A Review of Peter Enns’s, Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 2005)


A Review by Norman Geisler of Peter Enns’s, Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 2005)

by Norman L. Geisler
August, 2009

Points of Agreement with Professor Enns

This book has done exactly what the author intended-it provoked a scholarly “conversation” (167) on a very important evangelical topic. Like most books of its kind, there is much with which one can agree; some things on which there is disagreement, and other things that need further discussion. Let me begin with some points of agreement. Professor Enns confesses that “Bible is God’s word” (15, 108, 161). Likewise, he asserts that the Bible is unique book in the “coming together” of divine and human elements (168). Furthermore, he claims correctly that “for God to reveal himself means that he accommodates himself” (109). Also, he rightly contends that the “incarnational model” (of comparing the Bible and Christ) is a helpful one (20). Likewise, he acknowledges the “full humanity” (20) of the Bible, an important part of which is the diversity in Scripture (77). Like most other evangelicals, he holds that the “canon is closed” (67). He properly claims to rejects a “cultural relativism” (168) where the Bible is not “standard for faith” (169).

As for the relation of external evidence to the Bible, we agree with Professor Enns that our assumptions determine how we understand evidence (48). We also concur that Genesis does not borrow from Babylonian origin stories because the similarities are only conceptual, not textual (55). Enns also points out that there are similar truths in other religions known from General Revelation (58). He correctly points out that similarity of Genesis with other ancient texts does not diminish the inspiration of the Bible (39). Nor is the directly dependent on creation and flood stories (29). Archaeology supports historicity of Israel’s monarchy (43). Our problems with the Bible are largely due to our misconceptions (15). He rightly acknowledges that conflicting passages are sometimes not addressing the same situation (90). Thus, there is often no “fundamental contradiction” between apparently different (96). Even conflicting proverbs are both correct in their specific situations (76). He also affirms that one cannot properly apply the law without recognizing the different situations that are addressed (94-95).

As for his view of God, Enns is correct in asserting that God does not need creation to be complete in Himself (103). Also, God knows far more about what the Bible teaches than the human writers did (161). God transcends the world, nonetheless, he can and does interacts with the world (104-105).

On the matter of biblical interpretation, there are several points of agreement as well. Enns rightly observes that the Old Testament should be understood in light of the climax of Israel’s history which is Christ (120). Also, Christ is both the beginning and end of Bible interpretation (163). There is Christ-related “coherence” in the Bible (170). Further, the Bible is clear on the central matters of our Faith (170). The real dilemma about how the New Testament writers used the Old Testament is: Either we should follow the apostle’s use of Old Testament (and violate historical-grammatical view) or not follow them and admit they were misguided or using a view we can’t use today (156).

Of course this list is not exhaustive. However, it does suggest that there are significant overlaps with his view and the historic evangelical view of Scripture.

Areas of Disagreement with Professor Enns

In spite of the many good things Professor Enns affirms, there are many troubling things to ponder. First, we will list some of them and then we will engage the most important ones.

Disagreement about the Nature of the Bible

Professor Enns claims that the non-Christian world view of their day influenced what the biblical authors wrote (14). He also holds that it is a misconception to think Bible is unique, unified in outlook (16). He says myth is proper way to describe Genesis, even though he claims it is also contains history (41, 49). Enns believes that “The Bible seems to be relativized” by culture of the day (43). He claims that we cannot reason back from the evidence for the historicity of later Old Testament books to that of earlier ones (43-44). There is no objective unbiased view of history (45). He believes it is fallacious assumption that Bible is accurate in all details (47). He holds that all attempts to state nature of Bible are open to examination (48). Genesis was not recorded until first millennium B.C. (52). God adopted the mythical categories within which Abraham thought (53). He also asserts that God transformed the ancient myths to focus on Him (54). The Bible does not say Flood was universal (55). He affirms that Israel’s laws were not new in content but were uniquely in that they were connected to a monotheistic community–Israel (57). OT history is not untrue because it is not objective (62). Samuel and Kings were not written until the 4th or 5th cent. B.C (63). There was only one cleansing of the temple by Jesus (65), even though the Gospels list two at different times. OT laws are culturally relative and not normative (67). Some moral laws of the OT are not biding on us today (67). The Bible not a timeless how-to book that applies today (67). Diverse factual content is not incompatible with theological message (73). There are contradictions in Ecclesiastes (77, 78). Enns claims that Ecclesiastes has no notion of an after life (79). There are inconsistencies in the moral law in the Old Testament (85). Even the Law is inconsistent. Exodus conflicts with Deuteronomy (87). God allows the Law to be “adjusted over time” (87). NIV is wrong for assuming inerrancy as a basis of its translation (92). He also believes that the Bible was written over a 500-1000 years period which is 500 years less than most evangelical scholars hold.

Disagreement about God and Theology

We also disagree with Enns that God learned through his interaction with Abraham (103). Or, that God reacts to man’s actions (104). Or, that Moses got God to actually change his plans (105). He rejects the view that God does not really change (105). He rejects any “behind the scene” view in favor of taking the Bible as it is (106). Our prayers do have an effect on God (107). He speaks against an apologetic stance that defends the Bible against the charge of error (108). He is opposed to apologetics that defends the perfection of Bible (109). We accept the Bible as the word of God by faith (66. 169), not by reason or evidence.

Disagreement about Interpreting the Bible

NT writers use 2nd temple hermeneutics (117). The traditional grammatical-historical is generally a good approach, but “original context” means not only grammar and history but the hermeneutics of the time (117). Daniel was given a deeper meaning of Jeremiah’s words about the 70 years (119). The biblical writers dig for deeper “mysteries” in the text (131). There is a “superfullfillment” in Christ of OT texts that were not speaking of him (136). Abraham’s “seed” had double and deeper meaning (137). Paul changed an Old Testament text, adding a word (and changing the meaning) (140-142). Non-historical tradition is part of the New Testament interpretation of the Ole Testament (143). Apostles did not come to view that Jesus is Lord from an objective interpretation of the OT (153). The New testament takes the Old Testament out of context and puts it in another context (of Christ) (153). Israel is replaced by the Church (God’s higher, deeper meaning) (154). Historical-grammatical method is not normative method (159). God intended more than the human author of the Bible did (160). Bible is [merely] a written witness to Christ (161). Christian interpretation is well beyond scientific markers (objective criteria) (162). Proper interpretation is a community activity-a historic community, the family of God. The Bible interpretation is not a fortress to defend but a pilgrimage to take (162). Inerrancy or infallible can never be fully understood (168). We have no absolute point of reference to interpret the Bible stripped of our own cultural context. Incarnational model helps us to see multidimensional gospel (169). The Bible is not a timeless rule book or owner’s manual (169). Available evidence transcends the labels of conservative or liberal (171).

Interacting With Central Issues

Now that we have set forth many of the areas of agreement and disagreement with Professor Enns, we will interact with several issues relating to the nature and understanding of Scripture. First, we will look at Professor Enns’s understanding of God. For it is axiomatic that the statement “The Bible is the Word of God” (which Enns endorses-21, 108), is no stronger than what is meant by “God.”

Relation of Biblical and Systematic Theology

Despite the fact that Enns claims his view does not lend support to the Openness View of God, which claims that God has no infallible foreknowledge of human free acts (106), the evidence is to the contrary since all the following affirmed by Enns clearly supports the Openness View of God: He declared that: (1) God actually learned through his interaction with Abraham (103). (2) God reacts to man’s actions (104). (3) Moses got God to change his plans (105). (4) He rejects the view that says God does not really change (105). (5) He rejects any “behind the scene” in favor of taking the Bible as it is (106). (6) He also holds that our prayers do have an effect on God (107).

Since we have addressed Open Theism in details elsewhere (see our Battle for God, Kregel, 2000), we will only note here that these conclusion are both contrary to Scripture which affirms that God does not change (1 Sam. 15:29; Heb. 6:18; Titus 1:2: Jas. 1:17) and sound reason which demands there be an ultimate unchanging Being by which all change is measured. As for infallible foreknowledge, the God of the Bible knows “the end from the beginning” (Isa. 46:10). Hence, he was able to predict the Cross of Christ before the foundations of the world (Rev. 13:9; Acts 2:22-23), predetermine the elect (Eph. 1:4; Rom. 8:29), predict Judas would betray Christ (Jn. 13:26; 17:12; Acts 1:16) and make numerous other infallible predictions, including whole world kingdoms (Dan. 2, 7), and the birth (Micah 5:2), death (Isa. 53), and resurrection of Christ (Psa. 2, 16 cf Acts 2:24-30). Indeed, God’s test for a false prophet (namely, if he gives a false prophecy) assumes only God can make infallible predictions of the future (Deut. 13:2-3; 18:22).

He also claims that there is no evidence that God providentially guided the customs of the day (57) so as to be a fitting vehicle of his Word through the human authors. But the Bible speaks of God’s providential knowledge and care extending to details like the death of a sparrow or the number of hairs on our head (Mt. 6:25-30).

Enns also opposes any apologetics that defends the perfection of Bible (109). He claims we accept the Bible as the Word of God by faith (66. 169), not by reason or evidence. Yet, as we shall see next, he accepts extra-biblical evidence as being all but determinative in deciding the meaning of the biblical text. But if this kind of extra-biblical evidence can be used so strongly, then why cannot other archaeological evidence be used to support the historicity of the Bible. Indeed, Enns admits that such evidence supports the historicity of Israel’s monarchy (43), though he denies that the Nuzi material supports the historicity of the Patriarchs (30). Other than an anti-supernatural bias, there is no reason that similar evidence can be used to support the historicity of New Testament books like Acts and Luke. But once one admits this, he is already doing evidential apologetics which Enns rejects. Ironically, Enns is rejecting his own incarnational model by positing a deeper, mystical, allegorical meaning to the biblical text than the historical-grammatical method reveals. For in the Incarnation there was a union of the divine and human so that what Jesus said was one with what God said. There was a divine concursus in the adaptation to human finitude (not error) in what God said and what Jesus said. If so, then both were affirming one and the same meaning and truth. There was no separation. To deny this is to employ a heretical view of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. Likewise, by analogy in the incarnational model of Scripture, God and the human authors affirm one and the same thing in one and the same text. The fact that God knows more about the topic than the human author-or that more is affirmed elsewhere-is irrelevant. The truth is that in the union of the divine and human in Scripture is that both are affirming one and the same thing.

Relation of Extra-biblical Data to Interpretation

Many of the novel and questionable views expressed by Enns seem to be related to his misunderstanding of the relation of extra-biblical data to the Bible. He declared that the Genesis story is “firmly rooted in the worldview of its time” (27). He even acknowledges that this extra-biblical data is sometimes highly influential role in determining the meaning of the Bible (48).

In this connection, Professor Enns is clearly overly enamored with the alleged “Second Temple” interpretation he feels the New Testament writers are making of the Old Testament (155). In these New Testament texts he sees them using a midrash-like non-factual spiritual embellishment of certain Old Testament passage, such as Paul’s allegedly making the rock that followed Israel a midrashic-like story to emphasize his Christotelic interpretation of the Old Testament. Space only permits a brief response to this mistaken interpretation. First, even Enns admits this is a minority view among evangelicals. Second, he also acknowledges that ere are no clear rules to prevent us from taking his “Christoletic” view too far (162). Third, Enns is aware that this involves developing “deep intuitions” (102) in order to come to these conclusions. Likewise, he acknowledges that one must reject the traditional historical-grammatical method of interpretation to do this and come up with multiple layers of meaning (161). Finally, other evangelical scholars have offered alternative interpretations without jettisoning an objective hermeneutic to do so (See D.A. Carson’s article in JETS).

