highly probably historical evidence that it happened, which there is . The main reason it becomes implausible to an atheist is that it is a miracle, an act of God. And there cannot be acts of God if there is no God, which he believes is the case. Thus the real debate of historical reliability of the New Testament (and thus the deity of Christ) is dependent on whether there is good evidence for the existence of God, which there is.And if God exists, then miracles are not only possible, but the biggest one – the creation of the world – has already happened. Thus, other smaller miracles are possible. When one sees a record with miracles in it, he cannot dismiss it in advance as being improbable. If miracles are possible (which they are in a theistic universe), then their probability depends purely on the reliability of the documents. And the Gospel documents are reliable. In summary, there are more NT documents, earlier documents, more documents, by more contemporaries and eyewitness testimony, more historically and archaeologically confirmed than for any other events in the ancient world. Hence, it is highly probable that Jesus did the miracles contained in the NT and rose from the dead to confirm his claim to be the Son of God. If so, the essential facts of Christianity are true.

Further, Loftus accepts a number of challengeable or untrue premises. The theist agrees that Christianity is a historical religion and “history, at best, cannot show us that the claims of the Bible are true. History can only give us probabilities”(37). However, Christians disagree when Loftus concludes from this that this situation “leaves room for reasonable doubt” (37). Probabilities leave room for some doubt but not necessarily always a reasonable doubt. And high probabilities do not leave room for any reasonable doubt, though there is always room for possible doubt in historical arguments.

What is more, just as Loftus claims a cumulative argument for his atheists world view, the Christian can claim the same for his Christian world view. It too can be a cumulative case where one probability is built on another until the whole argument for Christianity is so highly probable that it is beyond all reasonable doubt.  And the flip side is that if atheism only offers some possible, but not even probable arguments against Christianity, then adding up these mere possibilities does not yield any probability in favor of atheism. And a close look at each of Loftus’ arguments–minus their biased presuppositions–yields only a possibility for atheism in face of a high probability in favor of theism.

There are many examples of these bias presuppositions. One is the “outsider perspective” (discussed above). Another is the presumption of naturalism (see below). Further, he presupposes that “ancient standards [for eyewitnesses] are pathetic in comparison to today’s standards” (38). This is simply false. Indeed, many legal experts have examined the New Testament eyewitness testimony and found it more than sufficient. Nor does one have to accept Loftus claim NT writers could not be good witnesses since they had a flawed hermeneutic of the OT. This is for two reasons. First of all, their hermeneutic was not flawed since they never misinterpreted the OT. They always drew the proper meaning or an implication in that meaning from the text. What is more, there is no logical connection between their view of OT interpretation and their accuracy in recording events they witnessed. Even allegorists tell the literal truth when they witness a murder!

Finally, Loftus’ God-of-the-gaps argument is faulty. He reasons that since “there is becoming less and less room for God, as we explain more and more,” we can assume no room for God as we explain the rest. “This scientific naturalistic assumption” is made so often, even by Christians in their daily lives, that it “probably has a metaphysical grounding” (262). Here Loftus makes an unjustified metaphysical leap of faith. Even if one could find a natural cause for all regular events in this world (which the theist can readily admit), this would not rule out either some miracles in the present and the past. It would not eliminate the possibility (or probability–if there is evidence) for a miracle in the present, because while regular events do always have natural causes, this is not necessarily true of non-regular events (anomalies). For science in the present empirical sense deals only with repeatable events. A law or a prediction cannot be based on one occurrence. It takes many occurrences from which a pattern can be induced and a projection made. Second, there is a significant difference between observable and repeatable events in the present (empirical science) and unobserved, unrepeated events in the past (forensic science). No one observed these past events (like the origin of the universe and first life). Hence, observation and repetition are not available for forensic science of origin science. Here one must depend on the principles of causality and uniformity. Events (even past ones) had a cause (causality). And the present is the key to the past (uniformity). Hence, the kind of causes that produce a certain kind of event in the present should be posited for these same kind of events in the past. Some of these events demand intelligent causes. This is true of archaeology and paleography of the past, as well as cryptology, information theory, and the like in the present. Hence, uniformity does not mean uniformitarianism. Because there are intelligent causes of certain kinds of events in the present (like a sculptor or a sculpture), then an intelligent cause must be assumed for like events in the past (like the forming of Mt. Rushmore). Likewise, when we see the mathematically identical letter sequence in a written language (known to have an intelligent cause in the present), we may rightly posit an intelligent cause for the DNA in the first living cell (in the past). So, it is not any more of a God-of-the gaps move that leads one to posit an intelligent cause of first life (which contains 1000 sets of The Encyclopedia Britannica of information in it) than is does to produce these sets in the present. Thus, Loftus confuses origin science and operation science as well as uniformity (analogy) and uniformitarianism (naturalism). And his argument fails for these reasons.

The So-called “Cumulative Argument.”

Loftus proposes another line of reasoning that does not serve atheism well either. For his offer of implausible possibilities does not add up to probability. Indeed, rather than one part strengthening the other, it is more like the “leaky-bucket” fallacy where the failure of one bucket to hold the water is wrongly supposed to be corrected by another leaky bucket under it. In most cases the parts of the so called “cumulative argument” are only possibilities which never add up to probabilities. Loftus’ argument is more like a chain of different arguments. But as we all know, a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.
For example, one of the weakest links in his case for atheism is his failure to provide any real positive evidence for God’s non-existence – except evil which really calls for God. And his negative arguments against the theistic arguments are neither plausible nor probable. Even if they were, at best, they would not be disproofs for God, but disproofs of proofs for God. Indeed, some are absurd like chance producing complex and specified order in the universe. A fundamental law of thought is that the effect cannot be greater than the cause. And both the universe (by way of the Anthropic Principle) and life (by way of Information Theory) manifest incredible intelligent design. In fact, based on Hume’s principle of uniformity, there is every reason to accept an intelligent cause of the universe and life since we never ever see a regular occurrence of these kinds of events other than by an intelligent cause. And if there is good reason to believe God exists, then miracles follow. Because if there is a God who can make the world, then he can intervene in it. And without an antisupernatural bias there is no presumption in favor of either skepticism or atheism with regard to the existence of God, the truth of Christianity based on or the authenticity of the New Testament, and the miracles of Christ contained in it–particularly His resurrection.

The Outsider Test for Faith.

Also crucial to Loftus’ atheistic view is what he calls the “outsider test.” According to this test, “the presumption of skepticism [is] the preferred stance when approaching any religious faith, especially one’s own” (40). “Mark Twain said: ‘the easy confidence with which I know another man’s religion is folly teaches me to suspect that my own is also.’ Believers are truly atheists with regard to all other religions but their own. Atheists just reject one more religion” (40). Quoting Michael Shermer, Loftus says, the fact is that “‘most of us most of the time come to our beliefs for a variety of reasons having little to do with empirical evidence and logical reasoning’” (43).

What is interesting about these statements is that Loftus does not seem to be aware of their self-defeating nature. If “most of us most of the time come to our beliefs for a variety of reasons having little to do with empirical evidence and logical reasoning” (43), then can we not assume that Loftus came to his atheistic views the same way? Further, if one should have the presumption of skepticism toward any belief system, especially his own, then why should Loftus not have the presumption of skepticism toward his own atheistic beliefs? The truth is that the outsider test is self-defeating since by it every agnostic should be agnostic about his own agnosticism and every skeptic would be skeptical of his own skepticism.

What is more, Loftus contends that “it’s overwhelmingly true that the presumption you begin with will be the one you will end up with” (44). If so, then this sword cuts both ways for it would be true of skeptics and even atheists like Loftus as well. But the truth is that people do convert from their beliefs. And some are convinced by evidence to do so. Hence, the real issue is whether there is evidence for the truth of the view to which one is converting. And the atheist’s view lacks positive evidence. On the other hand, the theists offers many valid evidences for God, and the atheist really has none–except evil and even it is self-defeating.

Another example of his many self-defeating statements is his denial of any ultimates. He insisted, “There just aren’t any ultimacies.” But, just two sentences later he says, “So it makes what I do here what ultimately matters – it’s all there is. . . . And while life is ultimately meaningless, I am living life to the hilt everyday” (273). But if there are no ultimates, then how can Loftus know what “ultimately matters” and what is “ultimately meaningless”?

Further, Loftus’ “outsider test” is contrary to common sense. By it we could eliminate the credibility of any holocaust survivor’s testimony because he was an “insider.” But who better would know what happened than someone who went through it. Likewise, by this odd test one could deny his own self-existence since from an outsiders view (which he should take according to the test) his existence could be doubted or denied as an illusion. But what is more obvious and self-evident than one’s own existence?

One form of the outsider argument leads Loftus to claim “believers are truly atheists with regard to all other religions but their own. Atheists just reject one more religion” (40). But can’t theists use the same basic argument and reject atheism. In brief, atheists are unbelievers with regard to all beliefs other than their own. Why don’t they just become unbelievers with regard to one more belief (namely, their atheism)?
The skeptic is calling for the presumption of falsehood on our basic beliefs. But if our beliefs are based on good evidence and reason, then why should they be doubted? In fact, we should not doubt the opposite of what we have good reason to believe until there is better reason to believe something else. Loftus himself would not give the presumption of disbelief to his own atheism. Why then should a Christian doubt the existence of God or the truth of Christianity? There is one and only one reason–evidence. It has nothing to do with an advanced presumption. Advance presumption is nothing more or less than bias.

Loftus’ advanced skepticism argument contains the same fallacy as Hume’s argument against miracles. According to Hume, the presumption against miracles is so great that it would practically take a miracle to overcome it. But, of course, there would be an advanced presumption against that miracle and so on. Thus, it is in advance practically impossible for any event to be confirmed as a miracle.  Or to put it another way, Hume argued that: (1) Natural laws are regular. (2) Miracles are rare. (3) The evidence for the regular is always greater than the evidence for the rare. (4) An intelligent person should always base his beliefs on the greater evidence. (5) Therefore, the intelligent person should never believe in miracles. Besides the fact that premises (3) is false, even on a naturalistic basis (since the Big Bang, spontaneous generation of first life, and macro-evolution are rare and not regular events), there is an absurd conclusion contained in Hume’s argument that is also contained in Loftus’ reasoning.

Now the absurd conclusion that follows from Hume’s reasoning is that even if a miracle actually happen (like the resurrection of Jesus), no intelligent person should believe in it. Now there is something patently wrong with an argument that insists we should not believe in something, even if has actually happened! Likewise, it is also unreasonable to argue that even if there is good evidence for an event, nevertheless, no rational person should believe it. Why not? That is what rational people do–they believe based on good evidence.

Neither Hume nor Loftus would reason this way about the Big Bang or spontaneous generation of first life. Naturalists believe these events happened, even though they are not being repeated regularly. Why then should a Christian who has good reasons to believe in God (like the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments) approach his belief with advanced skepticism. We have offered this evidence elsewhere , so it need not be repeated here. Advanced skepticism should only be used when one has advanced evidence or good reasons to disbelieve that the event really did not happen. Otherwise, one should come with an open mind to the question.

The truth is that the only way the atheist or skeptic can even compete on the playing field of religious truth is to load the dice or stack the deck. Most often this is done by assuming either metaphysical or methodological naturalism. Otherwise, their position is often absurd. This is clear from two illustrations. In the face of the strong evidence in favor of a Big Bang origin of the universe, British atheist Antony Kenny wrote: “A proponent of [the big bang] theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came from nothing and by nothing” (emphasis added). But even the skeptic David Hume said, “I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause” (emphasis added). Likewise, Harvard’s Richard Lewontin confessed correctly: “Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to understanding the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its construct . . . because we have a prior commitment to materialism. . . . We are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes. . . . Moreover that materialism is absolute for we cannot allow a divine foot in the door” (New York Review of Books, 1/9/96, emphasis added). Trying to reach someone like this is a case of not being able to make the horse drink after you led him to the water. Lewontin is a classic case in point. He admits an incredible bias in advance of looking at the facts that would accept “patently absurb” views “against common sense” because of a “prior” and “absolute” commitment to a naturalistic and materialistic world view (i.e., atheism). Loftus is not as blunt, but he has a similar blind spot when he argues against common sense and Hume’s principle of “constant conjunction” and posits pure chance (which can’t cause anything–only minds and natural forces can) caused the incredible specified and irreducible complexity found in living things. No one ever observes any such thing happening once, let alone over and over (as Hume’s principle demands). Nor has it been repeated in the laboratory without intelligent intervention.