Objectivity and Interpretation

Enns also embraces a post-modern form of subjectivism in interpreting Scripture. He contends that the traditional grammatical-historical is generally a good approach, but it is insufficient (159). It must be augmented with a so-called “Second Temple” midrashic-like view that adds spiritual embellishment to the text (117). He believes Daniel was given a deeper meaning of Jeremiah’s words about the 70 years (119). He claims that the biblical writers dig for deeper “mysteries” in the text (131). There is a “superfullfillment” in Christ of Old Testament texts that were not speaking of him (136). Abe “seed” had double and deeper meaning (137). He sees non-historical tradition as part of New Testament interpretation of the Old Testament (143). Further, Enns affirms that the Apostles did not come to view that Jesus is Lord from an objective interpretation of the Old Testament (153). He uses this to support his replacement theology that Israel is replaced by the Church (God’s higher, deeper meaning) (154). Indeed, he claims that Christian interpretation is well beyond any scientific markers or objective criteria (162). Indeed, he believes that proper interpretation is a community activity-a historic community, the family of God. Hence, biblical interpretation is not a fortress to defend but a pilgrimage to take (162). He affirms that inerrancy or infallible can never be fully understood (168). We have no absolute point of reference to interpret the Bible stripped of our own cultural context. The Bible is not a timeless rule book or owner’s manual (169). New Testament writers use Second Temple hermeneutics (117). The traditional grammatical-historical is generally a good approach, but “original context” means not only grammar and history but hermeneutics or the time (117). Daniel was given a deeper meaning of Jeremiah’s words about the 70 years (119). The biblical writers dig for deeper “mysteries” in the text (131). There is a “superfullfillment” in Christ of OT texts that were not speaking of him (136). Abraham’s “seed” had double and deeper meaning (137). Paul changed the passage, adding a word (and changing the meaning) (140-142). Non-historical tradition is part of New Testament interpretation of the Old Testament (143). Apostles did not come to view that Jesus is Lord from an objective interpretation of the OT (153). NT takes OT out of context and puts it in another context (of Christ) (153). Israel replaced by the Church (God’s higher, deeper meaning) (154).

According to Enns, the historical-grammatical method is not normative method (159). God intended more than the human author of the Bible did (160). Christian interpretation is well beyond scientific markers (objective criteria) (162). Proper interpretation is a community activity-a historic community, the family of God down through the centuries. The Bible interpretation is not a fortress to defend but a pilgrimage to take (162). Inerrancy or infallible can never be fully understood (168). We have no absolute point of reference to interpret the Bible stripped of our own cultural context. Incarnational model helps us to see multidimensional gospel (169). The Bible is not a timeless rule book or owner’s manual (169). Thus, he is unwilling to call his view either labels or conservative (171). As a matter of fact, it should be called neo-Barthian.

The evaluation of this subjectivism can be brief. One cannot deny that objective meaning can be derived from the text without having an objective understanding of the text. Nor can one say all interpretation is progressive without standing outside the progress to make this pronouncement. Further, there is no way to know that God intended a deeper meaning for a given text when all we have is the written text to inform us what God mean. To use other text to get this alleged “deeper” meaning does not avoid the problem for two reasons. First, even here all we have is the written text to go by. Second, what the biblical text says elsewhere does not add to what another text says; it simply gives us more on this topic. A given text cannot affirm (or deny) any more than that given test affirms (or denies). To claim any more for it is to attempt to read beneath, behind, or beyond the lines-rather than reading the lines. In the final analysis, Enns is not augmenting the historical-grammatical method of interpretation; he is negating it.

The Incarnational Model

Professor Enns is correct in positing an incarnational model that includes two important factors: 1) the “full humanity” of Scripture; 2) the unity of the divine and human elements of the Bible. However, he seems to be in serious error in his understanding that these elements involve factually and historically incorrect materials (168). Likewise, he contends that this model handles diversity better (73). Also, it aids us in seeing a multidimensional gospel (169). But this does no escape the charge of hermeneutical relativity which is self-defeating.

On closer examination it becomes apparent that by “incarnational model” Enns does not mean what is traditionally meant by orthodox theologians who make this comparison between Christ and Scripture. For they argue that just as Christ was fully human without sin, even so the Bible is fully human but without error. After all, both the Savior and Scripture are called “the Word of God.” But God can neither sin nor error. Hence, God’s word (Living or Written) cannot sin or error. Indeed, both are called perfect (flawless) in the Bible. The Living Word of God is said to be “without sin” (Heb. 4:15. “without blemish or defect” (1 Peter 1:19), one who “committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth” (1 Peter 2:22), “righteous” (1 Peter 3:18), “pure” (1 Jn. 3:3), one “who had no sin” (2 Cor. 5:21), “holy, innocent, unstained, separate from sinners” (Heb. 7:26). Using the biblical incarnational analogy, it is difficult to see how the Written Word of God could be imperfect and errant. Indeed, the Bible is said to be “perfect” (flawless) (Psa. 19:7), “truth” (Jn. 17:17), “God-breathed” (2 Tim. 3:16), “unbreakable” (Jn. 10:35), imperishable (Mt. 5:17-18), Spirit-utter words (2 Sam. 23:2; Jn. 14:26; 16:13), and comprised of “every word which comes out of the mouth of God” (Mt. 4:4). Clearly, the incarnational analogy as presented in the Bible favors the inerrancy of all the Bible affirms.

The “Accommodation” View

While it is acknowledge that historically orthodox theologians have held that a divine adaptation is necessary for God’s communication with human beings, nonetheless, there has been a serious shift in the meaning of “accommodation” in more recent times. So serious is the shift, that we have for some time advocated that evangelicals discard the term “accommodation” for the word “adaptation.” This will not be the first time that it becomes necessary to use a new terms to describe (the word “gay” once had different connotations too). Certainly, when God revealed himself in Holy Scripture there was an adaptation to human finitude. But there was no accommodation to human error. For God cannot err (Titus 1:1; Heb. 6:18). Unfortunately, Professor Enns seems to believe that God can accommodate Himself to factually incorrect affirmations (i.e., errors). But this is a denial of the inerrancy of Scripture. This is manifested in several things he said.

First, he uses some ambiguous terms of the Bible, such as the Bible is “messy” (109) and Jesus “completely assumed” cultural trappings of world around him (17). Hence, the Bible cannot be kept from the “rough and tumble drama of human history” (109). But he nowhere clearly disassociates this from implying that the there are affirmations in the Bible that entail factual mistakes or misrepresentations. Indeed, at time Enns seems to admit that there are these kinds of errors in the Bible. For example, he holds that the biblical authors really believed there were other gods (i.e., polytheism) (98).

Second, by using a true incarnational model, words and phrases like “messy” (109), “completely assumed” cultural trappings of world around him (17), and entering the “rough and tumble drama of human history” (109) are, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, they veil a denial of the inerrancy of the written Word of God and, by comparison, the sinlessness of the Son of God.

Third, Enns speaks against an apologetic stance that defends the Bible against the charge of error (108). If he believed the Bible is inerrant, he should have no hesitation in trying to defend it against false charges that it is not.

Finally, Enns believes there are inconsistencies in the moral law in the Old Testament (85). Even the Moral Law is inconsistent. He believes that Exodus conflicts with Deuteronomy (87). He says that God allows the Law to be “adjusted over time” (87). Also, he held that the NIV translation is wrong for assuming inerrancy as a basis of its translation (92). But what is this but a denial of inerrancy.

In view of this, it is apparent why Enns prefers to move beyond the “battle for the Bible” which is over whether or not the Bible affirms any errors, namely, statements that are factually incorrect. It is because he does not believe in inerrancy. Indeed, Enns seems to favor a neo-Barthian view of Scripture wherein the Bible is merely “the written witness to Christ” (161). Or, the book wherein God “speaks to the church” (46). These statements are true as far as they go, but they do not go gar enough. Indeed, they seem to be a cover for a neo-Barthian view which denies the historic orthodox view that the Bible is the infallible and inerrant written Word of God.

Conclusion

When the true view of Enns is unveiled, it is easier to understand the kind of theological paranoia Enns reveals about his view when he exhorts others not to speak of his views like his with “judgmental suspicions” (172) or “predispositions against new ideas,” or to consider such views to be “on a slippery slope.” Likewise, we warns against “power plays” and attempts to “vilify person holding” such views, or against those who “go on the attack” against it and “jump to conclusions” about one’s motives and engage in “build[ing] our own kingdoms” All of this he calls the “angry evangelical syndrome” (173). Of course, the net effect of ad hominem phrases like these is to build a protective wall around his admittedly minority and clearly unorthodox views. By so doing, he hopes to ward off any critical analysis that would consider them unbibiblical and/or unorthodox.

It is always a danger when one sets out, as Enns does, to reconcile his view of Bible with “modern biblical scholarship”(13). More often than not, when this takes places one trades orthodoxy for academic respectability. This criticism should come as no surprise to Enns since he recognizes that one’s world view influences how he interprets the Bible (14). He wrote: “the assumptions we have about the nature of God (which includes notions of revelation and inspiration…), and so on, will largely determine how we understand the evidence” (48). Why then should we expect that most of “modern biblical scholarship” (which he wishes to accommodate), based as it is on antisupernatural biases, is not reconcilable with the Bible. An attempt to reconcile a supernatural God who performed supernatural events recorded in a supernaturally inspired Book with naturalistically based scholarship which denies all of the above is doomed to failure.

An Exposition and Evaluation of the McGowen View on the Inspiration of Scripture (2009)


An Exposition and Evaluation of the McGowen View on the Inspiration of Scripture

by Norman L. Geisler

2009

 

In his book The Divine Spiration of Scripture: Challenging Evangelical Perspectives (Inter Varsity Press, 2007) Scottish Reformed theologian A. T. B. McGowen provides a thought-provoking evaluation of the ongoing debate between the infalliblist and the inerrantist positions. A careful reading of his proposal reveals many positive contributions.

The Positive Contributions of McGowen’s Work

There are many commendable features of this book that are well worth contemplating. First of all, it sees this as a “watershed issue” (9). Further, it observes that theopnuestia in 2 Timothy 3:16 should be translated as “spiration” or breathing out is a better rendering. It also affirms the value of the word “infallible” (39, 48). The term “inerrancy” alone is insufficient. After all, there can be inerrant phone books-with no errors-that do not thereby have divine authority. It also sees the ICBI (International Council on Biblical Inerrancy) statement as a “most significant” statement (104) and would chose it, if necessary, over the errancy view of Rogers and McKim (212). Likewise, McGowen would choose B. B Warfield over Jack Rogers of Fuller Seminary (161). He even cites favorably both John Woodbridge’s critique of Rogers and McKim (99) as well as that of Donald Bloesch who agrees (100, 125). Nor does McGowen deny that God can, if He chooses, produce an inerrant text (113-114), as inerrantists have long held.. Furthermore, he even says the Bible is a “co-authored” book by both God and human beings (148). Then too, his definition of inspiration hits some important key notes of the doctrine when he affirms that “the Holy Spirit caused men to write books and his supervisory action was such that although these books are truly the work of human beings, they are also the Word of God”(43). He is certainly right in denying the “mechanical dictation” of Scripture(163).