Conclusion

While Loftus’ view does not come across as strong as Lewontin’s, nonetheless, the same bias is there against a view (theism) that he admits doubting originally for non-rational reasons. He admits that he came gradually “by a leap of faith,” and he attempts to justify this rationally by offering reasons based on bias, unjustified conclusions, and self-defeating presuppositions. Looking at the evidence through these lenses will never lead one to the truth. And it will do no good in the end for anyone to blame it on God for not overpowering a skeptics mind or will. For no skeptic would want a God who forces them to believe against their will. The God of the Bible is not that kind of God (Mt. 23:37) but is “longsuffering toward us, not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance [change their mind]” (2 Pet. 3:9).

In summation, one can place question marks on both his “conversion” and “deconversion.” Given the legalistic context, one can question whether or not he really understood the grace of God. And by his own testimony, the initial factors that prompted his “deconversion” were not really rational but emotional and volitional. As to the rational doubts that ensued, there is nothing much new that other skeptics have not already asked – and apologists have not already answered.

[Footnotes missing]

Copyright © 2012 NormanGeisler.net – All rights reserved

Can Atheists Justify Being Good Without God ?


Can Atheists Justify Being Good Without God ?
by Norman L. Geisler

 


There is a new atheist’s ad out with a picture of  Santa Claus and the words: “Why  believe in a god? Just be good for goodness sake.”  This is clever, but is it possible?  Let’s analyze it more carefully.

First, if there is no Moral Law Giver (God), then how can there be a moral law that prescribes: “Be good.”  Every prescription has a prescriber, and this is a moral prescription.

Second, what does “good” mean?  How is good to be defined.? If it can mean anything for anyone, then it means nothing for anyone.  It is total relativism. Being “good” for some (like Nazis) can mean killing Jews.  But for Jews it is evil.  Hence, on this view there is no objective difference between good and evil.

Third,  what does “goodness” itself mean in the atheist slogan.  Being good “for goodness sake” implies that something is just plain good in itself.  That is, it is an ultimate goodness.  But this by definition is what Christians mean by God.  Everything else hasgoodness, but only God (the Ultimate) is goodness.  In this case, the atheist is using “goodness” as a surrogate or substitute for God.

This maneuver is not uncommon for atheists. Before the Big Bang evidence, atheists were fond of doing this with the word  “universe.”  It was supposed to be eternal and, hence, needed no Cause since only what begins needs a Beginner.  Carl Sagan employed the term “Cosmos” as a God-substitute.  He said, “the COSMOS is everything that ever was, is, or will be.”  It sounds a little like what Psalm 90 declares: “From everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.”  Bertrand Russell attempted the same tactic in his famous BBC debate with Father Copleston.  When asked what caused the universe, he replied that nothing did.  It was just “there.”  But how does an eternal, uncaused universe from which everything else came to be differ from an Uncaused Cause (God)?

However, in the light of the Big Bang evidence that the universe had a beginning, these answers lack scientific support.  As agnostic Jastrow put it, “The scientist’s pursuit of the past ends in the moment of creation.”  And  “This is an exceedingly strange development, unexpected by all but theologians.  They have always accepted the word of the Bible: `In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth'” (God and the Astronomers, 115).

Fourth, Dembski and Wells give another objection in recent bookn(How to be an Intellectually Fulfilled Atheist (or not), 115): “Atheism is a belief with scientific pretensions but no scientific backing.”  It has no scientific backing for believing in an eternal universe, The Second Law of Thermodynamics still holds.  The universe is running out of useable energy and, therefore, cannot be eternal.  And it has no scientific backing for the spontaneous origin of first life.  Again, as Dembski notes, “Until science can show that physical process operating under realistic prebiotic conditions can bring about full-fledged cells from nonliving material, intellectual fulfillment remains an atheistic pipedream” (ibid.).

Fifth, the truth is that many of the great atheists themselves understood well that without God there is no basis for being good for goodness sake.  The famous French atheist, Jean Paul Sartre said,  without God,  “I was like a man who’s lost his shadow.  And there was nothing left in heaven, not right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders” (The Flies, Act III).  Nietzsche said that when God died (see the “Madman” in Gay Science), then all objective values died with Him.  And a subjective understanding of goodness to which everyone can assign their own relative meaning, is not goodness at all–let alone being goodness for goodness sake.

Sixth, atheists fail to make an important distinction.  One can be good (as many atheists are) without believing in God.  But one cannot be good without there being a God.  That is, they can believe in a moral law (and live accordingly) without believing in God.  But they cannot justify this belief without reference to a Moral Law Giver (God).  This leads to one last observation.

Seventh, the fact is, that you cannot have an objective moral law without a Moral Law Giver.  But atheist are the first to insist there must be a moral law–otherwise, how can they mount their argument against God from the injustices in this world.   C. S. Lewis sais this clearly when he wrote,  “[As an atheist] my argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust.  But how had I got this idea of just and unjust?  A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line” (Mere Christianity, 15). Thus, he reasoned from this objective moral law to a Moral Law Giver (God).  The atheist must make his painful choice: Either he loses the basis for his argument against God from evil, or he must admit there is an objective moral law which leads to a Moral Law Giver.  One thing is certain: without God, the atheist cannot have objective goodness for goodness sake.  Indeed, since “for goodness sake” is a euphemistic phrase meaning “For God’s sake,” then the atheist ad, both literarily and logically, should be rendered, “Why believe in God? Just be good for God’s sake.”  In other words, it is precisely because there is a God that we can really be good.  Without an absolutely good God, there is no real objective basis for being good.

An Apologetic for Apologetics


An Apologetic for Apologetics
by Norman L. Geisler

Introduction

Christianity is under attack today, and it must be defended. There are attacks from within by cults, sects, and heresies. And there are attacks from without by atheists, skeptics, and other religions. The discipline that deals with a rational defense of the Christian Faith is called apologetics. It comes from the Greek word apologia (cf. 1 Peter 3:15) which means to give a reason or defense.

I. Objections to Defending the Faith: Biblical and Extra-Biblical

Many objections have been offered against doing apologetics.  Some offer an attempted biblical justification.  Others are based in extra-biblical reasoning.  First, let’s take a look at those based on biblical texts.

 A. Objections to Apologetics from Within the Bible

 1. The Bible Does Not Need to Be Defended

One objection to apologetics often made is the claim that the Bible does not need to be defended; it simply needs to be expounded. Hebrews 4:12 is often cited as evidence: “The Word of God is alive and powerful…” (NIV).  It is said that the Bible is like a lion; it does not need to be defended but simply let loose. A lion can defend itself. Several things should be noted in response.

First, this begs the question as to whether or not the Bible is the Word of God. Of course, God’s Word is ultimate, and it speaks for itself. But how do we know the Bible is the Word of God, as opposed to the Qur’an, the Book of Mormon, or some other book? One must appeal to evidence to determine which of the many conflicting books really is the Word of God.

Second, no Christian would accept the claim of a Muslim without question that “the Qur’an is alive and powerful and sharper than a two-edged sword….” We would demand evidence.  Likewise, no non-Christian should accept our claim without evidence.

Third, the analogy of the lion is misleading. A roar of a lion speaks with authority only because we know from previous knowledge what a lion can do. Without the tales of woe about a lion’s ferocity, its roar would not have the same authoritative effect on us. Likewise, without evidence to establish one’s claim to authority, there is no good reason to accept that authority.

2. Jesus Refused to do Signs for Evil Men

Some argue that Jesus rebuked people who sought signs. Hence, we should be content simply to believe without evidence. Indeed, Jesus did on occasion rebuke sign seekers. He said, “A wicked and adulterous generation asks for a miraculous sign!” (Matt. 12:39 cf. Luke 16:31). However, this does not mean that Jesus did not desire people to look at the evidence before they believed for many reasons.

First, even in this very passage Jesus went on to offer the miracle of His resurrection as a sign of who He was, saying “But none will be given it except the sign of the prophet Jonah (Matt. 12:39-40).  Likewise, Paul gave many evidences for the resurrection (in 1 Cor. 15).  And Luke speaks of “many convincing proofs” (Acts 1:3) of the resurrection.

Second, when John the Baptist inquired whether He was the Christ, Jesus offered miracles as proof, saying: “Go back and report to John what you hear and see: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cured, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is preached to the poor” (Matt. 11:5). When replying to the Scribes, He said: “`But that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.’ He said to the paralytic, `I tell you, get up, take your mat and go home'” (Mark 2:10-11). Nicodemus said to Jesus, “Rabbi, we know you are a teacher who has come from God. For no-one could perform the miraculous signs you are doing if God were not with him” (John 3:2).

Third, Jesus was opposed to sign-seeking or entertaining people by miracles. Indeed, He refused to perform a miracle to satisfy king Herod’s curiosity (Luke 23:8).  On other occasions He did not do miracles because of their unbelief (Matt. 13:58), not wishing to “cast pearls before swine.” The purpose of Jesus’ miracles was apologetic, namely, to confirm His message (cf. Ex. 4:1f; Jn. 3:2; Heb. 2:3-4). This He did in great abundance, for “Jesus of Nazareth was a man accredited by God to you by miracles, wonders and signs, which God did among you through him…” (Acts 2:22).

3. Paul Was Unsuccessful In His Use of Reason on Mars Hill and Later Discarded the Approach

Opponents of apologetics sometimes argue that Paul was unsuccessful in his attempt to reach the thinkers on Mars Hill (Acts 17), discarding the method and later telling the Corinthians that he wanted to “know Jesus and Him only” (1 Cor. 2:2). However, this interpretation is based on a misunderstanding of the text.

For one thing, Paul did have results on Mars Hill. For some people were saved, including a philosopher. The text says clearly “A few men became followers of Paul and believed. Among them was Dionysius, a member of the Areopagus, also a woman named Damaris, and a number of others” (Acts 17:34).

Second, nowhere in either Acts or 1 Corinthians does Paul indicate any repentance or even regret over what he did on Mars Hill. This is reading into the text what simply is not there.

Third, Paul’s statement about preaching Jesus and Jesus only is not a change in the content of Paul’s preaching. This is what he did everywhere. Even to the philosophers “he preached Jesus and the resurrection” (Acts 17:18 cf. v. 31). So there was nothing unique about what he preached; it was simply how he did it. Paul tailored his starting point to where the audience was. With the heathen at Lystra he began by an appeal to nature (Acts 14) and ended by preaching Jesus to them. With the Jews he began with the OT and moved on to Christ (Acts 17:2-3). But with the Greek thinkers Paul began with creation and reason to a Creator and on to His Son Jesus who died and rose again (Acts 17:24f).

 4. Only Faith, not Reason, Can Please God

Heb. 11:6 insists that “without faith it is impossible to please God.” This would seem to argue against the need for reason. In fact, it would appear that asking for reasons, rather than simply believing, would displease God. In response to this argument against apologetics two important points must be made.

First of all, the text does not say that with reason it is impossible to please God. It says without faith one cannot please God. It does not eliminate reason accompanying faith or a reasonable faith.

Second, God in fact calls upon us to use our reason (1 Pet. 3:15). Indeed, He has given “clear” (Rom. 1:20) and “convincing proofs” (Acts 1:3 NASB) so that we do not have to exercise blind faith.

Third, this text in Hebrews does not exclude “evidence” but actually implies it. For faith is said to be “the evidence” of things we do not see (Heb. 11:1 NKJV). For example, the evidence that someone is a reliable witness justifies my believing his testimony of what he saw and I did not. Even so, our faith in “things not seen” (Heb. 11:1 NKJV) is justified by the evidence we have that God does exist which is “clearly seen, being understood from what has been made” (Rom. 1:20).

5. Paul Said God Can’t be Known by Human Reason when he wrote, “the world by wisdom knew not God” (1 Cor. 1:21 NKJV).

However, this cannot mean that there is no evidence for God’s existence, since Paul declared in Romans that the evidence for God’s existence is so “plain” as to render even the heathen “without excuse” (Rom. 1:19-20). Further, the context in 1 Corinthians is not God’s existence but His plan of salvation through the cross. This cannot be known by mere human reason but only by divine revelation. It is “foolish” to the depraved human mind.

What is more, the “wisdom” of which he speaks is “the wisdom of this world” (v. 20), not the wisdom of God. Paul called a sophist the “disputer of this age” (v. 20). Sophist could argue for argument’s sake. This leads no one to God.
Further, Paul’s reference to the world by wisdom not knowing God is not a reference to the inability of human beings to know God through the evidence He has revealed in creation (Rom. 1:19-20) and conscience (Rom. 2:12-15). Rather, it is a reference to man’s depraved and foolish rejection of the message of the cross.

Finally, in this very book of 1 Corinthians Paul gives his greatest apologetic evidence for the Christian Faith–the eyewitnesses of the resurrection of Christ which his companion Luke called “many convincing proofs” (Acts 1:3 NASB).
Indeed, even though man knows clearly through human reason that God exists, nevertheless, he “suppresses” or “holds down” this truth in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18).  Thus, it is the presence of such strong evidence that leaves him “without excuse” (Rom. 1:20).

6. The Natural Man Can’t Understand Spiritual Truths

Paul insisted that “the man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God…” (1 Cor. 2:14). They cannot even “know” them. What use, then, is apologetics? In response to this argument against apologetics two things should be observed.

First, Paul does not say that natural persons cannot perceive truth about God, but only that they do not receive it (Gk: dekomai, welcome). Indeed, Paul emphatically declared that the basic truths about God are “clearly seen” (Rom. 1:20). The problem is not that unbelievers are not aware of God’s existence but that they do not want to accept Him because of the moral consequences this would have on their sinful lives.

Second, 1 Cor. 2:14 says they do not “know” (Gk: ginosko) which can mean to know by experience. In other words, they know God in their mind (Rom. 1:19-20) but they have not accepted Him in their heart (Rom. 1:18). The Bible says, “The fool has said in his heart, `There is no God'” (Psa. 14:1).

7. Only the Holy Spirit Can Bring Someone to Christ

The Bible says that salvation is a work of the Holy Spirit. He alone can convict, convince, and convert (John 16:8; Eph. 2:1; Titus 3:5-7). This is certainly true, and no orthodox Christian denies this. However, two things must be kept in mind.
First, the Bible does not teach that the Holy Spirit will always do this apart from reason and evidence. It is not either the Holy Spirit or Reason. Rather, it is the reasonable Holy Spirit using good reason to reach rational people.  God is always the efficient cause of salvation, but apologetic arguments can be an instrumental cause used by the Holy Spirit to bring one to Christ.

Second, apologists do not believe that apologetics saves anyone. It only provides evidence in the light of which people can make rational decisions. It only provides evidence that Christianity is true. One must still place his faith in Christ in order to be saved. Apologetics only leads the “horse” to the water. Only the Holy Spirit can persuade him drink.

8. Apologetics is not Used in the Bible

It is objected that if apologetics is biblical, then why don’t we see it done in the Bible? There are two basic reasons for this misunderstanding.

First, by and large the Bible was not written for unbelievers but for believers. Since they already believe in God, Christ, etc., they are already convinced these are true. Hence, apologetics is directed primarily for those who do not believe so that they may have a reason to believe.

Second, contrary to the claim of critics, apologetics is used in the Bible. 1) The first chapter of Genesis confronts the mythical accounts of creation known in that day. 2) Moses’ miracles in Egypt were an apologetic that God was speaking through him (Ex. 4:1-9). 3) Elijah did apologetics on Mt. Carmel when he proved miraculously that Yahweh is the true God, not Baal (1 Kings 18). 4) As we have shown in detail elsewhere,  Jesus was constantly engaged in apologetics, proving by signs and wonders that He was the Son of God (John 3:2; Acts 2:22). 5) The Apostle Paul did apologetics at Lystra when he gave evidence from nature to the heathen that the supreme God of the universe existed and that idolatry was wrong (Acts 14). 6) The classic case of apologetics in the NT is Acts 17 where Paul reasoned with the philosophers on Mars Hill. He not only presented evidence from nature that God existed but also from history that Christ was the Son of God. Indeed, he cited pagan thinkers in support of his arguments.

B. Objections to Apologetics from Outside the Bible

These objections against apologetics are geared to show either its irrationality, inadequacy, or fruitlessness. Many come from a rationalistic or skeptical point of view. Others are fideistic which denies reason should be used to support ones faith.

1. Human Reason Can’t Tell Us Anything About God. Some critics assert that human reason cannot give us any information about God.

First, it says that reason doesn’t apply to questions about God. But this statement itself is offered as a reasonable statement about the issue of God. In order to say that reason doesn’t apply to God, one has to apply reason to God in that very statement. So reasoning about God is inescapable. Reason cannot be denied without being employed.
Second, purely hypothetical reason itself does not tell us anything exists, including God.  But since something undeniably exists (e.g., I do), then reason can tell us much about existence, including God.  For instance, if something finite and contingent exists, then something infinite and necessary must exist (i.e., God).  And if God exists, then it is false that He does not exist. And if God is a necessary Being, then He cannot not exist. Further, if God is Creator and we are creatures, then we are not God. Likewise, reason informs us that if God is omnipotent, then He cannot make a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it. For whatever He can make, He can lift.

2. Reason is Useless in Religious Matters

Fideism argues that reason is of no use in matters that deal with God. One must simply believe. Faith, not reason, is what God requires (Heb. 11:6). In response to this several points can be made.
First, even from a biblical point of view God calls on us to use our reason (Isa. 1:18; 1 Pet. 3:15; Matt. 22:36-37). God is a rational being, and He created us as rational beings. God would not insult the reason He gave us by asking us to ignore it in such important matters as our beliefs about Him.

Second, this position is fideistic and is self-defeating. For either it has a reason that we should not reason about God or it does not. If it does, then it defeats itself by using reason to say we should not use reason. If fideism has no reason for not using reason, then it is without reason for its position, in which case there is no reason why one should accept fideism.
Furthermore, to claim reason is just optional for a fideist will not suffice. For either the fideist offers some criteria for when we should be reasonable and when we should not, or else his view is simply arbitrary. If he offers some rational criteria for when we should be rational, then he does have a rational basis for his view, in which case he is not really a fideist after all. Reason is not the kind of thing in which a rational creature can choose to participate. By virtue of being rational by nature one must be part of rational discourse. And rational discourse demands that one follow the laws of reason.

A major contribution made by the late Francis Schaeffer was his emphasis on the need for a reasoned approach to apologetics.  In his Escape from Reason he showed the futility of those who attempt to reject reason.  He constantly chided those who make a “dichotomy between reason and non-reason.” He also criticizes those who forsake reason for a  “lower story” materialism or an “upper story” mysticism.

3. You Can’t Prove God or Christianity by Reason

According to this objection, the existence of God cannot be proven by human reason. The answer depends on what is meant by “prove.”

First, if “prove” means to demonstrate with mathematical certainty, then most theists would agree that God’s existence cannot be proven in this way. The reason for this is because mathematical certainty deals only with the abstract, and the existence of God (or anything else) is a matter of concrete, real existence.  Mathematical certainty is based on certain axioms or postulates that must be assumed in order to get a necessary conclusion. But if God’s existence must be assumed in order to be proven, then the conclusion that God exists is only based on the assumption that He exists, in which case it is not really a proof at all. Mathematical certainty is deductive in nature. It argues from given premises. But one cannot validly conclude what is not already implied in the premise(s). In this case one would have to assume God exists in the premise in order to validly infer this in the conclusion. But this begs the question.

Second, if by “prove,” however, we mean “give adequate evidence for” or “provide good reasons for,” then it would seem to follow that one can prove the existence of God and the truth of Christianity. Indeed, many apologists have offered such proofs and people have become Christians after reading their writings.

4. No One is Persuaded of Religious Truths by Reason

According to this argument, no one is ever persuaded to accept a religious truth by reason. Psychological, personal, and subjective factors prompt religious decisions, not rational arguments. But this objection is patently false for many reasons.
First of all, who ever became a believer because he thought it was irrational and absurd to do so. Certainly, the vast majority of people who believe in God or accept Christ do so because they think it is reasonable.

Second, this objection confuses two kinds of belief: belief in and belief that. Certainly, religious belief in God and in Christ is not based on evidence and reason. But neither is it done without them. Every rational person looks to see if there is evidence that the elevator has a floor before he steps in it. Likewise, all rational people want evidence that an airplane can fly before they get in it. So belief that is prior to belief in. Apologetics deals with the former. It provides evidence that God exists, that Christ is the Son of God, and that the Bible is the Word of God. A religious decision is a step of faith in the light of the evidence, not a leap of faith in the dark–in the absence of evidence.

II. The Reasons for the Need to Defend the Faith

There are many good reasons for doing apologetics.  First of all, God commands us to do so.  Second, reason demands it.  Third, the world needs it.  Fourth, results confirm it.

A. God Commands the Use of Reason

The most important reason for doing apologetics is that God told us to do it. Over and over the New Testament exhorts us to defend the Faith.  1 Peter 3:15 says, “But in your hearts acknowledge Christ as the holy Lord. Always be prepared to give an answer to every one who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have.” This verse says several important things.
First, it says that we should be ready. We may never run across someone who asks the tough questions about our faith, but we should still be ready just in case. But being ready is not just a matter of having the right information available, it is also an attitude of readiness and eagerness to share with others the truth of what we believe.


Second, we are to give a reason to those who ask the questions (cf. Col. 4:5-6). It is not expected that every one needs pre-evangelism, but when they do need it, we must be able and willing to give them an answer.


Finally, it links doing pre-evangelism with making Christ Lord in our hearts. If He is really Lord, then we should be obedient to Him by “destroying speculations and every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God, and … taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). In other words we should be confronting issues in our own minds and in the expressed thoughts of others that are preventing them from knowing God. That is what apologetics is all about.


In Philippians 1:7 speaks of his mission as one of “defending and confirming the gospel.” He added in verse 16, “I am put here for the defense of the gospel” (Phil 1:16). And we are put where we are to defend it as well.


Jude 3 declares: “Beloved, while making every effort to write to you about our common salvation, I felt it necessary to write to you appealing that you contend earnestly for the faith once for all given over to the saints.” The people Jude was writing to had been assaulted by false teachers and he needed to encourage them to protect (literally agonize for) the faith as it had been revealed through Christ. Jude makes a significant statement about our attitude as we do this in verse 22 when he says, “have mercy on some, who are doubting.” Apologetics, then, is a form of compassion.


Titus 1:9 makes knowledge of Christian evidences a requirement for church leadership. An elder in the church should be “holding fast the faithful word which is in accordance with the teaching, that he may be able both to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict.”


In 2 Timothy 2:24-25 Paul declares that “the Lord’s bondservant must not be quarrelsome, but be kind to all, able to teach, patient when wronged, with gentleness correcting those who are in opposition, if perhaps God may grant them repentance leading to the knowledge of the truth.” Anyone attempting to answer the questions of unbelievers will surely be wronged and be tempted to lose patience, but our ultimate goal is that they might come to a knowledge of the truth that Jesus has died for their sins.

Indeed, the command to use reason is part of the greatest command. For Jesus said, “`Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment” (Matt. 22:37-38).

B. Reason Demands It

God created us with human reason. It is part of His image in us (Gen. 1:27 cf. Col. 3:10). Indeed, it is that by which we are distinguished from “brute beasts” (Jude 10). God calls upon us to use our reason (Isa. 1:18) to discern truth from error (1 John 4:6); to determine  right from wrong (Heb. 5:14), and to discern a true from a false prophet (Deut. 18:19-22).
A fundamental principle of reason is that we should have sufficient grounds for what we believe. An unjustified belief is just that–unjustified. Being created rational creatures and not “unreasoning animals” (Jude 10 NASB), we are expected to use the reason God gave us.  Socrates said, “The unexamined life is not worth living.” Likewise, the unexamined faith is not worth having. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Christians “to give a reason for their hope” (1 Pet. 3:15). This is part of the great command to love God with all our mind, as well as our heart and soul (Matt. 22:36-37).

C. The World Needs It

Many people refuse to believe without some evidence, as indeed they should. Since God created us as rational beings He does to expect us to live irrationally. He wants us to look before we leap.  This does not mean there is no room for faith. But God wants us to take a step of faith in the light–in the light of evidence. He does not want us to leap in the dark.
We should have evidence that something is true before we place our faith in it. For example, no rational person steps in an elevator unless he has some reason to believe it will hold him up. Likewise, no reasonable person gets on an airplane that has a broken wing and smoke coming out the tail end. Belief that is prior to belief in. Evidence and reason is important to establish belief that. Once this is established, one can place his faith in it.  Thus, the rational person will want some evidence that God exists before he places his faith in God. Likewise, rational unbelievers will want evidence for the claim that Jesus is the Son of God before they place their trust in Him.

D. Results Confirm It

There is a common misnomer among many Christians that apologetics never helps to bring anyone to Christ. This is a serious misrepresentation of the facts.

1. The Conversion of St. Augustine

There were several significant rational turning points in Augustine’s life before he came to Christ. First, he reasoned his way out of Manichaean dualism. One significant turning point here was the success of a young Christian debater of Manicheans called Helpidius.