Further, the book is on track in rejecting the neo-orthodox view of Scripture that the Bible merely “become the Word of God” in a moment of encounter with Him through the Bible (29). It is not the Word of God subjectively but is God’s Word objectively (73). Likewise, revelation is not merely an event as many neo-orthodox claim (21). McGowen is also correct in affirms that inspiration is verbal (136) and that there are any degrees of inspiration (134).and that it is not the authors of Scripture that are inspired (39, 133) but the Scriptures they wrote. McGowen also makes an often overlooked but important distinction. He points out that it is not the Bible that needs’ illumination, but only human minds (45-47). Another crucial point is that one should not claim for the Bible what it does not claim for itself (121). Nor does he reject the view there are implicit or logically entailed claims in Scripture. Indeed, he says the use of logic is “appropriate” (117) and “contradictions” should be avoided (212). More could be added.

An Evaluation of McGowan’s Basic Proposals on the Nature of Scripture

McGowen’s proposal is the first direct and serious proposal by an otherwise conservative Reformed scholar since the ICBI “Chicago Statement” (in 1978) As such, McGowen’s proposals demand attention.

The Claim That the Word “Inerrancy” Should be Discarded

McGowen argues that the term inerrancy should be discarded by evangelicals (13). He offers several reasons for this, one of the most often repeated of which is that the term “inerrancy” implies scientific precision (117). He also believes it is recent in origin, not being found in early creeds but being a result of heated battle between early 20th century Fundamentalist and Liberals (121). Neither does he believe the term is biblical, but he calls it a “violent assumption” (135) of Fundamentalist thinking. “Inerrancy,” he believes, is an apologetic response to the Enlightenment (50, 115). He also argues that it does not have the weight of history behind it.

First of all, in response it is important to note that both sides of the debate can agree that there is nothing sacred about the word “inerrancy.” Indeed, it is not the term so much as the truth of inerrancy that is important to preserve. The basic question is whether or not the Bible is completely without error in all that it affirms. This can be said in more than one way. But before we hasten to throw away the term “inerrancy,” let us remind ourselves of the strength of the word and the weakness of the suggested alternative terms.

Second, we can readily discard the argument that the word “inerrancy” is not biblical. By that same logic, the word “Bible” is not biblical for it is nowhere used of the Bible in the Bible. Further, it too does not have the weight of early history behind it. So should we discard it too? Indeed, the word “Trinity” is not in the Bible and did not appear in the earliest ecumenical Creeds such as the Apostles Creed (2nd cent), the Nicene Creed (A.D. 325), or the Chalcedonian Creed (A.D. 451). Does that mean we should discard it? The answer is “No,” and the reasons are that while the term is not biblical, nonetheless, the truth is biblical, and the term is a good term to describe it. The same is true of the word “inerrancy.”

Third, the term inerrancy need not mean “scientific precision,” as is wrongly alleged by anti-inerrantists. Every term should be understood in its context and with the qualifications given to it by its users. Even McGowen agrees that the ICBI statement makes numerous qualifications on the meaning of the term (106). These qualifications clearly deny the misimplications of modern “scientific precision.” Article XIII of the ICBI “Chicago Statement” declared plainly: “We further deny that inerrancy is negated by Biblical phenomena such as a lack of modern technical precision. . ..” (Emphasis added).

Fourth, it is well to remember that the term inerrancy also has some strong features in its favor. For one, it is negative, and negative terms are powerful. Consider, the force of the Ten Commandments many of which are stated in negative terms, like: “You shall not murder” or “You shall not bear false witness” or “You shall not commit adultery. Further, “The Bible is true” is not nearly as strong as “The Bible is without error.” Even McGowen appears to commend the ICBI statement for having “denials” as well as “affirmations” (106). But denials are negative which is the reason they help in clarifying the point at hand. Inerrancy, as a negative term, does the same thing. As is readily apparent the statement “The Bible is without error” is clearer and stronger than the statement “The Bible is true.” For the latter does not make it clear whether the Bible is completely true.

Considering the Alternatives

We readily grant that no term, including inerrancy, expresses all that the Bible claims about itself. Nonetheless, by comparison the term stands tall as compared to most of the alternatives offered.

The Term Infallible

McGowen favors the word “infallible” over the word “inerrant” (48, 123, 125,162). He insists that the word “infallible” is “more dynamic (or organic) and is a less mechanical view of authority” (49). It carries with it the idea that “the Holy Spirit infallibly uses God’s Word to achieve all he intends to achieve” (49). However, this use of the word “infallible” is precisely why the term “inerrant” is also needed.

In response, we acknowledge the strength of the term “infallible,” if it is used the sense of “unerring” in connection with the word “inerrant.” However, the term “infallible” has been rendered fallible by the intentionalist sense in which it is used by non-inerrantists. My Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary gives the primary definition of “infallible” as “incapable of error; unerring.” In this sense of the term, inerrantist have no problem since it is perfectly compatible with the term inerrant. It is the secondary sense of the term which the inerrantists reject as inadequate, namely, “not liable to mislead, deceive, or disappoint.” Indeed, McGowen speaks of Scriptures which “infallibly achieves God’s purposes” (149). He quotes Bavink’s view with approval,[1] saying: “In his organic view, Bavink focuses not on the text of Scripture as such but upon its meaning and purpose” (158, emphasis added). Likewise, he affirms “that intention [of Scripture] is no other than that it should make us ‘wise unto salvation'” (159, emphasis added).

However, focusing on the intention or purpose of the Bible, rather than its affirmations and denials, does not necessitate the Bible is without all errors in all that it affirms. Many statements with good intentions, even those that achieve their intended results, contain errors. So, by that definition of “infallible” one could have an infallibly correct error. But this is nonsense. Since the term “infallible” carries these connotations for many, it is necessary to add the word “inerrant” to make clear what the Bible teaches on the topic.

Of course, in the good sense of the term “infallible”(i.e.., incapable of error), it is not an either/or situation. The Bible is both infallible and inerrant. But, unlike McGowen’s implication, the Bible is not merely infallible in itsintentions and achievements but also in its affirmations (and denials). Truth is not found in intentions because humans can, and often do, utter errors with good intentions. So, defining either infallibility or inerrancy in terms of intentions, achieved or not, does not measure up to what the Bible claims for itself which is that truth must be judged by its correspondence to the facts. Indeed, even McGowen seems to admit this elsewhere when he commends “modes of rationality that actually correspond with the nature of its objectively given reality. . . “(73, emphasis added). Indeed, ICBI clarified the meaning of “truth” as correspondence in an official authorized commentary on “The Chicago Statement,” affirming that “By biblical standards of truth and error [in Article XIII on “Truth”] is meant the view used both in the Bible and in everyday life, viz., a correspondence view of truth.”[2]

The correspondence view of truth is in fact the one which the Bible[3]embraces. For example: It is implied in the ninth command (“You shall not bear false witness”), i. e., don’t misrepresent the facts. It is also entailed in Acts 24 when it says you can “learn the truth” when you “verify [the facts]” (vs. 8, 11). Further, it is manifest in Genesis 42:16 when Joseph said they should look at the facts “so that your words may be tested to see if you are telling the truth.” In addition, it was employed in the test for a false prophet whose prophecy was considered false “if the word does not come to pass or come true” (Deut. 18:22). It is also utilized in everyday conversations when we consider something false if it misrepresents the facts (e.g., we say “check the facts” or “check it out for yourself” and the like). Indeed, the correspondence view of truth is essential to a legal oath when one promises “to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

One can and does agree that the word “inerrancy” alone is insufficient to describe what the Bible is.[4] It also has sanctity, infallibility, indestructibility, indefatigability (can’t be worn out), indefeasability (can’t be overcome). Indeed, it can save (1 Pet. 1:23), nourish (2 Pet. 2:2), wash (Psa. 119:9), purify (Jer. 23:29a), shatter (Jer. 23:29), cut deeply (Heb. 4:12), prevent sin (Psa. 119:11), illuminate (Psa. 119:105), comfort (Rom. 15:4), and predict (2 Pet. 1:19). The truth is that no one word covers all that the Bible is, just like no one attribute exhausts all that God is. However, this is not to say that the Bible is not inerrant as well. Nor is this to say we can rob it of this characteristic any more than we can strip it of infallibility.

McGowen Prefers the Word “Authentic”

McGowen prefers the word “authentic” (213) to “inerrant.” However, the term “authentic” as used of Scripture is theologically anemic. The Bible claims much more than this for itself. Jesus refers to the Bible as indestructible (Mt. 5:17-18), unbreakable (Jn. 10:35), the “Word of God” (Jn. 10:35), and as coming “out of the mouth of God” (Mt. 4:4). Paul said, it is “God-breathed” (2 Tim. 3:16). These concepts are insufficiently described by the term “authentic.” After all, one can have an authentic coin minted with mistakes on it or an authentic copy of the famous “Wicked Bible” that translated Exodus 20:14 as “Thou shalt commit adultery”! There is also “authentic” Confederate currency and persons with authenticity-all of which falls far short of what is perfect.

The same goes for terms like “trustworthy” and “reliable.” The Bible is trustworthy like a good friend, but even trustworthy friends make mistakes. It is reliable like a good map, but even good maps can have errors on them. These terms are far too weak to describe what is meant by a God-breathed book that was joint-authored by God. So, both of these terms fail to measure up to what the Bible claims for itself.

Having said all this, there are other good ways to describe what is meant by inerrancy. “Totally free from all error in everything it affirms” is a good phrase. But for a single word it is difficult to beat the word “inerrancy.” And as defined by the ICBI statement, it is clearly the best single word available in English. And it would be unwise to discard it for words like trustworthy, reliable, authentic, or even infallible in purpose. Of course, the proper use of infallible and inerrant in all it affirms is a good and powerful way to express the biblical doctrine.

The Claim That Inerrancy Does not Follow From God’s Nature

Typical of strong Calvinists, McGowen embraces a form of divine voluntarism. Ethical voluntarism declares that something is good because God wills it; God does not will it because it is good. However, this would make all the moral commands of God in Scripture arbitrary. For example, according to voluntarism, God could will that love is wrong and hate is right. But this is not only counter-intuitive, it is morally repugnant, to say nothing of being unbiblical since God is by nature Love (1 Jn. 4:16). Further, voluntarism would undermine unconditional election, a doctrine dear to the heart of a Reformed theologian. For if voluntarism were true, then God could change his mind about who the elect are or even whether the elect will ultimately be saved.

This same kind of voluntarism is evident in MeGowen’s argument against inerrancy. In one of the most important sections in the book, he writes: “inerrantists make an unwarranted assumption about God. The assumption is that, given the nature and character of God, the only kind of Scripture he could ‘breathe out’ was Scripture that is textually inerrant. If there was even one mistake in the autographa, then God cannot have been the author, because he is incapable of error” (113). Thus, MeGowen says inerrancy is not a legitimate inference from the Bible (115) but is merely an “a priori” argument (131).

McGowan goes on to say that “the argument of the inerrantists is that God is unable to produce anything other than an inerrant autographic text . . . I agree with the inerrantists that God could have brought into being inerrant autographic texts, had he chosen to do so, but I reject their argument that he must have acted in this way” (113-114). He concludes, “I think it is wrong to prejudge the nature of Scripture through some deductivist approach, based on what we believe inspiration must mean, given God’s character” (136). We cannot “assume that they must be inerrant because God cannot lie” (137). This could hardly be more clear and, in my view, more faulty. Several observations are in order in this regard.

First, MeGowen is a voluntarist on what God could or could not do in producing a God-breathed book. That is, he affirmed that God was free to make an original Bible with or without errors in it. He was under no necessity imposed upon him by his own nature to produce an errorless original. As incredible as this may sound, McGowen’s biblical voluntarism entails the claim that speaking the truth is optional, not necessary, for God! If ever there was a misdirected and over-stated view of God’s sovereignty, this is it.