Second, Augustine reasoned his way out of total skepticism by seeing the self-defeating nature of it.
Third, were it not for studying Plotinus, Augustine informs us that he would not even been able to conceive of a spiritual being, let alone believe in one.

2. The Conversion of Frank Morrison

This skeptical attorney set out to disprove Christianity by showing the resurrection never occurred. The quest ended with his conversion and a book titled Who Moved the Stone? in which the first chapter was titled “The Book That Refused to be Written”!  More recently another unbelieving attorney had a similar journey.

3. The Conversion of Simon Greenleaf

At the turn of the century the Professor of Law at Harvard, who wrote the book on legal evidence, was challenged by students to apply the rules of legal evidence to the New Testament to see if its testimony would stand up in court. The result was a book titled The Testimony of the Evangelists in which he expresses his confidence in the basic documents and truths of the Christian Faith.

4. The Results of Debates

Many people have been led toward or to Christianity as a result of debates we have had with atheists and skeptics. After debating Berkley University philosopher Michael Scriven on “Is Christianity Credible?” the University of Calgary audience voted three to one in favor of Christianity. The campus news paper report read: “Atheist Fails to Convert Campus Christians!”  Following a debate on the rationality of belief in Christianity with the head of the philosophy department at the University of Miami, the Christian student leadership held a follow-up meeting. The atheist professor attended and expressed doubts about his view expressed at the debate. It was reported that some 14 people who had attended the debate made decisions for Christ.


After a debate on the Moonie religion at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, a Moonie girl asked some questions about Christianity. I could see that she had been convinced that the Unification Church was not teaching the truth. After talking with her briefly, I introduced her to a female seminary student who led her to Christ.
When sharing the gospel with Don Bly, he informed us that he was an atheist. After reasoning with him from atheism to open-minded agnosticism, he agreed to read Frank Morrison’s book. The evidence for Christ’s resurrection convinced him and we had the privilege of leading him to Christ. He has subsequently raised his family for Christ became a leader in a church south of St. Louis.

5. The Results of Reading Apologetic Writings

I have received a number of letters and reports of people who have been converted to belief that God exists or to belief in Christ after readingApologetics works. God used its arguments as an instrument to bring people toward and to Christ.
The world’s most notorious atheist wrote, “Nor do I claim to have had any personal experience of God or any experience that may be called super- natural or miraculous.  In short, my discovery of the divine has been a pilgrimage of reason and not of faith.”


Noted former atheist Francis Collins said, “After twenty eight years as a believer, the Moral Law still stands out for me as the strongest signpost to God.  More than that, it points to a God who cares about human beings, and a God who is infinitely good and holy.”


A college student wrote, “God sent me your book ‘I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist’….  I opened the book thinking I would rip it apart with my superior viewpoint and about one quarter of the way through I ended up apologizing to God and accepting him into my heart.  I have since grown exponentially in Christ, and I thought I would thank you for your inspiring book.”


“I just got done reading Why I Am a Christian, and I was blown away.  It is perhaps the most powerful and influential Christian book I’ve ever read.  It was exactly what I was looking for.  It provided the answers to the roadblocks that were guarding against my faith…. Your book pressed the red button setting off the nuclear bomb of my faith.”

Conclusion

Christianity is under attack today and must be defended against attacks from within by cults and heresies and from without by skeptics and other religions.  We have a reasonable Faith, and the Bible has commanded that we give reasons for it. As perhaps the greatest apologist of the twentieth century, C. S. Lewis, said: “To be ignorant and simple now–not to be able to meet the enemies on their ground–would be to throw down our weapons, and to betray our uneducated brethren who have, under God, no defense but us against the intellectual attacks of the heathen. Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad philosophy needs to be answered.” The reason we need to defend the true religion is because there are false religions. The reason we need to stand for authentic Christianity is that there are counterfeit forms of Christianity.


*This article is a revision of a previously unpublished article called “The Need for Apologetics.”


**Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from the Bible are taken from the New International Version of the Bible (NIV).

Sources

Bush, Russ L., ed., Classical Readings in Christian Apologetics

Clark, Gordon H., Religion, Reason and Revelation

Corduan, Winfried, Reasonable Faith.

Geisler, Norman L., Christian Apologetics

Geisler, Norman L. and Ronald Brooks, When Skeptics Ask

Kreeft, Peter and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics

Lewis, Gordon R., Testing Christianity’s Truth Claims

McDowell, Josh, Evidence That Demands A Verdict

Montgomery, John W., Faith Founded on Fact

Moreland, J. P., Scaling The Secular City

Smith, Wilbur M., Therefore Stand

Copyright © 2012 NormanGeisler.net – All rights reserved

A Response to Philosophical Postmodernism


A Response to Philosophical Postmodernism

by Norman L. Geisler

 

A Brief Background of Postmodernism

Premodernism is often thought of as the time before 1650 A.D.  The dominant theme was metaphysics or the study of being (reality). Modernism then began with Rene Descartes around 1650 and turned attention to epistemology or how we know.  The precise date of Post-modernism is in dispute.  Although its roots go to Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900), it did not begin to take shape until around 1950 with Martin Heidegger and began to occupy a front seat in the discussion a decade or two later with Derrida.  The primary focus of Post-modernism is hermeneutics or how to interpret.  The object of interpretation can be history, art, or literature, but deconstructing it is the center of focus.

Someone has illustrated the difference between the three periods of thought by the image of a referee.  The Pre-modern referee says: “I call them like they are.”  The Modern referee claims, “I call them like I see them.”  But the Post-modern referee declares: “They are nothing until I call them.”

Forerunners of Postmodernism

Modern western thought begins with two main streams: empiricism and rationalism.  David Hume represented the former and Rene Descartes the latter.  The empiricists stressed the senses and the rationalist the mind.  The empiricists began a posteriori in sense experience, but the rationalist began a priori with innate ideas in the mind.  Immanuel Kant synthesized the two streams, arguing that the senses provide the content of our knowledge but the mind gives form to it. He claimed that the mind without the senses is empty, but the senses without the mind are blind.  The unfortunate result of his brilliant but tragic synthesis was agnosticism. We cannot know reality as it is in itself but only as it is after it is mediated to us through the senses and formed by the categories in our mind.  Hence, metaphysics—knowing reality in itself—is impossible.

 

Kantian agnosticism gave rise to ren Kierkegaard’s fideism on the one hand and Nietzsche’s atheism on the other hand. Acknowledging the Kantian gulf between appearance and reality, Kierkegaard suggest a “leap of faith” to the “wholly other” God who transcends all capacity to know him with our minds.  Nietzsche, on the other hand preferred not to leap to an unknown God but to pronounce God dead and simply go on willing the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs forever.

 

In the absence of any absolute Mind to express any absolute meaning, Ludwig Wittgenstein built on Frege’s conventionalism and insisted that we are all locked inside a linguistic bubble which allows us to make no cognitively meaningful statements about the mystical (metaphysical) beyond.  That is to say, without saying God is dead, he insisted that all meaningful talk about God is “dead” (i.e., meaningless).

 

Borrowing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method, the later Martin Heidegger posited a new hermeneutic which, giving up on any metaphysical knowledge of reality, attempted to retrieve rays of truth to shine through poetry (particularly that of Friedrich Holderlin). It is out of this context that Jacque Derrida conceived his hermeneutical method of deconstructions by which one deconstructs a text and reconstructs it over and over again.  Before we analyze that more carefully, it will be helpful to contrast Modern and Post-Modern thought in general.

Contrast of Modernism and Post-Modernism

 

As can be seen from the following chart, there is an import shift between modern and post-modern thought.  The general shift is from epistemology to hermeneutics; from absolute truth to relative truth; from seeking the author’s meaning finding to the reader’s meanings; from the structure of the text to destructing the text; from the goal of knowing truth to the journey of knowing:

 

Modernism                              Postmodernism

Unity of thought                      Diversity of thought

Rational                                   Social and psychological

Conceptual                              Visual and poetical

Truth is absolute                     Truth is relative

Exclusivism                             Pluralism

Foundationalism                     Anti-foundationalism

Epistemology                          Hermeneutics

Certainty                                 Uncertainty

Author’s meaning                   Reader’s meanings

Structure of the text                Deconstructing the text

The goal of knowing               The journey of knowing

                                  The Nature of Postmodernism

Postmodernism is a condition where [since God is dead] “anything is possible and nothing is certain” (Vaclav Havel).  Nietzsche pronounced “God is dead,” but there are several different meanings that can be given to this phrase “God is Dead.”  It can mean God is dead–

  1. Epistemologically–Kant
  2. Mythologically—Nietzsche
  3. Dialectically—Hegel
  4. Linguistically—Ayer
  5. Phenomenalogically—Husserl
  6. Existentially–Sartre
  7. Cognitively—Wittgenstein
  8. Hermeneutically—Heidegger/Derrida

Of course, many of these thinkers also believe God is dead actually(e.g., Nietzsche, Sartre, and Derrida), but this is beside the point at hand here, namely, the methodology of Post-Modern deconstructionism.

Jacques Derrida: Post-Modernism

Two of the dominant figures in Post-modernism are Jacque Derrida and Paul-Michel Foucault.  Derrida wrote:  Of Grammatology (‘67); Speech and Phenomena (‘67); Writing and Difference (‘67); Limited Inc. (1970); Post Card: From Socrates, Freud and Beyond (1972); Specters of Marx (1994).

        Foucault wrote: Madness and Civilization (1961); Death and Labyrinth (1963); The Order of Things (1966); Discipline and Punish (1975);Archaeology of Knowledge (1976), and History of Sexuality (1976-1984).
The starting point for their post-modern thought was Nietzsche’s death of God.  For if

If there is no Absolute Mind, then there is-

  1. No absolute truth (epistemological relativism)
  2. No absolute meaning (semantical relativism)
  3. No absolute history (reconstructionism)

And if there is no Absolute Author, then there is—

  1. No absolute writing (textual relativism)
  2. No absolute interpretation (hermeneutical relativism)

And if there is no Absolute Thinker, then there is—

  1. No absolute thought (philosophical relativism)
  2. No absolute laws of thought (anti-foundationalism)

And if there is no Absolute Purposer, then there is—

  1. No absolute purpose (teleological relativism)

If there is no Absolute Good, then there is—

  1. No absolute right or wrong (moral relativism)

The Death of All Absolute Values in Post-Modernism

“Without God and the future life?  How will man be after that? It means everything is permitted now” (The Brothers Karamazov, Vintage, 1991, p. 589).  As Jean Paul Sartre put it, “I knew myself alone, utterly alone in the midst of this well-meaning little universe of yours.  I was like a man who’s lost his shadow.  And there was nothing left in heaven, no right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders” (Sartre, The Flies, 121-122 in No Exit and Three Other Plays).  Aldous Huxley acknowledge this same conclusion when he wrote, “The liberation we desired was simultaneously liberation from a certain political and economic system and liberation from a certain system of morality.  We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom” (Ends and Means, 272).

Perhaps no one described it better than Bertrand Russell when he wrote of a world without God:  “Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving…. His origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms…. All the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system…. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built” (Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship” (in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 67).

In short, the root of Post-modernism is atheism and the fruit of it is relativism—relativism in every area of life and thought.  Of particular interest is the post-modern attack on foundationalism, history, and textual interpretation and how this has affected Christian thought.

The Attack on Foundationalism

Foundationalism is the view that there are fundamental self-evident first principles which form the basis of all knowledge. It is at least as old as Plato and Aristotle in the Western world, though it has been the unwitting foundation of Christian Thought from the beginning of time.

There is an important distinction between two basic kinds of foundationalism often neglected by post-modern thought.  There is deductive foundationalism and reductive foundationalism.

Deductive foundationalism springs from modern rationalist like Benedict Spinoza and Rene Descartes.  It is based on a Euclidian geometric model whereby certain axioms are defined as self-evident and all other truth is deduced from them.  The problem with this is that not all axioms are necessary.  Different axioms are possible, both in mathematics and philosophy. Further, these rational axioms are empty.  They yield no knowledge about reality.  For example, saying “All triangles have three sides” does not tell us there are any triangles.  It merely says that if there are any triangles, then by definition they must have three sides.

Reductive foundationalism finds roots in Aristotle and was embraced by the great Christian thinker Thomas Aquinas.  It states that all truths are reducible to (or based on) self-evident first principles. Every statement not evident in itself must be evident in terms of something else. But there cannot be an infinite regress of non-evident statements. For an endless regress of explanations is nothing more than an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation.  Hence, there must be first self-evident statements in terms of which non-evident statements are known to be true.

First principles of knowledge are self-evident.  That is, they are a statement where the predicate term is reducible to the subject term, though not always deducible from it. The basic laws of thought include the following:

Several things are noteworthy about these first principles of thought.

First, they are all first principles of thought and being.  Why?  Because “If there were an infinite regress in demonstration, demonstration would be impossible, because the conclusion of any demonstration is made certain by reducing it to the first principle of demonstration” (Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 244).  Or, as C. S. Lewis aptly put it, “You cannot go on ‘explaining away’ forever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away.  You cannot go on ‘seeing through’ things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it.  It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque.  How if you saw through the garden too?  It is no use trying to see through first principles.  If you see through everything, then everything is transparent.  But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world.  To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see” (The Abolition of Man, 91).

Second, they self-evident in the reductive sense. That is, there predicate is reducible to their subject.  So that once one understand the meaning of the subject and predicate he can immediately see that they are self-evident.  For example, once one knows what the words “bachelor” and “unmarried” mean, then he knows immediately that “all bachelors are unmarried men.”  Likewise, once one knows this is a three-sided figure, then he sees immediately that it is a triangle.

Third, they are also undeniable.  That is, every attempt to deny them, affirms them (at least implicitly) in that attempted denial.  Take, for example, the Law of Existence.  I cannot deny that something exist without existing to make the denial.  The claim that I do not exists, implies that I do exist to make the denial.

Fourth, these first principles apply to all of reality.  They are metaphysical first principles.  Unlike deductive foundationalism, they are not empty and vacuous.  They are first principles of being (reality). They begin with something exists.

Fifth, from these principles one can demonstrate the existence and central attributes of God. For if something exists (#1), and if nothing cannot cause something (#5), then something eternal and necessary must exists. And whatever else exists, then it must be similar to God in its being (#7).  But not all being is a necessary being (#6). For example, I am a contingent being, that is, I am, but I might not be.  My non-existence is possible.  But I am a knowing and moral being (which is undeniable).  Hence there must be an eternal and necessary Being who is a knowing and moral Being that exists (i.e., God).  And if God exists, then absolute thought, values, and meaning also exists.  In short, post-modernism is wrong.

 

A Critique of Postmodernism

 

            This critique can be applied to other areas of post-modern thought, for example, to deconstructionism in history and textual interpretation.  Let’s briefly apply it to history.

 

A Critique of Post-Modern View of History

 

According to a post-modern view of history, we must deconstruct all historical accounts of the past since they are relative and not objective.  This, of course, would be destructive of  orthodox Christianity since it is a historic religion.  We believe, as the Apostles’ Creed says, that Jesus “was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried… [and] the third day He arose again from the dead.”  These are all historical claims, and if history is unknowable, then we cannot know these to be true.  But is history really unknowable?  Let’s briefly examine the post-modern arguments for the unknowability of history. One historical relativist said, “The event itself, the facts, do not say anything, do not impose any meaning. It is the historian who speaks, who imposes a meaning” (Carl L. Becker, “What Are Historical Facts?” in The Philosophy of History in Our Time, p. 131).

However, there is a serious self-defeating problem with this claim.  How can one know that something is not objective history unless he has an objective knowledge of history that enables him to say that a particular view of history is not objective.  One cannot know not-that unless he knows that.  And he cannot know not-objective history unless he knows objective history.  Second, it is self-defeating to deny objectivity in history.  Even Charles Beard, the apostle of historical relativity himself, wrote: “Contemporary criticism shows that the apostle of relativity is destined to be destroyed by the child of his own brain.”  For, “If all historical conceptions are merely relative to passing events…then the conceptions of relativity is itself relative.”  In short, “the apostle of relativity will surely be executed by his own logic” (Meyerhoff ed., The Philosophy of History in Our Time, 138, emphasis added).

 A Critique of a Post-modern Views of Hermeneutics

There are several characteristics of a deconstructionists view of interpretation.

First, it is based in conventionalism.  This is  the view that all meaning is culturally relative.  However, this too is self-defeating for if “all meaning is culturally relative” then even this statement would be culturally relative.  Yet it claims to be a statement about cultural relativity not one of cultural relativity.

Second, post-modern hermeneutic claims that there is no objective meaning.  For all statements are made from a subjective perspective.  However, this too is self-destructive for it amount to saying that it is an objective statement about meaning that no statements are objectively meaningful.

Third, it denies that there is a correspondence between our statements and their object. This denies the correspondence view of truth.  But the problem with denying that truth corresponds to reality is that this very denial claims to correspond to reality.  So, one cannot deny statements correspond to reality without making a statement he believes corresponds to reality.

Fourth, post-modern hermeneutics is a form of linguistic solipsism.  Following Wittgenstein, Derrida believes that we are locked inside of language in a kind of linguistic bubble and cannot get out.  However, this is a form of the “nothing-buttery” fallacy.  For all statements that imply we can know nothing but what is inside the linguistic bubble imply that we have knowledge ofmore than what is inside the bubble.  Like the Kantian contradiction, one cannot know about reality that he cannot know anything about reality.  Language is not a wall that bars us from reality; it is a window that expresses the reality we know.

This linguistic solipsism fallacy is based on the failure to recognize that creation is analogous to the Creator.  There must be a similarity between the Cause of finite being and the Infinite Being that caused it.  For one cannot give what he does not have to give.  He cannot produce what he does not produce.  Thus, the Source of all being must be similar to the being that he brings into being.[1]

Fifth, according to post-modernism, logic is language dependent.  The laws of thought are, therefore, culturally dependent.  But this is clearly contrary to fact—the fact that language is based on logic, not the reverse.  For the basic laws of thought (enumerated above) operate in ever language and culture, as do the basic laws of mathematics.  Logic transcends culture and makes cross-cultural communication possible.  The very claim that the Law of Non-contradiction is not applicable to all cultures is itself a non-contradictory statement about all cultures.

Sixth, another post-modern hermeneutical premise is that meaning is determined by the reader, not by the author.  For they claim that every text is understood in a context and every reader brings a new context to the text.  Hence, it is not the meaning of the author that is the true meaning of a text by the meanings of the readers.  However, here again we are faced with a self-stultifying claim.  For no post-modernist desires us to give our meaning(s) to his words. He expects us to take the meaning of his words (i.e., the author’s meaning).  So, the denial that the author’s meaning is the correct meaning implies that the authors’ meaning is the correct meaning.

The Problems with Post-modernism

In summation, the problems with post-modernism are: (1) It can’t be thought consistently; (2) It can’t be spoken consistently, and (3) It cannot be lived consistency.  Why? Because it is based on atheism, and atheism cannot be thought, spoken, or lived consistently.  Evidence for the inability to live atheism consistently comes from the lives of atheists themselves. 

Evidence for atheists that atheism cannot be lived consistently

Atheist Jean Paul Sartre wrote, “I reached out for religion, I longed for it, it was the remedy. Had it been denied me, I would have invented it myself… I needed a Creator….” (The Words, 102).   Atheist Albert Camus added,   “For anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful” (The Fall, 133).  Even Nietzsche wrote a poem to an “Unknown God,” crying out:  “Unknown one! Speak. What wilt thou, unknown-god?… Do come back With all thy tortures! To the last of all that are lonely, Oh, come back!… And my heart’s final flame –Flares up for thee! Oh, come back, My unknown god! My pain! My last–happiness!” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part Four, “The Magician”).

Bertrand Russell expressed a revealing moment when he wrote to a lady friend, “Even when one feels nearest to other people, something in one seems obstinately to belong to God…–at least that is how I should express it if I thought there was a God.  It is odd, isn’t it? I care passionately for this world and many things and people in it, and yet…what is it all?” There must be something more important one feels, though I don’t believe there is” (emphasis is his).

A number of years, before the iron curtain was lifted, while I was returning from Europe, I was given Time magazine.  The cover caught my attention.  It read: “God is Dead; Marx is dead, and I am not feeling too well either” (Timecover, European edition, 1978). Nietzsche wrote, “I hold up before myself the images of Dante and Spinoza, who were better at accepting the lot of solitude. Of course, their way of thinking, compared to mine, was one which made solitude bearable; and in the end, for all those who somehow still had a “God” for company…. My life now consists in the wish that it might be otherwise…and that somebody might make my “truths” appear incredible to me…” (Letter to Overbeck, 7/2/1865).

Even David Hume could not live his skepticism.  He wrote:  “Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds [of doubt], nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of the philosophical melancholy and delirium…” (A Treatise on Human Nature1.4.7).  So, what did he do?  He said, “I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse…; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther” (ibid. 1.4.7).

Famous unbelieving historian and philosopher Will Durant wrote: “I survive morally because I retain the moral code that was taught me along with the religion, while I discarded the religion….  You and I are living on a shadow…. But what will happen to our children…? They are living on the shadow of a shadow” (Chicago Sun-Times 8/24/75 1B).

The British Humanist Magazine charged that Humanism is almost “clinically detached from life.”  It recommends they develop a humanist Bible, a humanist hymnal, Ten Commandments for humanists, and even confessional practices!  In addition, “the use of hypnotic techniques–music and other psychological devices–during humanist services would give the audience that deep spiritual experience and they would emerge refreshed and inspired   with their humanist faith…” (1964). I have composed some hymns for them: “Socrates, Lover of My Soul,” “No One Ever Care for Me like Plato,” and “My hope is built on nothing less than Jean Paul Sartre and nothingness”! A hymn for a Post-modernists might read like this:

                           “Open my eyes that I may see,

                   More of my own subjectivity.

                           Help me, Derrida, ever to be

                  All absorbed in uncertainty.

                           Then I’ll know what it is to be

                        Lost forever in postmodernity.”

In summary, when atheists themselves evaluate atheism they conclude it like living on s a “shadow of a shadow.”  It is not “bearable.”  It is “dreadful,”even “cruel.” It even leads to “delirium.” The main point is that postmodernism is not only unthinkable and unspeakable, but it is unlivable.

Atheist Albert Camus declared that “Nothing can discourage the appetite for divinity in the heart of man” (Camus, The Rebel, 147).  Blaise Pascal insisted that there is a God-sized vacuum in the human heart which nothing but God can fill.  He wrote: “What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him… though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself” (Pascal, Pensees # 425). Former Atheist Francis Collins who headed up the human genome project asked:  “Why would such a universal and uniquely human hunger [for God] exist, if it were not connected to some opportunity for fulfillment?… Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists.  A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food.  A duckling wants to swim: well there is such a thing as water” (The Language of God, 38).  So, if there is a God-sized vacuum in the human heart, then nothing smaller than God will be able to fill it.

Atheist Sigmund Freud claimed that “What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes.”  As for “religious doctrines,” “all of them are illusions and insusceptible of proof” (The Future of an Illusion, 49-50). However, as it turns out it is the atheist who has the illusion.  For Freud never made a study of believers on which he based his view.  On the contrary, recent studies show that belief in God leads to a better and happier life. Former Freudian did a study of great atheist and found that they were fatherless wither actually of functionally and that, rather than believers creating the Father (God), atheists are attempting to kill the Father (Paul Vitz, Faith of the Fatherless). He wrote, “Indeed, there is a coherent psychological origin to intense atheism” (p. 3). “Therefore, in the Freudian framework, atheism is an illusion caused by the Oedipal desire to kill the father (God) and replace him with oneself” (p. 13).

Indeed, in Nietzsche’s famous quote about “God is dead” the next line is “and we have killed him.”  French existential atheist Jean Paul Sartre, illustrates the point in his own autobiography when he wrote: “I had all the more difficulty of getting rid of him in that he had installed himself at the back of my head.… I collared the Holy Ghost in the cellar and threw him out; atheism is a cruel and long-range affair; I think I’ve carried it through. I lost my illusion” (The Words, 252-253).

However, even though Sartre had given up on God, God had not given up on him.  Before Sartre’s death he is recorded as saying, “I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck  of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured.  In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here” (National Review, 11 June, 1982, p. 677).  Indeed, Sartre was disowned by his own mistress as a “turncoat” and visited by a Christian minister regularly before his death.  I have in my file a letter from missionaries in France who knew Sartre who had expressed to them his regret on how many young people he had led astray with his atheistic thought.

 


 

[1] Of course, there must be a difference between Creator and creature since He is an infinite kind of Being and we are finite beings.  He is a Being with no potentiality for non-being, and we are contingent beings which have the possibility not to be.  God is Pure Actuality (with no potential not to exist), and all creatures are actualities with the potentiality not to exist.