Indeed, this is precisely where inerrantists sharply disagee with non-inerrantists like MeGowen. This disagreement is reflected in the basic statement on Scripture of the Evangelical Theological Society to which McGowan refers. It reads, “The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and is therefore inerrant in the autographs” (emphasis added).” The word “therefore” logically connects the word of “God” and “inerrant” to make it clear that neither God nor the Bible errs. This meaning of the word “therefore” has been confirmed by a living framer of the statement, namely, Reformed theologian Roger Nicole.

Further, and more importantly, the Bible makes it clear that God cannot choose, even if He desires to do so, to produce an imperfect original. Why? “Because it is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). Paul speaks about “the God who cannot lie” (Titus 1:2). He adds, “God cannot deny himself” (2 Tim. 2:13). Numerous other Scriptures speak of God’s unchanging nature (Num. 23:19;1 Sam. 15:29; Psa.102:25-27; Heb. 1:10-12; Mal. 3:6; James 1:17. No serious examination of all these Scriptures in context can support a voluntarist interpretation that God can change his essential nature, even if He wanted to do so. If this is so, then McGowen’s central thesis fails, and the inerrantists argument stands firm:

  1. God cannot error.
  2. The original Bible is God’s Word.
  3. Therefore, the original Bible cannot error.

To deny this conclusion, as MeGowen knows, one must deny at least one or the other of the two premises. McGowen’s attempt to deny the first premise failed. It goes against the grain of God’s very nature as truth to presume that such an unchangeably true Being can error, if He wishes. God is truth (Deut. 32:4; Psa. 31:5) by His very unchangeable nature and, as such, He “cannotlie” (Titus 1:2); “It is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). To do so, would be to deny Himself, and “he cannot deny himself” (2 Tim. 2:13).

Further, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth (Jn. 15:26). And the Word of God is the utterances of the Spirit of Truth. Jesus said, “But when He, the Spirit of truth, comes, He will guide you into all the truth” (Jn. 16:13). Peter added, “But know this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture is a matter of one’s own interpretation, for no prophecy was ever made by an act of human will, but men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God” (2 Pet. 1:20-21). David confessed, “The Spirit of the LORD spoke by me, and His word was on my tongue” (2 Sam. 23:2). Now by simple logical inference,

  1. The original Bible is the utterance of the Spirit of Truth.
  2. The Spirit of truth cannot utter error.
  3. Therefore, the original Bible cannot utter err.

Here again, to deny inerrancy one must deny at least one or more of the two premises. McGowen’s attempt to deny the first premise fails. Truth is not an option with God. It is a necessity.

MeGowen also believes that the copies of the Bible are inspired (159). Given that inspiration means “spirated” or “breathed out” of God and given that he recognizes errors in the copies, MeGowen is left with explaining just how God can breath out errors. Indeed, according to this analysis, it is not only possible for there to be errors in what God breathes out, but it may be actual as well. But this is contrary to the very nature of God as truth to breathe out error. He cannot overrule his unchangeable nature by his sovereignty any more than He can will Himself out of existence!

An Implied Accommodation Theory

Upon closer analysis MeGowen also seems to reject the second premise of the argument for inerrancy as well, namely, that “The Bible is the Word of God.” According to this view, God must accommodate Himself, not only to human finitude, but to human error in the production of Scripture. But nowhere in Scripture is there support for the view that God accommodates Himself to human error rather than merely adapts Himself to human finitude. In short, a truly human book, such as the Bible is, can still avoid errors. Were this not so, then by the same logic, one must conclude that the divine accommodation in the Incarnation means that Christ sinned. This is the way MeGowen attacks the so-called incarnational model often used by evangelicals to illustrate their view.

The err at the root of this view appears to be based on a Barthian and neo-Gnostic view of human fallenness in which any contact with this fallen human world makes sin unavoidable. It is to argue that since the Bible was written by fallen human beings in fallen human language, it too must inevitably partake of errors as well.

There is another serious problem with this radical view of divine accommodation.[5] If contact with a fallen world makes error inevitable, then not only does this mean there can be (and probably are) errors in the original Bible, it also means that the Incarnate Christ too must partake of both the same proneness to error and to sin. But the New Testament makes it very clear that Jesus did not sin (Heb. 4:15: 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 1:23; 1 Jn. 3:2). Likewise, it would mean that the very teachings which came from Jesus lips would have been tainted with error since he too was speaking in a fallen human language. But this belief would precipitate a Christological crisis unacceptable to orthodoxy. Surely, no one who believes in the union of two natures in the one Person of Christ, the Second Person of the Godhead, thereby affirms error in his human words. Hence, McGowen’s view of divine accommodation to err in the production of Scripture must be rejected. The fact is, however, that finitude does not necessitate fallenness. If it did, then not only would the Son Himself have partaken in sin and error, but the beatified saints in heaven would not be free from sin and error, as the Scriptures teach they will be (1 Cor. 13:10;1 Jn. 3:2; Rev.21:4).

Rejecting the “Incarnational” Analogy

According to this inerrantists reasoning, just as God in His Living Word (the Savior) has united with the human nature of Christ without sin, even so God is united with His written Word (the Scripture) yet without error. MeGowen objects to this analogy with two basic arguments (118-121).

First, he argues that unlike Christ whose two natures are united in one person, there is no such union of the divine and human in Scripture. But McGowan misses the point, even on his own grounds. For elsewhere he speaks of a co-authorship of Scripture (148). He cites with approval the following: “This enables Bavink faithfully and clearly to emphasize both sides of any orthodox doctrine of Scripture, namely that God is the author but yet the human beings are the authors” (148). This would mean that both the human and divine aspects of Scripture are united in one set of propositions(better, sentences) or verbal expression in like manner to the divine and human being united in Christ in one person. This conclusion is borne out also by the fact that MeGowen holds to “verbal” inspiration by affirming that “I disagree with him [James Orr] on [his denying] verbal inspiration. It seems to me that there is no good reason for arguing that the content but not the form of the Scriptures have come to us from God” (136). But if the verbal form of Scripture is “breathed-out” from God, as MeGowen claims it is, then there is a propositional (better, sentential) unity that combines both the divine and human elements of Scripture in one and the same verbal structure.

Even McGowen’s own definition of Scripture supports the Incarnational model for he says “the Holy Spirit caused men to write books and his supervisory action was such that although these books are truly the work of human beings, they are also the Word of God” (43). Again, there is a unity between the human and divine in God’s written Word (the Scripture) that is analagous with the union of the divine and human in His Living Word (the Savior).

Further, MeGowen argues wrongly that the word “divine” does not apply to Scripture, as it does to the divine nature of Christ in the Incarnation. He wrote: “Only God is divine and therefore only God can have a divine nature” (120). But in a very important sense this is not so. Even Peter affirmed that in some real sense “we are partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4). Surely, this is not in a metaphysical sense (e.g., we can’t be infinite) but in a moral sense (we can be true). MeGowen seems to unwittingly answer his own question when he admits that “I am not denying that the Scriptures (like human beings) can share some of the divine attributes” (120). But that is all that is necessary for the analogy to be a good one, namely to have strong similarities which it has.

As for the Bible not being God, of course it is not. That is why the Incarnational model is an analogy (similar but not identical). No informed evangelical ever held that the Bible was God and should be worshiped. The Bible is like God in his moral attributes (like the necessity to be truth and holiness), not in his non-moral (metaphysical) attributes (like infinite and eternal). In view of this, the Incarnational reasoning can be stated as follows:

  1. God’s Living Word (Christ) and His Written Word (the Savior) are similar in that:
    1. They have a divine and human dimension;
    2. These two dimensions are combined in one unity.
    3. Thus, both are without flaw.
  2. Hence, both God’s Living Word and His Written Word are without flaw morally in that:
    1. God’s Living Word is without sin:
    2. Written Word is without error.[6]

The remaining question is: How can the effect (an inerrant Bible) be greater than the cause (errant humans)? Of course, it cannot, but the ultimate (primary) Cause is God; the human writers are only the secondary causes. Their imperfection and tendency to err does not bleed through to the effect because God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick! Or, in biblical terms: “No prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit.” (2 Pet. 1:21). In theological terms, to cite MeGowen himself, “the Holy Spirit caused men to write books and his supervisory action was such that although these books are truly the work of human beings, they are also the Word of God” (43). Since the Scriptures did not originate from “the will of man,” but of God, and since the superintending Spirit of truth “cannot lie,” then what He uttered in these human words cannot err.

McGowen’s Neo-Barthian Implication

Although MeGowen rightly disowns some neo-orthodox beliefs such as a denial of objective propositional revelation and revelation coming only in acts and not words, nonetheless, he is not without Barthian influence in this matter. In fact, I would call his view neo-Barthian in some significant respects. First, as already noted (and discussed more fully below), MeGowen allows for the possibility of errors in the original text of the Bible-the one breathed-out by God. Second, he speaks of the Bible as an instrument through which God speaks-rather than the Bible being the voice of God itself. As to the first he says, “The Scriptures are the record of the revelation that God has given to his church . . . ” (21). He adds, “Our knowledge of the love of God in Christ comes to us through the voice of God speaking in the Scriptures” (31). Again, “God’s Word came to us in the form of human witness” (112). Finally, he cites James Orr with approval, saying, “God has given a historical, supernatural revelation and . . . the Scriptures are the ‘record’ of this revelation” (132). But what is this but a more euphemistic way to affirm Barth’s scratched record analogy of one hearing his master’s voice through an imperfect recording. This is contrary to Scripture which describes itself as “perfect” (Psa. 19:7) (Hebrew: tamiym, without flaw) which is the same word used of the Passover lamb (Ex. 12:5) that was to be “without blemish.” But the Bible speaks of itself as the revelation of God itself (the very Word of God), not a faulty record of it.

This conclusion is also supported by McGowen’s claim that the Bible has no authority in itself, only God does (45). But if the Bible is the Word of God written, then it has the authority of God in it since it is God’s voice speaking in the words of Scripture. One would think that with McGowen’s emphasis on the “dynamic” nature of inspiration (49), to wit that God is continually speaking through His Word (155), that he would not have fallen into the Barthian error of claiming the Bible is not the revelation of God but merely a human record of it through which God speaks to us. This is undoubtedly why MeGowen also claims there is some truth in the Barthian claim that “the Bible becomes the Word of God” to us or is “a subjective revelation” to us (156).

Finally, this neo-Barthianism in MeGowen is also supported by his contention that the Bible is only an instrumental revelation. He writes, “the purpose of Scripture is instrumental to the work of the Spirit” (24). Likewise, he speaks with approval that “Barth was arguing that our knowledge of the love of God in Christ comes to us through the voice of God speaking in the Scriptures” (31). Thus, God speaks “by His Spirit through His Word” (31). So, the Bible is “the means” by which he communicates with us (31). In short, the Bible is not the revelation of God; it is the instrument through which God’s revelation comes to us. But once this distinction is made and the wedge is driven between the words of the men who wrote the Scriptures and the voice of God that speaks through these fallible human voices, then we cannot have a true revelation from God.

Faulty Logic in the MeGowen Analysis

Part of the reason MeGowen is able to come to these wrong conclusions about inerrancy is the faulty logic he employs. A few examples will suffice. Many of them are forms of the notorious “Straw Man” fallacy. First, hee false charges that inerrantist hold to mechanical dictation is even rejected by the Fundamentalist John R. Rice repudiated who admits to holding “verbal dictation”.[7] Indeed, no Calvinist, like McGowen, who believes in iresistable grace should have any problem believing that God can work on different persons with their unique styles to produce exactly what God wanted to say.