Copyright © 2012 Norman L. Geisler – All rights reserved


Further resources:

A History of Western Philosophy Vol. 1

A History of Western Philosophy Vol. 2

The Emergent Church: Theological Postmodernism


The Emergent Church: Theological Postmodernism

by Norman L. Geisler

March 2012

The Key Influence on Postmodernism

The post-modern movement finds its roots in Friedrich Nietzsche and the death of God movement he spawned.  The whole post-modern movement can be cast in this context.  Nietzsche wrote: “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.  How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves?” (“The Madman” in Gay Science, 125).  But once they pronounced that God is dead, then the rest of post-modernism follows logically.  For if there is no absolute Moral Law Giver, there can be no absolute moral law (subjectivism).  Likewise, if there is no absolute Mind, then there can be no absolute meaning (conventionalism) or absolute truth (relativism).  Further, if there is no objective meaning, then there cannot be an objective interpretation of a text.  Hence, deconstructionism follows.   So, the death of God leads to the death of every other area of  thought and life as follows:

  1. “Death of God”–Atheism
  2. Death of objective truth–Relativism
  3. Death of exclusive truth—Pluralism
  4. Death of objective meaning–Conventionalism
  5. Death of thinking (logic)—Anti-Foundationalism
  6. Death of objective interpretation–Deconstructionism 
  7. Death of objective values–Subjectivism

Key Influence of Postmodernism on Theology

Post-modernism in theology has been called Post-Protestant, Post-Orthodox, Post-Denominational, Post-Doctrinal, Post-Individual, Post-Foundational, Post-Creedal, Post-Rational, Post-Absolute.  Actually, “Post” = “Anti” since post-modernism is opposed to everything listed above which they see as part of the modern world.

The North American father of post-modernism in evangelical theology, wrote: “But for me…opposing it [Postmodernism] is as futile as opposing the English language.  It’s here. It’s reality. It’s the future…. It’s the way my generation processes every other fact on the event horizon” (McLaren, The Church on the Other Side (COS), 70).   He added, “Postmodernism is the intellectual boundary between the old world and the other side.  Why is it so important? Because when your view of truth is changed, when your confidence in the human ability to know truth in any objective way is revolutionized, then everything changes. That includes theology…” (McLaren, COS, 69).

Key Books by Post-Modern Theologians

Brian McLaren wrote The Church on the Other Side, A Generous Orthodoxy, and  A New Kind of Christian.  Stanley Grenz, the grand-father of the movement wrote:  A Primer on Post-Modernism, Beyond Foundationalism, Revisioning Evangelical Theology. Rob Bell hit the front page of Timemagazine recently with his denial of Hell in his book, Love Wins.  He also wrote Velvet Elvis: Repainting the Christian Faith.  Doug Pagitt & Tony Jones penned, An Emergent Manifesto of Hope and Tony Jones wrote, The New Christians: Dispatches  from the Emergent Frontier.

Basic Beliefs of Post-Modernism

            There are many beliefs of post-modernist.  We will list the key views and show how they are making self-defeating claims.  This is what the apostle Paul urges us to do when he said “We destroy arguments and bring every thought captive to Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5).

Anti-Absolutism

McLaren wrote: “Arguments that pit absolutism verses relativism, and objectivism versus subjectivisim, prove meaningless or absurd to postmodern people” (McClaren, “The Broadened Gospel,” (in “Emergent Evangelism,” Christianity Today [Nov., 2004], 43).

As we shall see, the root problem with post-modern thought is that it is self-defeating.  It cannot even state its view without contradicting itself.  For example,–

  1. Relativism Stated: “We cannot know absolute truth.”

2. Relativism Self-Refuted: We know that we cannot know absolute truth.

 

Anti-Exclusivism

Another aspect of post-modern thought is its pluralism or anti-exclusivism. McClaren wrote: “Missional Christian faith asserts that Jesus did not come to make some people saved and others condemned.  Jesus did not come to help some people be right while leaving everyone else to be wrong. Jesus did not come to create another exclusive religion” (A Generous Orthodoxy, 109).

“But Christianity’s idea that other religions cannot be God’s carriers of [redemptive] grace and truth casts a large shadow over our Christian experiences (Samir Selmanovic, in Pagitt, An Emergent Manifesto of Hope, 191). “Christianity is a non-god, and every non-god can be and idol” (192). “God cannot be hijacked by Christianity” (194). “If a relationship with a specific person, namely Christ, is the whole substance of a relationship with the God of the Bible, then the vast majority of people in world history are excluded from the possibility of a relationship with the God of the Bible…” (194). “To put it in different terms, there is no salvation outside of Christ, but there is salvation outside of Christianity” (19).  “Would a God who gives enough revelation for people to be judged but not enough revelation to be saved be a God worthy of worshiping? Never!” (195).

 
  1. The Anti-exclusivism claim: “It is wrong to make a claim that one view is exclusive truth as opposed to opposing views.”
  2. The Self-refutation: The anti-exclusivist claim is exclusively true as opposed to exclusivism.

Anti-exlusivism is just another term for pluralism. The problem is clear.  The claim that no view is exclusively true is an exclusivistic truth claim itself.

  1. The Claim of Pluralism: “No view is exclusively true.”
  2. The Self-Refutation: It claims that its view (that no view is exclusively true) is exclusively true.

Anti-Foundationalism

As Stanely Grenz noted in the title of his book Beyond Foundationalism, the post-modern movement is opposed to epistemological foundationalism.  That is, they are opposed to the view that there are self-evident principles at the basis of all thought.  “The theory that at the bottom of all human knowledge is a set of self-inferential or internally justified beliefs; in other words, the foundation is indubitable and requires no external justification. For the conservative, the sacred text of Christianity is indubitable, established by an internal and circular reasoning: ‘‘The Bible claims to be God’s truth, so therefore it’s true.’’ (Jones, The New Christian, 19).

The basic principles of foundationalism include the laws of logic, such as the following:

  1. The Law of Identity (A is A).
  2. The Law of Non-Contradiction (A is not non-A).
  3. The Law of Excluded Middle (Either a or non-A).
  4. The Laws of rational inference.

For example, it is a rational inference to conclude that:

  1. All A is included in B.
    2. All B is included in C.
    3. Hence, All A is included in C.

There are different kinds of rational inferences.  There is categorical inference (above).  And there is hypothetical inference (below):

  1.  If all human beings are sinners, then John is a sinner.
  2. All human beings are sinners.
  3. Therefore, John is a sinner.

There are also disjunctive inferences: Either a person is saved or else he is lost (but he cannot be both at the same time and in the same sense).  So, if he is not saved, then he must be lost.  Given these kinds of principles being the bedrock of foundationalism, it is difficult to see what one could have against these venerable laws of thought.

Nonetheless, Stanley Grenz wrote a whole book against Foundationalism titled: Beyond Foundationalism.  McLaren wrote: “For modern Western Christians, words like authority, inerrancy, infallibility, revelation, objective, absolute, and literal are crucial…. Hardly anyone knows …Rene Descartes, the Enlightenment, David Hume, and Foundationalism—which provides the context in which these words are so important.  Hardly anyone notices the irony of resorting to the authority of extra-biblical words and concepts to justify one’s belief in the Bible’s ultimate authority” (McLaren, Generous Orthodoxy 164).

To reduce their view to a simple proposition, they claim the following:

 
  • Claim of Anti-Foundationalism: “Opposites (e.g., A is non-A) can both be true”
  • The Self-Refutation: They hold that the opposite of this statement (that opposites can both be true) cannot be true.

It must be false.  But if the opposite of true is false, then they are using a

foundational logical principle to deny foundational logical principles. This is self-defeating.

Anti-Objectivism

Another characteristic of post-modern thought is subjectivism.  Grenz wrote: “We ought to commend the postmodern questioning of the Enlightenment assumption that knowledge is objective and hence dispassionate” (Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism, 166).  Put in simple form:

  1. The Claim of Anti-Objectivism: “There are no objectively true statements.”
  2. The Self-Refutation: It is an objectively true statement that there are no objectively true statements.

In short, their anti-objectivism makes an objective truth claim.  Hence, it is hanged on its

own epistemological gallows.  It self-destructs.

Anti-Rationalism

Another characteristic of post-modernism in theology is anti-rationalism.  It is a form of fideism that denies that reason has no place in matters of faith. Grenz chided “Twentieth-century evangelicals [who] have devoted much energy to the task of demonstrating the credibility of the Christian faith…” (Grenz,PPM, 160).  He added, “Following the intellect can sometimes lead us away from the truth” (Grenz, PPM, 166).  Of course, he seems blissfully unaware of the fact that not following basic rational thought will lead you there a lot faster!

McLaren, added: “Because knowledge is a luxury beyond our means, faith is the best we can hope for.  What an opportunity! Faith hasn’t encountered openness like this in several hundred years” (McLaren, COS, 173).  He urged: “Drop any affair you may have with certainty, proof, argument—and replace it with dialogue, conversation, intrigue, and search” (McLaren, Adventures in Missing the Point, 78).  But here again we are faced with a self-defeating claim:

  1. The Claim of Fideism: “There are no reasons for what we believe.”
  2. The Self-Refutation: There are good reasons for believing there are no good reasons for what we believe.

To state it another way, —

  1. The Claim of Fideism: “Knowledge is a luxury beyond our means.”
  2. The Self-Refutation: We have the luxury of knowing that we can’t have the luxury of knowing.

Anti-Objectivism (of Meaning)

The term that describes anti-objectivism in meaning is Conventionalism.  It claims that all meaning is culturally relative. There is no fixed meaning. Meaning is not objective.  But here again we are faced with self-destructive claims:

  1. The Claim of Conventionalism: “There is no objective meaning.”
  2. The Self-Refutation: It is objectively meaningful to assert that there is no objective meaning.

The post-modern dilemma is painful.  It cannot even express its view without borrowing from its opposing view.  It literally has no ground of its own on which to stand.  It is living on borrowed capital.

Anti-Realism

According to post-modern theology, there is no objective world that can be known.  Rather, “the only ultimately valid ‘objectivity of the world’ is that of a future, eschatological world, and the ‘actual’ universe is the universe as it one day will be” (Grenz, Renewing the Center, 246).

  1. The Claim of Anti-Realism “There is no real world now that can be known.”

2. The Self-Refutation: We know it is really true now (i.e., true in the real world now) that there is no real world now that can be known.

One cannot really know now that there is no real world now.  For “really” implies there is a reality to know.  And if there is a real world now, then one cannot deny it without implying it. 

Anti-Certainty

Protestants believe the Bible is infallible (Matt. 5:17-18; John 10:35), but not any interpretation of it—like an alleged infallible Papal pronouncement.  However, lacking infallibility in all matters of Faith does not mean we lack certainty in some matters. The principle of perspicuity (clarity) affirms that the main teachings of Scripture are clear and we can be certain of them.  For in the Bible the main things are the plain things, and the plain things are the main things. Of these we can have moral certainty.  Post-modern Christians challenge that one can have any certainty in our knowledge of the Bible.  McLaren put it this way: “Well, I’m wondering, if you have an infallible text, but all your interpretations of it are admittedly fallible, then you at least have to always be open to being corrected about your interpretation, right?… So the authoritative text is never what I say about the text or even what I understand the text to say but rather what God means the text to say, right?” (McLaren,NKC, 50).

  1. The Claim of Anti-Certainty: “My understanding of the text is never the correct one.”

2. The Self-Refutation: My understanding of the text is correct in saying that my understanding of the text is never correct.

In short, the claim that one is certain that he can never be certain about anything the Bible teaches is a self-defeating claim.

Anti-Propositionalism

It is an essential truth of evangelical Christianity that the Bible contains proposition truth claims.  That is, regardless of the literary form (story, parable, poetry, or proverbs), the Bible contains truth that can be stated in propositional form.  In short, the Bible contains doctrinal truths.  But Grenz and other post-modern theologians claim that: “Our understanding of the Christian faith must not remain fixated on the propositional approach that views Christian truth as nothing more than correct doctrine or doctrinal truth” (Grenz, PPM, 170).  So, “Transformed in this manner into a book of doctrine, the Bible is easily robbed of its dynamic character” (Grenz,Revisioning Evangelical Theology, 114-115).

  1. The Claim of Anti-Propositionalism: “Our view of the Christian faith must not be fixed on propositional truth (doctrine).”
  2. The Self-Refutation: We must be fixed on the propositional truth that we should not be fixed on propositional truth.

What the anti-propostionalist fails to see is that denying propositional truth is a propositional truth.  Denying doctrine is a doctrine. Denying creeds is a creedal statement.