Second, he alleges a “straw man”of atomistic view “that every isolated word of Holy Scripture is inerrant”” (65). This word-by-word revelation which is found primarily in cultic dictation or in orthodox Muslim’s beliefs about the origin of the Qur’an, not in an evangelical view of inspiration who believe is in wholistic inspiration. That is a word taken properly in the context of a whole sentence and a sentence taken in the whole context of a literary unity (and ultimately that taken in the context of the whole Scripture) is inspired and inerrant. In brief, a whole sentence (with all of its parts) is an inerrant revelation from God if understood in its proper contexts. Paul stressed the importance of a singular “seed” in contrast to “seeds” (Gal. 3:16). The absence of a letter can change the whole meaning of a doctrine, as the early Creed discovered. The Greek word for “same” (homoousion) differed from the word for “similar” (homoiousion) by only one letter, the letter “I” (the letter iota in Greek). This one tiny letter was the difference between orthodoxy and heresy on whether Christ was the same or only similar to God. So, in this sense, even letters are inspired, not in isolation from words, sentences and the overall context but as a crucial part of the whole-the wholistic meaning.

Another “straw man” created by MeGowen is what he calls “inflexible literalism” (65, 103). He equated ICBI with fundamentalists (103, 123). However, the ICBI “Chicago Statement” on inerrancy went to great lengths to deny this charge-so detailed were the statements that, strangely, MeGowen criticized it for being so careful to define its meaning this precisely. Article XIII declared: “We further deny that inerrancy is negated by Biblical phenomena such as a lack of modern technical precision, irregularities of grammar or spelling, observational descriptions of nature, the reporting of falsehoods, the use of hyperbole and round numbers, the topical arrangement of material, variant selections of material in parallel accounts, or the use of free citations.” Article XVIII adds, “We affirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by grammatical-historical exegesis; taking account of its literary forms and devices, and that Scripture is to interpret Scripture.” Likewise, Article VI declares: “We affirm that the whole of Scripture and all its parts, down to the very words of the original, were given by divine inspiration. We deny that the inspiration of Scripture can rightly be affirmed of the whole without the parts, or of some parts but not the whole” (emphasis added). What is this but a whole-istic inspiration?

McGowen also contends that God’s revelation “can never become mere data to be processed by the theologian, rather than the means by which God confronts and communicates to us.” But once again, whoever said that the Bible is “mere data” for us to process. The Word of God is not merely an object to be studied (73). It also the Word of God to be obeyed (Js. 1:22). The very ICBI statements (which MeGowen rejects) states the contrary in its very first statement, saying:”God, who is Himself Truth and speaks the truth only, has inspired Holy scripture in order to reveal Himself to lost mankind Jesus Christ . . . Holy scripture is God’s witness to Himself.” (No. 1). Article III declares: “We affirm that the written Word in its entirety is revelation given by God.” How can one conclude from this, as MeGowen does (117), that inerrantists believe the Bible is viewed merely as an object to be studied, rather than a revelation to be obeyed?

Fourth, it does not seem to concern MeGowen admits to logical fallacy of “circular reasoning” in his apologetic (32). This begs the question by saying in essence: “We know the Bible is the Word of God because the Bible (as the Word of God) tells us so.” MeGowen cites Bavink with approval that “Holy Scripture is self-attested (autopistos) and therefore the final ground of faith. No deeper ground can be advanced. To the question ‘Why do you believe Scripture?’ The only answer is: ‘Because it is the word of God.’ But if the next question is ‘Why do you believe that Holy Scripture is te word of God’ a Christian cannot answer?” (31) Even Van Til, whom MeGowen cites favorably (37), could offer a transcendental argument in response, namely, because nothing else in the world makes sense apart from positing that the Triune God is revealed in canonical Scripture. However, one can be sure that neither MeGowen nor any other fideist would accept this reasoning when a Muslim says, “Why should we believe the Qur’an is the Word of God? The only answer is: Because the Qur’an says it is the Word of God.” I am sure MeGowen would want some good evidence and reasons before he accepted the Qur’an as the Word of God, regardless of what the Qur’an says about itself.

As for the claim that in such an answer “we are setting these things as a higher authority than the voice of God speaking in Scripture” we point out that besides confusing epistemology and ontology, he is overlooking the fact that the Bible itself commands us to use “reason” (1 Peter 3:15) and evidence (Acts 1:3) to test truth claims. Moses gave tests for a false prophet (Deut. 13 and 18). John exhorted us to “test the spirits to see whether they are from God” (1 Jn. 4:1), and Paul “reasoned” (Acts 17:2, 17) with the Jews and Greeks to demonstrate that Jesus was the Messiah. Indeed, Jesus himself used reason and evidence to substantiate his claims to be God.[8] As Augustine said, “Who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. . . . ?”[9]

Fifth, MeGowen is also guilty of taking a text out of its context. He does this with a statement made by B. B. Warfield, the great Princetonian defender of inerrancy. Warfield is careful to stress the humanity of Scripture as well as its divine origin. In so defending the humanity of the biblical authors, Warfield and Hodge state that the authors of Scripture were dependent on human languages that “bear everywhere indelible traces of error” and on human “sources and methods in themselves fallible” and personal knowledge that was “defective, or even wrong” (211). But using this to support McGowen’s errant view of inerrancy is totally unjustified for two reasons. First, it omits the crucial point, namely, that God in his providence overrules these human weaknesses and produces an inerrant product through their human pens. To repeat, this only proves the point that God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick. Second, even in this quote McGowen overlooks the fact that Warfield is not saying that these human sources always err. Indeed, he qualifies it by the phrases “in large measure” and “in many maters.” Finally, Hodge and Warfield clearly say that they are referring to these human sources “in themselves,” not as superintended by a God who cannot err.

Sixth, MeGowen sometimes throws the baby out with the bathwater. For example, he lumps “propositional” revelation with the alleged necessity of “scientific precision” and rejects them both together. Thus, propositional truth gets thrown out with modern “scientific accuracy.” But most inerrantists, indeed all who signed the ICBI or ETS statements as defined by ICBI, do not believe that one has to believe in “scientific accuracy” in order to believe in propositional revelation (117). This same unnecessary lumping occurs with “inerrancy” and “fundamentalism” (103, 123) as well as inerrancy and “literalism.” This, in spite of the fact that inerrancy proponents explicitly deny such implications (see above).

Answering Other Objections to Inerrancy Raised by MeGowen

There are many other objections MeGowen raises to inerrancy. Several call for a brief response since they are held by many as significant obstacles to belief in inerrancy.

Death of Inerrancy by a Thousand Qualifications

Strangely enough MeGowen criticizes the ICBI and ETS inerrantist for having so many qualifications to their view. This is odd in view of the fact that the non-inerrantist holds the opposite on all these points and yet they are not criticized for all their qualifications. Further, MeGowen actually commends the ICBI statement for making things clearer by having “denials” as well as “affirmations.” But these additional negative qualifications make the doctrine, even clearer.

Basically, inerrancy does not die a death by “a thousand” qualifications for two reasons. First of all, the so-called qualifications do not kill it but enhance it and, thus, keep it alive. In short, they do not negate all meaning in the original claim; they clarify it by negating things from it that do not belong to it.

Second, there are not “a thousand” qualifications; there really are only two: 1) Only the original text is inerrant; and 2) Only what is affirmed as true in the text, is true and not any thing else. The rest of the so-called “qualifications” are not really qualifications by inerrantists but misunderstandings by non-inerrantists. Hence, the re-wording is necessary only because opponents have misunderstood or mischaracterized the doctrine. This calls for a denial by inerrantists that helps one to understand what was implied in the original affirmation that everything affirmed as true in the text, is true (and everything affirmed as false, is false). Just as the early Creeds had to grow in order to explain what they meant in earlier more simple forms because later heretics misunderstood, distorted, or challenged it, even so later inerrantists have had to add more “qualifications” to explicate the original meaning as opposed to the heretical challenges of their day.

For instance, it should have been sufficient to simply say: (1) The Bible is the Word of God. This really should be sufficient, but because some have denied the obvious, it is necessary to add (2) the Bible is the inspired Word of God. However, when some use inspired in a human sense, it is necessary to say (3) The Bible is the strong>divinely inspired Word of God. But since some deny such a book is infallibly true, it is necessary to add (4) the Bible is the divinely inspired infallible Word of God. Likewise, when some claim it is only infallible in intent but not in fact, then it is necessary to clarify that it means (5) the Bible is the divinely inspired infallible and inerrant Word of God. Even here some have argued that it is only inerrant in redemptive matters, hence it is necessary to add (6) the Bible is the divinely inspired infallible and inerrant word of God in all that it affirms on any topic. And so on. There is no apparent end to this process. Why? Because when someone denies the obvious, it is necessary to affirm the redundant. It is the not inerrantists’ fault that he seems to be adding when he is explicating what the original statement meant. So, the inerrantist cannot be blamed for the alleged “qualifications” (really, further of the original meaning in the light of later denials). It is the opponents of inerrancy that should be blamed for denying the obvious. If “(1) The Bible is the Word of God,” then of course it is divinely inspired, infallible, inerrant, etc. But if one denies the obvious, then inerrantists must affirm the redundant to make our view clear.

There is No Mention of Inspiration and Inerrancy in the early Creeds

In response to this charge, it is crucial to remember that the belief in a divinely authoritative Bible is everywhere presupposed by the Creeds. Almost the entire The Apostles’ Creed (2nd cent.) is made up phases that are dependent on the Bible. Likewise, the Nicene Creed (A.D. 325) uses many of the same phrases and adds explicitly states that these truths were “spoken through the Prophets.” The Chalcedonian Creed (A. D. 451) uses many of the same phases from the previous Creeds and adds explicitly that “we have the prophets of the old” (in the Old testament) and what “the Lord Jesus Christ Himself taught” through the apostolic writings in the New Testament. The divinely authoritative basis for the teaching of the Christian Church is evident both implicitly and explicitly in the earliest general Creeds of the Church.

Second, there was little need to mention the Bible more explicitly since it was not seriously challenged. The Creeds grew out of needs. The needs of the day were centered more on the deity and humanity of Christ, the Trinity, and the resurrection. Hence, they were highlighted. Creeds grew out of controversy, and there was no serious controversy in the early church on the divine origin of Scripture.

Third, it is well established that the view of the early Fathers were strongly in favor of inerrancy. Noted authority on the early Fathers, J. N. D. Kelly, characterized the view of the early Fathers when speaking of Tertullian’s view that “Scripture has absolute authority; whatever it teaches is necessarily true, and woe betide him who accepts doctrines not discoverable in it.”[10] St. Augustine summed up the early Fathers well when he declared: “If we are perplexed by any apparent contradiction in Scripture, it is not allowable to say, The author of this book is mistaken; but either [1] the manuscript is faulty, or [2] the translation is wrong, or [3] you have not understood.”[11]What is this but an affirmation of the inerrancy of the original text of the Bible.

Why Did God Not Preserve the Autographs?

McGowen asks: “If textual inerrancy is so vital to the doctrine of Scripture, why did God not preserve the autographs of precise copies of the same?” (109). He adds, “What was the point of God acting supernaturally to provide an inerrant text providentially if it ceased to be inerrant as soon as the first or second copy was made?” (109).

In response, evangelical scholars have long pointed out several things which McGowen nowhere addresses at any length or refutes. First, there are important reasons to have a perfect autograph, the foremost of which is that the God of absolute truth cannot utter error (see above). For “It is impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:18). The “Spirit of truth” (Jn. 16:13) cannot utter untruths.

Second, since God did not breathe-out the copies, it is possible for them to error. However, God has providentially preserved them as a whole from any substantial error. In short, we have good copies of the original autographs. Noted scholars have substantiated this. Professor Frederic Kenyon stated, “The interval between the dates of original composition and the earliest extant evidence becomes so small as to be in fact negligible, and the last foundation for any doubt that the Scriptures have come down substantially as they were written has now been removed. Both the authenticity and the general integrity of the books of the New Testament may be regarded as finally established.”[12] The great Greek scholar A. T. Robinson stated that “The real concern is with a thousandth part of the entire text.”[13] That would make it 99.9% free of significant variants. Others have noted that these minor variants do not affect an essential teaching of the Christian Church. Even agnostic Bible critic Bart Ehrman admits: “In fact, most of the changes found in early Christian manuscripts have nothing to do with theology or ideology. Far and away the most changes are the result of mistakes pure and simple slips of the pen, accidental omissions, inadvertent additions, misspelled words, blunders of one sort or another.”[14] So, we have 99+ percent of the text and 100% of the essential truths of the Christian Faith. Hence, we do not need the autographs.

Third, there may be a good reason why God did not preserve the autographs. Knowing the human tendency to worship relics, imagine what would happen to the original Bible breathed-out by God! Look what happened to the brazen serpent in the wilderness years later (2 Kgs. 18:4). Further, knowing the human tendency to distort truth and corrupt doctrine with an alleged divine authority, think of what could happen to the autographs if they fell into human hands. But with the autographs preserved in some 5700 mss. that are spread all over the world there is no human way possible that any essential truth of the Christian Faith could be distorted in all these copies.

If Imperfect Copies are Adequate, Why not Imperfect Originals?

Perhaps an illustration will help answer this question. It is not difficult to understand the biblical story of God making a perfect Adam, allowing him to fall and reproduce other imperfect copies of the original Adam. Now all these copies (descendants) of Adam are 100 percent human and imperfect as we all are. So, essential humanity has been preserved even through generations of imperfect copies. Likewise, with Scripture it was essential to have an original that was perfect since a perfect God cannot make an imperfect original. For example, it is inconceivable that a perfect God could have made the first man with a deformed body with cancer growths already on it. But it is not inconceivable that he would make a perfect original man, endow him with free choice, allow him to sin and bring imperfections to his posterity while God, nonetheless, preserves his essential human nature in his posterity. It is for this same reason that God produced a perfect original Bible, and yet preserved the copies of all minor errors so as to protect all the essential truths for posterity.

In short, an adequate but imperfect original is not possible for a perfect God to make. There are many things that God cannot do, even by His sovereignty. He cannot change (Mal. 3:6; Js. 1:13, 17). He cannot deny Himself (2 Tim. 2:13). He cannot cease being God (Heb. 1:10-12). He cannot break an unconditional promise (Rom. 11:29). He cannot lie (Heb. 6:17-18). And, as an absolutely perfect God, He cannot produce an imperfect product either in the realm of truth or morals-because it is contrary to His very nature to do so.

Calling arguments like this “a priori” (111) or purely “deductive” (136) do not make them invalid or false. They are based on the very revealed nature of God in Scripture, and there is nothing wrong with making logical deductions from biblical truths. The Trinity is such a deduction since nowhere does the Bible explicitly teach in any text that there is one God in essence who is three in Persons. Rather, it teaches: (1) There is only one God, and (2) There are three Persons who are God (i.e., who share this one nature). The doctrine of the Trinity is a necessary logical inference from these two clearly biblical premises. Inerrancy, fits into this same category. There are two premises clearly taught in Scripture: (1) God cannot error and (2) The original Bible is the Word of God. The necessary logical conclusion to draw from this is: (3) The original Bible cannot err.

The Argument from Alleged Errors and Contradictions in Scripture

MeGowen is believe that there could be errors in the autographs. He says, “if God is able to use the errant copies . . . that we do have . . . why invest so much theological capital in hypothetical originals that we do not have?” (113). He adds, “The autographs (if we could view them) might very well look just like our existing manuscripts, including all the difficulties, synoptic issues, discrepancies and apparent contradictions . . . ” (119).

Elsewhere, he concludes with Bavink that “the guidance of the Holy Spirit promised to the church does not exclude the possibility of human error”(158). He seems to be fearful of saying there are “actual contradictions and errors,” but it follows from the very logic of his comparison. For the copies have actual errors and contradictions and God uses them for His purposes. Further, since he claims that the copies are inspired (159), he is faced with the contradictory belief in God-breathed errors anyway. Again, he says that he “reject[s] the implication that thereby the autographs must be inerrant” (124). That certainly means that they can be errant. Again, there is not a “third way.” Either the original can have errors or else they cannot have errors. The undeniable Law of Non-Contradiction (see above) demands this conclusion

Before concluding it will be instructive to examine McGowen’s example of an alleged error in the Bible which he gets from I. Howard Marshall (112). He calls it “a very good example” of an error in the biblical text. He alleges that Jairus told Jesus in Matthews 9:18 that his daughter was dead. But in Mark and Luke Jairus told Jesus she was only “at the point of death” (Mk 5:23) but not dead. Luke said she was only “dying” but not yet dead (Lk. 8:42). MeGowen hastily concludes that “there is a clear contradiction between the initial words of Jairus as recorded by Matthew and the other Evangelists” (113).

However, there is in actuality no contradiction between anything Jairus is recorded to have said. For this apparent discrepancy can be explained by the fact “while he [Jairus] was still speaking, someone from the ruler’s house came and said, Your daughter is dead'”(Lk. 8:49). Matthew did not mention that detail, but included the report of the girl’s death in Jairus’ request.[15]The fact is that Matthew did not say Jarius said anything that in fact he did not say. He merely combines the two parts of the conversation, thus stressing the point that the girl actually died by that time.[16] Having analyzed some 800 alleged contradictions in Scripture in The Big Book of Bible Difficulties,[17] I have concluded after a half century of study that the Bible is without error but the critics are not.

Conclusion

McGowen offers many positive insights into the nature of Scripture that are worth pondering (see above). However, in attempting to offered a “middle way between inerrantist and errantist he falls into serious errors. For one, he adopts a radical voluntaristic view of God being sovereignly able to utter error in the original mss. This is combined with an unbiblical view of divine accommodation to error, rather than divine adaptation to finitude without error. This is connected with his rejection of an “incarnational” model of inerrancy which rejection, if applied consistently to Christ, would lead to the conclusion that even the human words and actions of Christ would not be without sin and error.

As for his offer that Americans forsake their long-standing commitment to inerrancy for the weaker European non-inerrancy view, we would remind him of the decline of a vital European church based on the latter and the greater vitality of the American church based on the former. In brief, McGowen’s proposal to reject the term (and concept) of inerrancy should be graciously but firmly rejected because of its unbiblical, unreasonable, and unorthodox implications. In spite of the above stated positive aspects of his view, his central theses may seem more broad and attractive (neither of which is a test for truth), but in the end it is a dangerous deviation from the orthodox view of inerrancy taught in the Bible, affirmed by the church down through the centuries, demanded by orthodox theology from time immemorial, and which has provided a fruitful basis for a vital Christian church. Hence, rather than tempt one to give up either the concept or term inerrancy to describe God-breathed Scripture, McGowen’s gives us more reason to hold on to them.

[1] McGowen agrees with Herman Bavink more than almost any other author, saying, “My argument, then, is that Herman Bavink . . .[who] offers the finest model for an evangelical doctrine of Scripture” (212).

[2] See R.C. Sproul, Explaining Inerrancy: A Commentary (ICBI, 1980), 31.

[3] For a defense of the correspondence view of truth see the article titled “Truth, Nature of” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics” (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999) by N. L. Geisler..

[4] N. L. Geisler, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2002),Vol. 1.

[5] It is acknowledged that many orthodox theologians have used the word “accommodation” to mean adaptation to finitude, but it is denied that they meant this to include error or sin. However, since the term “accommodation” now carries this connotation for many, I recommend that we speak of divine “adaptation” to finitude and leave the word “accommodation” for the neo-orthodox (and neo-Gnostic) view of God acquiescing to error.

[6] I would argue that the Bible “cannot” err insofar as its divine dimension is concerned and “did not” err insofar as its human dimension is concerned.

[7] See John R. Rice, The God-Breathed Book: The Bible (Murfreesboro, TN; 1969), 9.

[8] For a treatment of the many ways in which Jesus used reason and evidence to substantiate his claims see our book, The Apologetics of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2009).

[9] St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, 5.

[10] J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine (NY: Harper & Row, 1960), 39.

[11] See St. Augustine, Reply to Faustus 11.5.

[12] Sir Frederic Kenyon, The Bible and Archaeology (NY: Harper, 1940), 288.

[13] ” Archibald T. Robertson, An Intro to Textual Criticism of the New Testament (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1925), 22.

[14] Bart Ehrman, Misquoting Jesus (NY: HarperOne), 55.

[15] See The Bible Knowledge Commentary, New Testament (Wheaton, Il: Victor Books, 1983), 40.

[16] For McGowen’s to insist that it is an error because Matthew’s record represents the ruler saying it at a different time is and example of the very “literalistic” view he elsewhere deplores in inerrantists. Further, it begs the question by assuming that conflation is not a legitimate literary style which the ICBI view on Inerrancy allows.

[17] Baker Books (2008).

From Apologist to Atheist: A Critical Review


From Apologist to Atheist: A Critical Review
Norman L. Geisler, Ph.D.

This is a review of Why I Rejected Christianity: A Former Apologist Explainsby John W. Loftus (Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford Publishing, 2007), a 278 page paperback. The book has four parts: Part 1: My Changing Years; Part 2: The Cumulative Case; Part 3: What I Believe Today; Part 4: Appendices of published writings and a photo of Loftus and two former professors, Dr. William Lane Craig and Dr. James Strauss.

Introductory Appreciation

So that my evaluation of the book does not obscure my appreciation of it, let me briefly point out some of the values of this book. First, it is an honest and open account of how a Christian became an atheist. Seldom are unbelievers so candid and open. Second, every Christian–let alone Christian apologists – can learn some valuable lessons from it on how to treat wayward believers. Third, it is a thoughtful and intellectually challenging work, presenting arguments that every honest theist and Christian should face. Indeed, some of his criticisms are valid. In particular I would single out his critique of the subjective argument from the alleged self-authenticating “witness of the Holy Spirit” by Loftus’ former teacher William Lane Craig (in chap. 15).

An Exposition and Evaluation of the Book

The book is too long to cover every argument contained in it. Since the vast majority, if not all of them, have been treated elsewhere in our writings (see Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics ), we will be content to highlight some important points Loftus made. The first part is best summarized by selecting the author’s own words.

Part 1
: “My Changing Years” is an open and illuminating account of how he became an atheist. This is best reported in his own words. “I was born in 1954 and grew up in Ft. Wayne, Indiana, in a Catholic home. . . . I never experienced true faith growing up, but I did learn that whenever I was in need I should call out to God. And that’s exactly what I did at 18 years old when I felt I had nowhere to turn for help. I was not always a good boy, being a middle child in a home with three boys. . . . I seemed to be in almost every fight in the household. . . . They [his parents] thought it would be good for everyone if I considered attending Howe Military School . . .” (9). “I was a problem teenager. . . . I spent many weeks in the Wood Youth Center, in Ft. Wayne. I dropped out of school. Most of my law breaking occurred during the time my mother and father were separated and divorced. . . . I was arrested six different times as a juvenile offender for various offenses!” (10). “Eventually I began to feel as if I was possessed by some demonic being. So one night . . . I went over to see a woman named Cathy . . . who had earlier spoken to me earlier [sic] about Jesus. She led me to accept the sacrifice Jesus made on the cross for my sins. . . . I felt free and forgiven for the first time in my life” (11).