Another post-modern claim connected to this is the following:

  1. The Claim of Anti-Propositionalism: “Doctrinal truth is not dynamic.”
  2. The Self-Refutation: It is a dynamic doctrinal truth (of post-modernism) that doctrinal truth is not dynamic.

But doctrine is dynamic!  Ideas have consequences!  E = MC2 is a proposition that had dynamic consequences—it produced an atomic bomb.  Likewise, biblical truth has consequences.  The truth of the Gospel has consequence; it is the power of God unto salvation (Rom. 1:16).  To deny the Gospel or its underpinning doctrines is to destroy the power of the Gospel.

 

Anti-Orthodoxy

Post-modern Christian Dwight J. Friesen speaks out against orthodoxy–the belief in orthodox doctrines of the Bible.  He wrote: “Jesus did not announce ideas or call people to certain beliefs as much as he invited people to follow him into a way of being in the world…. The theological method of orthoparadoxy surrenders the right to be right for the sake of movement toward being reconciled one with another, while simultaneously seeking to bring the fullness of conviction and belief to the other…. Current theological methods that often stress… orthodoxy/heresy, and the like set people up for constant battles to convince and convert the other to their way of believing and being in the world” (Friesen, in EMH, 205). Therefore, “in orthoparadox theology propositions and truth claims are more important than ever but not as litmus tests of correct belief or practice; rather, truth claims become launching pads for differentiated relationship…. Orthoparadox theology is less concerned with creating ‘once for all’ doctrinal statements or dogmatic claims and is more interested in holding competing truth claims in right tension” (Friesen, in EMH, 209)

  1. The Claim of Post-Orthodoxy: “We should not insist on being right about doctrine.”
  2. The Self-refutation: We insist on being right in our doctrine that we should not insist on being right in our doctrine.

The creed on non-creedalism is itself a creed.  One cannot deny orthodox doctrine without believing that his doctrine (teaching) on this matter is orthodox.

Anti-Condemnationism (Universalism)

Much of post-modern theology embraces various forms of universalism—the belief that ultimately no one will be lost.  All will be eventually saved.  In short, there is no hell—at least no one with anyone in it.  McLaren tried to side-step the issue by claiming, “More important to me than the hell question, then, is the mission [in this world] question.” (McLaren, Generous Orthodoxy, 114).  Jesus reconciled “all things, everywhere.”  And “Hell is full of forgiven people.” Rob Bell wrote: “Our choice is to live in this new reality or cling to a reality of our own making” (Bell, Velvet Jesus, 146).  He added, “So it is a giant thing that God is doing here and not just the forgiveness of individuals.  It is the reconciliation of all things.” (Bell in “Find the Big Jesus: An Interview with Rob Bell” in www.beliefnet.com).  His recent book Love Wins claims that God will keep on loving everyone in this life and in the next until everyone accepts it.

 
  1. The Claim of Universalism: “All persons (free agents) will be saved.”
  2. The Self-refutation: All persons (free agents) will be saved, even those who do not freely chose to be saved.
  1. S. Lewis pinpointed problem with universalism:

When one says, “All will be saved,” my reason retorts, “Without their will, or with it?”  If I say, “Without their will,” I at once perceive a contradiction; how can the supreme voluntary act of self-surrender be involuntary? If I say, “With their will,” my reason replies, “How, if they will not give in?” (The Problem of Pain, 106-107).

As C.S. Lewis put it elsewhere, “There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, `Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end. `Thy will be done.’  All that are in Hell, chose it.  Without that self-choice there could be no Hell” (The Great Divorcce, 69). Jesus said, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem,…how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing” (Mt. 23:37).  Contrary to Rob Bell, it is because God is loving and man is free that there must be a hell.  God can’t force people into heaven anymore than we can force someone to love us.  Love always works persuasively but never coercively.

 

Anti-Individualism

Another dimension to much of emergent thinking is anti-individualism or collectivism.  McLaren wrote: “He said he had been raised, as I had, to believe that the central story of the Bible was about saving individual souls.  The gospel, as he (and I) had understood it, was about getting individual souls to heaven…. First, it smacked of selfishness.  Would God want a heaven full of people who wanted to be ‘saved’ but didn’t want to be good?… Second, in a postmodern context, he said, the individualism of this approach sounded downright evil…” (McLaren, A New Kind of Christian, 62).

Unfortunately, it is self-defeating to claim God is interested in group but not in individuals.  For all groups are made up of individuals.  And while good wants us to belong to a body and to have unity in our community of believers, nonetheless, in the final analysis all salvation is individual.  God does not save people by groups or even families.  He saves them one by one, individual by individual.  This, of course, plays into the hands of ecumenism and the world-church movement which, as we know, is a characteristic of the end-times.  Salvation is only found in the whole, not in each person or part.  Indeed, the bible says, “Each one of us shall give an account of himself to God” (Rom. 14:12).

This anti-individualism is manifest in the post-denominationalism of the post-modoren chrch.  As Friesen put it, “Orthoparadox theology may be understood as supporting a form of ecumenism, which broadens the conversation beyond the church to include and engage cultural voices” (Friesen, inEMH, 209).  Of course, this post-denominationalism will lead ultimately to the super-denominationalism of the world church.  Tony Campolo tells how this union of seemingly opposed views may emerge. In his book Speaking My Mind he says: “A theology of mysticism provides some hope for common ground between Christianity and Islam. Both religions have within their histories examples of ecstatic union with God, which seem at odds with their own spiritual traditions but have much in common with each other. I do not know what to make of the Muslim mystics, especially those who have come to be known as the Sufis. What do they experience in their mystical experience? Could they have encountered the same God we do in our Christian mysticism?” (149,150)

 

Anti-Inerrantism

Evangelical Christians affirm that the Bible is the inerrant (without error) Word of God.  Why?  Because the Bible is the Word of God, and God cannot error (Jn. 17:17; Heb. 6:18).  So, the Bible cannot err.

This historic and biblical position is opposed by the anti-inerrantism of postmodernism.  McLaren wrote: “Incompleteness and error are part of the reality of human beings” (McLaren, COS, 173).  Grenz added, “Our listening to God’s voice [in Scripture] does not need to be threatened by scientific research into Holy Scripture” (Grenz, Revisioning Evangelical Theology, 116).  He added, “The Bible is revelation because it is the [errant] witness to and the [errant] record of the historical revelation of God” (Grenz, ibid., 133).

McClaren rejects the view that: “The Bible is the ultimate authority…. There are no contradictions in it, and it is absolutely true and without errors in all it says.  Give up these assertions, and you’re on a slippery slope to losing your whole faith” (McLaren, GO, 133-134). He claims that “Hardly anyone notices the irony of resorting to the authority of extra-biblical words and concepts to justify one’s belief in the Bible’s ultimate authority” (GO, 164).

However, the anti-inerrancy view is also trapped in self-contradiction.  Consider the following:

  1. The Claim of Errantists: “No human writing is without error.”
  2. The Self-refutation: This claim (that no human writing is without error) is without error.

Like all the foregoing self-defeating claims of post-modernism, they set the trap and fall in it themselves.  Jesus declared: “Your Word is truth.” (Jn. 17:17).  He added elsewhere, “If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken.” (Jn.10:34-35). “Laying aside the commandment of God, you hold the traditions of men…, making the word of God of no effect through your traditions.” (Mk. 7:8, 13).   Paul declared that “All scripture is given by inspiration of God….”(2 Tim. 3:16). The Scripture is the Word of God (Rom. 9:6) and God cannot err (Titus 1:2).  Jesus said, “’It is written’…by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God.” (Mt. 4:4).  Since the Bible is the very words of God, then to attribute error to the Bible, is to attribute error to God.

This is not to say that there are no difficulties in the Bible.  There are.  But St. Augustine’s dictum put it well: “If we are perplexed by any apparent contradiction in Scripture, it is not allowable to say, The author of this book is mistaken; but either [1] the manuscript is faulty, or [2] the translation is wrong, or [3] you have not understood.”  (Augustine, Reply to Faustus 11.5)

Emerging Problems with the Emergent Church

Post-modern theology is self-defeating. It stands on the pinnacle of its own absolute and relativizes everything else. It is an unorthodox creedal attack on orthodox creeds. It attacks modernism in the culture but is an example of postmodernism in the church.  In an attempt to reach the culture it capitulates to the culture.  In trying to be geared to the times, it is no longer anchored to the Rock. It is not an emerging church; it is really a submerging church.

As Mark Driscoll aptly put it, “The emergent church is the latest version of liberalism.  The only difference is that the old liberalism accommodated modernity and the new liberalism accommodates postmodernity” (Mark Driscoll, Confessions of a Reformation REV, 21).

The Emergent Church is the Submergent Church.  To put it poetically: The Emergent Church is built on sand, and it will not stand.  Christ’s Church is build on Stone, and it can not be overthrown (Matt. 16:16-18)

Answering a Final Objection

Some post-modernism try to avoid the painful logic of their own self-defeating statements by claiming that they are not making any truth claims.  Strange as this may seem, it does not solve their problem.  C. S. Lewis pinpointed the problem well when he wrote “You can argue with a man who says, ‘Rice is unwholesome’: but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, ‘Rice is unwholesome, but I’m not saying this is true.’  I feel that this surrender of the claim to truth has all the air of an expedient adopted at the last moment.  If [they]…do not claim to know any truths, ought they not to have warned us rather earlier of the fact? For really from all the books they have written…one would have got the idea that they were claiming to give a true account of things.  The fact surely is that they nearly always are claiming to do so.  The claim is surrendered only when the question discussed…is pressed; and when the crisis is over the claim is tacitly resumed” (Lewis,Miracles, 24).  In short, either the post-modern is making truth claims or he is not.  If he is, then his views are self-defeating.  If he is not, then he is not even in the stadium.  He can’t play the “game” unless he is on the field.  By claiming that he is making no truth claim, then he has disqualified himself in the arena of truth.

 

Works Evaluating Post-Modern Theology

There are many works evaluating aspects of post-modernism.  The following works are highly recommended for further consideration.

Adler, Mortimer. Truth in Religion.

Carson, D. A.  Becoming Conversant with the Emerging Church.

Carlson, Jason. “My Journey Into and Out Of the Emergent Church.”

Driscoll, Mark. Confessions of a Reformation REV.

Geisler, Norman.  DVD on Post-modernism (http://ngim.org).

Geisler, Norman.  Systematic Theology in One Volume. (link)

Gibbs, Eddie and Ryan Bolger.  Emerging Churches.

Howe, Thomas ed., Christian Apologetics Journal, volume 7, No. 1 (Spring, 2008, www.ses.edu/journal.htm)

Kimball, Dan. The Emerging Church.

Myron Penner ed., Christianity and the Postmodern Turn (pro and con)

Rofle, Kevin, Here We Stand.

Smith, R. Scott, Truth and The New Kind of Christian.

Robert Weber, Listening to the Beliefs of Emergent Churches (pro and con)

 

Copyright © 2012 Norman L. Geisler – All rights reserved

 

Is Jesus’ Hometown (Nazareth) a Myth?


Is Jesus’ Hometown (Nazareth) a Myth?

Joseph M. Holden, Ph.D.

 

For the past 2000 years first-century Nazareth was unquestionably considered the historic hometown of Jesus. The gospels make it abundantly clear that Jesus was “of Nazareth” (Jn. 1:45; Jn 19:19; Mk. 1:24; Lk. 18:27). However, Rene Salm has challenged the historical Nazareth in his The Myth of Nazareth: The Invented Town of Jesus (American Atheist Press, 2008). According to his view, ancient Nazareth did not emerge prior to A.D. 70, and the settlement of Nazareth did not exist earlier than the second-century A.D. long after Christ’s crucifixion. To substantiate these claims, Salm appeals to, among other things: 1) late dating Roman and Byzantine artifacts (e.g oil lamps), 2) the Gospel of Luke which tells us that Jesus’ hometown was Capernaum, not Nazareth, 3) “problematic” biblical passages (e.g. Mt. 2:23, “And he went and lived in a city called Nazareth, that what was spoken by the prophets might be fulfilled, ‘He shall be called a Nazarene.’” ESV) that have no prophetic reference in the Jewish Scriptures, and 4) that Josephus and the Jewish Talmud do not mention Nazareth in their lists of Galilean cities. However, there are several reasons why Salm’s argument against Nazareth should be rejected.