After being baptized in a Church of Christ, “by the fall of that year, I had read completely through the Bible twice!” (12). After graduating from Great Lakes Bible College (GLBC), Loftus attended Lincoln Christian Seminary (both Church of Christ schools). Then he notes, “I attended Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (TEDS), and graduated in 1985 with a Th.M degree, under the mentoring of Dr. William Lane Craig . . .” (7). Subsequently, “I was in the [Church of Christ] ministry for about fourteen years, or so. . . . I am now an atheist” (7-8).

Loftus summarized, “There are three major things that happened in my life that changed my thinking. They all happened in the space of about five years, from 1991-1996. These things are associated with three people: 1) Linda, 2) Larry, and 3) Jeff. Linda brought a major crisis in my life. Larry brought new information in my life. Jeff took away my sense of a loving Christian community. . . . In the midst of these things, I felt rejected by the Church of Christ in my local area. For me it was an assault of major proportions. If I still believed in the devil, I would say it was orchestrated by the legions of Hell” (emphasis in original, 20-21).

Linda
was the director of Operation Shelter Loftus founded to help people in need. He said, “She practically idolized me. She did everything I said to do. . . . What man doesn’t want to be worshiped? I guess I did. I was having problems with my own relationship with my wife at the time, and Linda made herself available. I succumbed and had an affair with her” (21). “But there is more. After a few months I decided I could no longer reconcile the affair with my faith or my family life. So I told Linda that it was over.” (22). She became angry and accused him of rape. “I received a phone call from someone who threatened my life. . . . All this devastated me; my sin, the strange mitigating factors, the Christian people who wouldn’t forgive even though I repented of this sin, the potential charge of rape, and God not seeming to care about his wayward soldier” (22).

Larry
, his cousin, was a bio-chemistry teacher in the Air Force. Loftus tried unsuccessfully to convince him of the truth of creation over evolution. Instead, he said, “He did convince me of one solid truth; the universe is as old as scientists say it is, and the consensus is that it is 12-15 billion years old. Now that by itself isn’t too harmful of an idea, . . . but it was the first time I really considered the theological implications of it. Two corollaries of that idea started me down the road to being the honest doubter I am today. The first is that in Genesis chapter 1 we see that the earth existed before the sun, moon, and stars, which were all created on the fourth day. This does not square with Astronomy. . . . The second corollary for me at the time was this. If God took so long to create the universe, then why would he all of a sudden snap his fingers, so to speak, and create human beings?” (22-23) “Nearly two years later, I came to deny the Christian faith. There were just too many individual problems that I had to balance, like spinning several plates on several sticks, in order to keep my faith. At some point they just all came crashing down” (emphasis in original, 23). Subsequently, “The Angola Christian Church asked for my resignation in December 1990.” Further, “at this point, neither one of the Christian Churches in our area wanted me. The truth is that not enough of the right people thought I should be in ministry” (24). “What bothered me was that Jerry Paul, my home minister in Ft. Wayne at the time, didn’t bother to call me. . . . Jerry never called me to talk to me, or pray with me, or comfort me. . . . I’m the sort of person who has a very hard time asking for help, and I was hurting badly” (24-25).

Loftus
got a job teaching philosophy and wrote a friend: “I have settled down to teaching strictly secular philosophy courses at secular colleges. I actually enjoy this much more than at GLCC (where “the watchdogs of brotherhood doctrinal purity” are on the beat). . . . I am now freed of the internal censors. I can now write as I think. Watch out now” (emphasis in original, 25-26).

Jeff, was pastor of another church in the Pleasant Lake area that Loftus felt more comfortable in attending. He wrote, “I felt rejected by the Church of Christ in my local area. After my experience with Linda, I didn’t even go to church for several months. . . . As best as I can tell, Jeff was suspicious of my motives–my own cousin! Without going into great detail, he and his wife Lurleen suspected that I was secretly trying to oust him to become the pastor there. . . . I began to doubt that people with our passions and living in our day and age so removed from the Bible, could properly understand that book, when people living in the same age and as close to one another as he and I couldn’t understand each other” (26). “I wonder to myself how these consciences can differ so widely, especially when Christianity is the only faith that claims God the Holy Spirit actually takes up residence in their being. I often ask myself why Christians don’t seem to act any better than others when they alone claim to have the power, wisdom and guidance of God right there within them. Apparently, the Holy Spirit didn’t properly do his job here. This was the last blow to my faith and one of the reasons why I am an atheist today” (emphasis in original, 27).

By way of response to Loftus’ sad story, my first inclination is to say, “Thanks, we needed that!” In fact, every Christian needs to take seriously what John has said. Several things are very apparent: there was a tremendous lack of God’s grace, forgiveness, and love manifest in this situation by other professing Christians. Apologists beware! There is more than reason, arguments, and evidence involved in people coming to faith as well as in people leaving the faith. Jesus said, “By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another” (Jn. 13:35).

My second thought is that becoming an atheist, by Loftus’ own admission, involves more than rational arguments. It involves a free choice by a sinful human being who the Bible says is in rebellion with God (Psa. 14:1; Rom. 1:18). Loftus admits the same in his above testimony. It is noteworthy that his first step away from God was adultery. Then, he began to doubt God’s Word. To be sure, an unloving Christian community did not help matters. But how he responded to this was his personal responsibility. And since we are more than rational and volitional creatures, we must be mindful of the role human emotion plays in a person’s decisions.

Part 3
: “What I Believe Today”

At this point it will be more instructive to hear the rest of the story. Loftus did not jump directly from theism to atheism. First, he chose to become a Deist. He wrote: “I previously chose to believe in Deism and the philosopher’s God who created this universe. . . . I struggled to believe in God. It was probably a Kierkegaardian leap of faith for me, which also made me an Existentialist, a Deistic Existentialist. But this wasn’t satisfying, for according to Marcus Borg: ‘There is little difference between a distant and absent God and no God at all’” (26, emphasis added).

Then The Answer Hit Me.
“When we seek for a cause of it all we run into absurdities, precisely because blind chancistic events cannot be figured out! Chance events can produce order. We know this. Even if the odds are extremely unlikely for this universe to exist, once there is some order in the universe and someone to look upon the order that’s there, it cries out for an explanation. . . . But when we reflect on why we can’t figure it all out, the best reason I can offer is that random chance events can’t be figured out [in] hindsight. So in the end, I do have a reason for what I believe. Nature is ultimate. According to the late Carl Sagan, ‘The cosmos is all there is, was, or ever will be.’ According to Bertrand Russell the universe is simply ‘a brute fact.’ I am an atheist. There is no God. And there is at least one reason for me not to believe in God, and that is because the universe is absurd when we try to figure it out. . . . According to Jacques Monad, ‘our number came up in a Monte Carlo game’” (266).

What is Life Without God?
This is the logical and last question with which Loftus deals. His answer is brief and to the point: Life, without God can be happy and meaningful because “while there may be no ultimate reasons for being a good person [apart from God] . . . , there are plenty of non-ultimate reasons for being good” (272). Reminiscent of the atheist Ayn Rand, Loftus contends that “the values of tolerance, family, and friendship in a political democracy under democratic capitalism provide a society with the best chance to avoid pain for most people in it”(272). He adds, “You don’t need an ‘ultimate’ anything to live life in this world. There just aren’t any ultimacies” (273). Strangely, just two sentences later he says, “So it makes what I do here what ultimately matters–it’s all there is. . .” (273). Then he adds, “And while life is ultimately meaningless, I am living life to the hilt everyday. I’m living without the guilt that Christianity threw on me, too! Life is good–very good! I feel better about it now than I ever have!” (273). One can only wonder how someone can feel better about things when they are really so bad. There is no real purpose for life; the world is absurd, and there is nothing after this–nothing! It would appear that this is a good example of what Freud defined as an illusion, namely, something one wishes to be true, even if there is no rational ground for believing it is.

Why then do so many people believe in God? Loftus answers, “In my opinion, this human need may be the reason why people believe in God in the first place, not because of arguments pro and con. As humans we simply cannot bear to believe we have no ultimate purpose in life, and that our existence is absurd” (270). Of course, we may ask why we cannot. Is it not possible that this God-sized vacuum was created by God, and that the soul is restless until it finds its rest in God? Loftus also has problems with why Christianity is so widely accepted in the world, particularly if there is no reality behind it. His answer also rings hollow in view of the strong historical evidence for the Christian Faith . He says, “In my opinion, Christianity is a legendary development from a person named Jesus that lucked its way into political power” (emphasis in original, 271). This, however, overlooks the fact that the great early spread of Christianity, as well as its greatest spread today, is under oppression of anti-Christian governments (like China).

As for the criticism that “Christians don’t have a good track record when it comes to slavery, wars, . . . scientific progress, and so on” (271). Loftus seems blissfully unaware that the Christian view of God and creation is the very foundation of science. Further, most of the founders of modern science believed in the biblical doctrine of creation. What is more, the strong influence of Christianity through people like Wilberforce in England and the Wesleys in America was crucial in the liberation of slaves. Of course, there have been people who claimed to be Christian who engaged in witch hunts, inquisitions, KKK, and the like. But there have also been leaders (like Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and others) who were atheists and/or evolutionists and who killed multi-millions of people. Certainly, no atheists would consider that this is a legitimate argument against atheism.

What If I’m Wrong?

In an enlightening statement, Loftus faces the final question and gives a brutally frank answer to it. “What if I’m wrong about Christianity? What then? Well, then I will go to hell, however conceived, when I die. And what did I do to deserve to go to hell? I ‘sinned,’ I didn’t believe in Jesus’ atonement, or in his bodily resurrection from the grave. Whose fault would this be? Mine?” (275). Again, his response has an empty sound. “I have honest doubts. Am I to be blamed because I couldn’t understand Christianity?” (275). “But what if I’m deceived by the traditional devil to have these doubts? Maybe he is playing tricks on me, making me think my doubts are honest ones, when they are not?” (275). Again, his question is good and his answer disappointing, shifting the blame to God rather than to take responsibility for his own decision. He asks instead: “The question is why an all-powerful God didn’t help me. The devil wouldn’t have a chance against God, but why does God do nothing to help me overcome my doubt?” (275). Of course, this is to assume, contrary to Scripture (1 Cor. 10:13; Phil. 4:13), that God does not provide this help for those who are willing. Further, it is to assume that God will overpower a human will to accomplish His desire, but this is also contrary to Scripture and good reasons. Jesus said, “How often I wanted to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing” (Mt. 23:37, emphasis added).