First, there has been little archaeological work completed in the Nazareth area since most of the ancient city lies under the modern city of Nazareth (ca. 60,000 population). The sparse materials and current cumulative data should not be stretched into Nazareth’s non-existence since the alleged absence of material data and the presence of later Roman and Byzantine evidence is not “contradictory” evidence that disproves Nazareth’s first-century existence. Such a conclusion is tantamount to arguing that since we have not found the Ark of the Covenant or Noah’s Ark that the temple never existed or that the flood never occurred. In other words, this sort of thinking commits the logical fallacy of arguing from silence! Besides, the archaeological data from excavations in the Nazareth area demonstrate that Nazareth was a small (60 acre) agricultural village, had a population of about 300-500 people, had several rolling-stone tombs in the vicinity (like the tomb of Jesus) used up until the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, and a third-century A.D. Jewish synagogue which was probably built over the top of an earlier synagogue that was familiar to Jesus. To be sure, it is not uncommon for a later synagogue to be built over an earlier synagogue structure as was accomplished at Capernaum. In addition, an assortment of pottery has been found in the Nazareth area dating from 900 B.C. to A.D. 640, suggesting the area was occupied at various times over a 1500-year period. Among these finds, there is no evidence that contradicts the view that Nazareth was a small historic village during the time of Jesus. Even if there was no material data uncovered at Nazareth from the early first-century A.D., it does not eliminate Nazareth as a historical city. Why? Salm seems to forget that Nazareth was a small village (about 3 miles south of the thriving city of Sepphoris) with a small population. Further, it is not uncommon that Nazareth’s location moved somewhat over time. It is unrealistic to expect such a small agricultural village to leave massive amounts of material behind as do large cities like Beth Shan and Jerusalem. To demand such evidence from Nazareth would be unrealistic. In fact, it is not uncommon for small villages to just disappear over time since later Roman and modern building projects have been known to erase traces of earlier settlements altogether. Current archaeology has not yet revealed the exact place of first-century Nazareth. This is hardly proof that Nazareth did not exist! The same is true of other small villages like Chorazin, whose archaeological data is mostly Byzantine. Though Chorazin could be located nearby the current location. We must be reminded that only 1% of the archaeological sites have been excavated, and to treat the Galilee region (or the Nazareth area) as “fully excavated” is misguided and incorrect since much more is yet to be learned. The jury is still out on the matter of first-century Nazareth’s exact location.

Second, Salm appears to be arguing against traditions and common lay assumptions, as well as the current Nazareth Village that has been reconstructed, and has not offered any material evidence that disproves first-century Nazareth’s existence. At best his arguments demonstrate that we don’t know the exact location of Nazareth, and that certain archaeological reports conflict on occasion, or that some overzealous Christians have overstated their case for Nazareth at times. However, none of this demonstrates that Nazareth is a myth. It only serves to show us that interpretations may conflict at times as is the case in all discipline that call for human interpretation (e.g. science, theology, etc). In fact, I don’t know of any reputable archaeologist today that is dogmatically certain of the exact location of Nazareth. As for the current Nazareth Village constructed for tourists to gain an understanding of first-century life in Jesus’ hometown, it seems to offer a accurate snapshot of what Nazareth was like without making the claim that the location of the current Nazareth Village was the exact same location of Jesus’ hometown.  Illustrations of terraced farming, replica synagogue, meals, carpenter’s workshop, and models dressed in authentic apparel offer a helpful and realistic portrait of life in Jesus’ Nazareth. Unlike the examples offered in the Nazareth Village tour which are grounded in real origin science (archaeology) and historic narrative descriptions, Salm’s argument against Nazareth is without positive archaeological or historical grounding whatsoever.

Third, the location of Sepphoris in relation to Nazareth is consistent with the social and economic milieu of Jesus’ day. Sepphoris, rebuilt in 4 B.C. by the Tetrarch of Galilee, Herod Antipas, was located about an hour’s walk from modern day Nazareth. This is strong evidence that villages like Nazareth settled within a short distance from this major hub, implying they were not “isolated” from the rest of the Galilee. The labor force (masons and carpenters) most likely could not afford, or did not need, to live in big opulent cities so they settled in nearby villages. Since Joseph and Jesus were masons/carpenters, with no indication that they were wealthy, it would make sense that they settled close by Sepphoris. For example, the small southern California cities of Temecula and Murrieta are affordable bedroom communities that feed the labor force of Los Angeles and San Diego! Though we must not take this to mean that Nazareth was a remote and isolated stop on the way to the city. There is evidence of first-century agricultural infrastructure in Nazareth such as grape and olive presses, farming, vinyards, some stone masonry, the sparse remains of a home (mud, stone, wood, and vegetation), and a nearby highway system connecting the port city of Caesarea Maritima to Tiberias. [1] All of these remains imply a self-sustaining first-century community intricately connected with the rest of northern Israel.

Fourth, Salm mistakenly rejects Matthew 2:23 due to its lack of specific reference among the prophetic books of the Old Testament for several reasons. First, Matthew did not say a single prophet made the statement, but rather it was of the prophets (plural). Meaning that Matthew was not quoting any specific prophet but was instead referring to the general consensus among the prophets that Jesus would be called a “Nazarene.” The fulfillment of this title can be understood in several ways. For example, the prophets said the Messiah would be despised and rejected (Isa. 53:3; Dan. 9:26; Zech. 12:10) much like the way Nazareth was despised during the early first-century (Jn. 1:46; 7:41, 52); 2) though Jesus never took the vow of the Nazarite (the word is spelled differently than Nazareth), He fulfilled it by perfectly keeping the Law by separating Himself to the Lord which was the essence of the Nazarite vow (Num. 6:2; Judg. 13:5); 3) others have indicated that the Hebrew word netzer (meaning “branch”) is the word from which Nazareth was named (since it sounds similar). Several prophets mentioned the “Branch” as being a title of the Messiah (Isa. 11:1; Jer. 23:5; 33:15; Zech 3:8; 6:12). The best solution is to accept Matthew’s statement at face value, namely, Matthew saw the fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy when Jesus and his family took residence in Nazareth (Mt. 21:11); 4) John records Phillip’s identification of “Jesus of Nazareth” as the fulfillment of what Moses and the prophets wrote (Jn. 1:45). Nathanial affirms its despised reputation and assumes Nazareth is a historical village when he replies, “Can anything good come out of Nazareth?” (Jn. 1:46, ESV).

Fifth, Salm ignores the numerous independent statements in the New Testament that identify Jesus with Nazareth. First, at his crucifixion Pontius Pilate placed a government-authorized sign (titulus) above Jesus’ head that read, “Jesus of Nazareth…” (Jn. 19:19). It is worthy of note that the religious leaders did not dispute truthfulness of Jesus’ hometown (“Nazareth”) written on the placard when they petitioned Pilate to change the writing, but only challenged His claim to be “the King of the Jews” (Jn. 19:20-22)! Second, Jesus was rejected at the synagogue in Nazareth (Lk. 4:16-30). It is inconsistent to affirm the historicity of Jesus and the synagogue and yet assign Nazareth to myth since it is so often associated with the historical Jesus as it is here.  Third, the New Testament writers often referred to “Jesus of Nazareth” (Mk. 1:24; Lk. 18:27) and those among His early church were identified as the “Nazarene sect” (Acts 24:5). Fourth, even the man with an unclean demon acknowledged that Jesus was “of Nazareth” (Lk. 4:33-34). This would have been the perfect opportunity for the demon to challenge the moral character of Jesus by catching Him in a lie about his hometown. Instead, the demon is forced to confirm the truth about His holiness, deity, authority, identity, and place of residence (Lk. 4:34). Never is Jesus identified with any other city such as “Jesus of Caesarea”, “Jesus of Capernaum”, “Jesus of Bethlehem”, or “Jesus of Jerusalem”, only “Jesus of Nazareth”. To conclude otherwise is to overlook the strong and obvious textual connection between Jesus and his hometown of Nazareth.

Sixth, the absence of historical notation among early literature (Josephus and Talmud) does not prove that Nazareth is a myth. Lack of identification does not mean lack of existence, it’s a logical fallacy to argue from silence! For many years, the Babylonian king, Belshazzar, mentioned in Daniel 5 was considered by critics to be a mythical interpolation in the text since he was missing from all Babylonian king lists. However, he was later discovered on the Nabonidus Cylinder to be the son and co-regent of Babylonian king, Nabonidus. Therefore, sound logic and previous experience must limit Salm’s claim of Nazareth’s omission in previous lists to: “the lack of notation in early writers is consistent with the view that Nazareth is a myth.” There are plausible reasons why Nazareth is not found in Josephus and the Talmud’s list of Galilean locations. First, it is possible that Josephus and the Talmud omit it because the lists are not intended to be exhaustive. Second, it may be because Nazareth (due to its despised reputation and size) was such an insignificant village at the time it warranted no mention. Third, by the time Josephus wrote his list of Galilean cities Nazareth may have been known by another name or was not occupied in the late first-century A.D. What is more, Jewish religious leaders may have refrained from listing Nazareth out of disdain for Jesus and His claims to be the Messiah. None of these reasons preclude Nazareth from being the historic village of Jesus.

Seventh, Salm’s theory forgets that Old and New Testament writers always layered their narratives over real geographical locations. Never have we discovered otherwise. Luke is a prime example of exact geographical descriptions to aid his foreign readers in understanding the geography of Palestine. In 1:26, Luke identifies the location as “a city of Galilee named Nazareth.” It is strange hermeneutical practice to accept the historicity of the Galilee region (as Salm apparently does) and reject the existence of Nazareth located within it.  Each time Nazareth and Jesus are mentioned they are so often coupled together in a non-mythical tone. Salm often asserts that instead of Nazareth being Jesus’ hometown, the Scriptures place Jesus in his home at Capernaum. However, this notion is fraught with problems, the most crucial of them is that Salm, being either unaware or by simply ignoring, the same grammatical coupling is associated with Capernaum as well, “Capernaum, a city of Galilee” (Lk. 4:31). Moreover, Matthew 4:12-17 clearly describes that Jesus “leaving Nazareth he went and lived in Capernaum by the sea, in the territory of Zebulun and Naphtali” to begin His ministry. Salm is correct when he says that Jesus lived in Capernaum, but this is only true after he left Nazareth (Lk. 3:23 cf. Lk. 4:14-37). It makes no sense (hermeneutically or logically) to assert that Jesus left a mythical city (Nazareth) to live in a historical one (Capernaum)!

Eighth, Salm’s theory favors the interpretations of liberal biblical scholarship without questioning their philosophical assumptions or methodology and does not seriously interact with conservative evangelical scholarship on the matter. Most notable is Salm’s unwarranted rejection of the reliability of the biblical text. There is simply no reason to reject the integrity of the Gospel records that are supported by credible eyewitnesses and thousands of early manuscripts. [2] Salm admits that the purpose ofThe Myth of Nazareth is only the foundational step in deconstructing classical Christianity in order to offer a “new account” of Christian origins that will rely heavily on “investigating suppressed evidence of Gnostic, Judean, and Essene roots of Christianity.” To replace credible and ancient eyewitness testimony with modern critical scholarship that is 2000 years removed from the events recorded in the biblical text is not only unwise, it is bad scholarship on any level!

Salm’s argument against Nazareth can only succeed if he brings to light archaeological evidence that contradicts the biblical testimony of first-century Nazareth. However, thus far it appears he has only revealed his bias against the reliability of the Scriptures and inerrancy, offered arguments from silence, employed minimalist New Testament interpretation, offered a critique of over-stated dogmatic claims by some Christians, and the conflicting interpretations of archaeological data. None of these warrant a change of mind from what has been generally accepted for nearly 2000 years – namely, that Nazareth is the historical town of Jesus.

 

Copyright by Joseph M. Holden 2012. All Rights Reserved.

 

[1] Craig A. Evans, Jesus and His World: The Archaeological Evidence (Westminster John Knox Press, 2012), 13-14. See Bellarmino Bagatti, Excavations in Nazareth: Vol. 1, From the Beginning till the XII Century (2 Vols). (Publications of the Studium Biblicum Franciscanum 17. Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1969), 174-218.

[2] See Bruce M. Metzger, The Transmission of the New Testament Text: Its Transmission, Corruption and Restoration; Norman Geisler and William E. Nix, From God to Us: How We Got Our Bible (Revised & Expanded) 2012; and Norman Geisler and Joseph Holden, A Popular Survey of Archaeology and the Bible – Harvest House, 2013; Norman Geisler and Frank Turek,I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist).

 

 

JoeHolden_small

Joseph Holden, Ph.D.

President of Veritas Evangelical Seminary

and co-author of the forthcoming book,

The Popular Handbook of Archaeology and the Bible