Part 2: “
The Cumulative Case”

This section deals with the reasons Loftus gives against Christianity and for atheism which, admittedly, were not the initial reasons that brought on His unbelief (see Part 1). The discussion here need not be long for several reasons. First, his unbelief was not initiated by reason, as he admits. Rather, it was his rejection by friends and the lack of Christian love (see above).
Second, there is nothing really new here that has not already been answered elsewhere (see my Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics). None of his arguments is definitive, either alone or as part of a whole “cumulative argument,” and many are so easily answered that they demonstrate the initial trigger for his unbelief was not really rational. For example, the initial problem he had with Genesis 1 (see above) being allegedly contrary to astronomy is only high school level apologetics. Since there was light from the first day (Gen. 1:3), there is no problem with the sun not appearing until the fourth day. Further, time does not help evolution nor hinder creation. No matter how much time one posits, natural laws and random processes do not produce the irreducible complexity and specified complexity we find in living things. Red, white, and blue confetti dropped from an airplane will never produce the America Flag on your lawn. And giving it more time to fall (by going up higher to drop it) only accentuates the problem by mixing the falling confetti up more. That these kinds of problems furthered the process of his early skepticism only goes to show that it was not a rationally based decision. Indeed, Loftus described it (above) as a “leap of faith” that lead him to reject theism. He said, “I previously chose to believe in Deism and the philosopher’s God who created this universe. . . . I struggled to believe in God. It was probably a Kierkegaardian leap of faith for me . . .” (265, emphasis added). Likewise, it was a leap of faith (or disbelief) that made him an atheist. No rational argument compelled or even demanded it.

One thing is certain: it was not evidence and rational arguments that led him to atheism.  Even his best argument against God–the argument from evil–which he considers to be the “Achilles heel” of Christianity– is circular reasoning. For how can one know God is ultimately in-just for allowing evil unless he knows what is ultimately just. And how can he know there is an ultimate standard of justice (i.e., absolute moral law), unless there is an absolute Moral Law Giver? Indeed, other great atheists, such as C. S. Lewis and Jay Budzisziewski, were converted to theism from atheism because of the existence of evil in the world.

The So-Called Cumulative Argument

Loftus declared: “I consider this book to be one single argument against Christianity, with each section a subset of that one argument. Each section of this argument depends upon the others for its force, since no single one of them alone can bear the whole weight of showing that the Christian world-view is false.” Thus, “it’s proper and fitting to do so as a whole, especially since this is the only way to properly evaluate world-views” (emphasis in original, 56). While there may be general agreement on this point, the disagreement emerges in two areas.

First, the atheist weighs the specific evidence differently than the theist, and his bias affects the way he weighs it. What Loftus views as improbable (say, the resurrection of Christ) is because of his bias against miracles, not because there is not highly probably historical evidence that it happened, which there is . The main reason it becomes implausible to an atheist is that it is a miracle, an act of God. And there cannot be acts of God if there is no God, which he believes is the case. Thus the real debate of historical reliability of the New Testament (and thus the deity of Christ) is dependent on whether there is good evidence for the existence of God, which there is.And if God exists, then miracles are not only possible, but the biggest one – the creation of the world – has already happened. Thus, other smaller miracles are possible. When one sees a record with miracles in it, he cannot dismiss it in advance as being improbable. If miracles are possible (which they are in a theistic universe), then their probability depends purely on the reliability of the documents. And the Gospel documents are reliable. In summary, there are more NT documents, earlier documents, more documents, by more contemporaries and eyewitness testimony, more historically and archaeologically confirmed than for any other events in the ancient world. Hence, it is highly probable that Jesus did the miracles contained in the NT and rose from the dead to confirm his claim to be the Son of God. If so, the essential facts of Christianity are true.

Further, Loftus accepts a number of challengeable or untrue premises. The theist agrees that Christianity is a historical religion and “history, at best, cannot show us that the claims of the Bible are true. History can only give us probabilities”(37). However, Christians disagree when Loftus concludes from this that this situation “leaves room for reasonable doubt” (37). Probabilities leave room for some doubt but not necessarily always a reasonable doubt. And high probabilities do not leave room for any reasonable doubt, though there is always room for possible doubt in historical arguments.

What is more, just as Loftus claims a cumulative argument for his atheists world view, the Christian can claim the same for his Christian world view. It too can be a cumulative case where one probability is built on another until the whole argument for Christianity is so highly probable that it is beyond all reasonable doubt.  And the flip side is that if atheism only offers some possible, but not even probable arguments against Christianity, then adding up these mere possibilities does not yield any probability in favor of atheism. And a close look at each of Loftus’ arguments–minus their biased presuppositions–yields only a possibility for atheism in face of a high probability in favor of theism.

There are many examples of these bias presuppositions. One is the “outsider perspective” (discussed above). Another is the presumption of naturalism (see below). Further, he presupposes that “ancient standards [for eyewitnesses] are pathetic in comparison to today’s standards” (38). This is simply false. Indeed, many legal experts have examined the New Testament eyewitness testimony and found it more than sufficient. Nor does one have to accept Loftus claim NT writers could not be good witnesses since they had a flawed hermeneutic of the OT. This is for two reasons. First of all, their hermeneutic was not flawed since they never misinterpreted the OT. They always drew the proper meaning or an implication in that meaning from the text. What is more, there is no logical connection between their view of OT interpretation and their accuracy in recording events they witnessed. Even allegorists tell the literal truth when they witness a murder!

Finally, Loftus’ God-of-the-gaps argument is faulty. He reasons that since “there is becoming less and less room for God, as we explain more and more,” we can assume no room for God as we explain the rest. “This scientific naturalistic assumption” is made so often, even by Christians in their daily lives, that it “probably has a metaphysical grounding” (262). Here Loftus makes an unjustified metaphysical leap of faith. Even if one could find a natural cause for all regular events in this world (which the theist can readily admit), this would not rule out either some miracles in the present and the past. It would not eliminate the possibility (or probability–if there is evidence) for a miracle in the present, because while regular events do always have natural causes, this is not necessarily true of non-regular events (anomalies). For science in the present empirical sense deals only with repeatable events. A law or a prediction cannot be based on one occurrence. It takes many occurrences from which a pattern can be induced and a projection made. Second, there is a significant difference between observable and repeatable events in the present (empirical science) and unobserved, unrepeated events in the past (forensic science). No one observed these past events (like the origin of the universe and first life). Hence, observation and repetition are not available for forensic science of origin science. Here one must depend on the principles of causality and uniformity. Events (even past ones) had a cause (causality). And the present is the key to the past (uniformity). Hence, the kind of causes that produce a certain kind of event in the present should be posited for these same kind of events in the past. Some of these events demand intelligent causes. This is true of archaeology and paleography of the past, as well as cryptology, information theory, and the like in the present. Hence, uniformity does not mean uniformitarianism. Because there are intelligent causes of certain kinds of events in the present (like a sculptor or a sculpture), then an intelligent cause must be assumed for like events in the past (like the forming of Mt. Rushmore). Likewise, when we see the mathematically identical letter sequence in a written language (known to have an intelligent cause in the present), we may rightly posit an intelligent cause for the DNA in the first living cell (in the past). So, it is not any more of a God-of-the gaps move that leads one to posit an intelligent cause of first life (which contains 1000 sets of The Encyclopedia Britannica of information in it) than is does to produce these sets in the present. Thus, Loftus confuses origin science and operation science as well as uniformity (analogy) and uniformitarianism (naturalism). And his argument fails for these reasons.

The So-called “Cumulative Argument.”

Loftus proposes another line of reasoning that does not serve atheism well either. For his offer of implausible possibilities does not add up to probability. Indeed, rather than one part strengthening the other, it is more like the “leaky-bucket” fallacy where the failure of one bucket to hold the water is wrongly supposed to be corrected by another leaky bucket under it. In most cases the parts of the so called “cumulative argument” are only possibilities which never add up to probabilities. Loftus’ argument is more like a chain of different arguments. But as we all know, a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.
For example, one of the weakest links in his case for atheism is his failure to provide any real positive evidence for God’s non-existence – except evil which really calls for God. And his negative arguments against the theistic arguments are neither plausible nor probable. Even if they were, at best, they would not be disproofs for God, but disproofs of proofs for God. Indeed, some are absurd like chance producing complex and specified order in the universe. A fundamental law of thought is that the effect cannot be greater than the cause. And both the universe (by way of the Anthropic Principle) and life (by way of Information Theory) manifest incredible intelligent design. In fact, based on Hume’s principle of uniformity, there is every reason to accept an intelligent cause of the universe and life since we never ever see a regular occurrence of these kinds of events other than by an intelligent cause. And if there is good reason to believe God exists, then miracles follow. Because if there is a God who can make the world, then he can intervene in it. And without an antisupernatural bias there is no presumption in favor of either skepticism or atheism with regard to the existence of God, the truth of Christianity based on or the authenticity of the New Testament, and the miracles of Christ contained in it–particularly His resurrection.

The Outsider Test for Faith.

Also crucial to Loftus’ atheistic view is what he calls the “outsider test.” According to this test, “the presumption of skepticism [is] the preferred stance when approaching any religious faith, especially one’s own” (40). “Mark Twain said: ‘the easy confidence with which I know another man’s religion is folly teaches me to suspect that my own is also.’ Believers are truly atheists with regard to all other religions but their own. Atheists just reject one more religion” (40). Quoting Michael Shermer, Loftus says, the fact is that “‘most of us most of the time come to our beliefs for a variety of reasons having little to do with empirical evidence and logical reasoning’” (43).

What is interesting about these statements is that Loftus does not seem to be aware of their self-defeating nature. If “most of us most of the time come to our beliefs for a variety of reasons having little to do with empirical evidence and logical reasoning” (43), then can we not assume that Loftus came to his atheistic views the same way? Further, if one should have the presumption of skepticism toward any belief system, especially his own, then why should Loftus not have the presumption of skepticism toward his own atheistic beliefs? The truth is that the outsider test is self-defeating since by it every agnostic should be agnostic about his own agnosticism and every skeptic would be skeptical of his own skepticism.

What is more, Loftus contends that “it’s overwhelmingly true that the presumption you begin with will be the one you will end up with” (44). If so, then this sword cuts both ways for it would be true of skeptics and even atheists like Loftus as well. But the truth is that people do convert from their beliefs. And some are convinced by evidence to do so. Hence, the real issue is whether there is evidence for the truth of the view to which one is converting. And the atheist’s view lacks positive evidence. On the other hand, the theists offers many valid evidences for God, and the atheist really has none–except evil and even it is self-defeating.

Another example of his many self-defeating statements is his denial of any ultimates. He insisted, “There just aren’t any ultimacies.” But, just two sentences later he says, “So it makes what I do here what ultimately matters – it’s all there is. . . . And while life is ultimately meaningless, I am living life to the hilt everyday” (273). But if there are no ultimates, then how can Loftus know what “ultimately matters” and what is “ultimately meaningless”?

Further, Loftus’ “outsider test” is contrary to common sense. By it we could eliminate the credibility of any holocaust survivor’s testimony because he was an “insider.” But who better would know what happened than someone who went through it. Likewise, by this odd test one could deny his own self-existence since from an outsiders view (which he should take according to the test) his existence could be doubted or denied as an illusion. But what is more obvious and self-evident than one’s own existence?

One form of the outsider argument leads Loftus to claim “believers are truly atheists with regard to all other religions but their own. Atheists just reject one more religion” (40). But can’t theists use the same basic argument and reject atheism. In brief, atheists are unbelievers with regard to all beliefs other than their own. Why don’t they just become unbelievers with regard to one more belief (namely, their atheism)?
The skeptic is calling for the presumption of falsehood on our basic beliefs. But if our beliefs are based on good evidence and reason, then why should they be doubted? In fact, we should not doubt the opposite of what we have good reason to believe until there is better reason to believe something else. Loftus himself would not give the presumption of disbelief to his own atheism. Why then should a Christian doubt the existence of God or the truth of Christianity? There is one and only one reason–evidence. It has nothing to do with an advanced presumption. Advance presumption is nothing more or less than bias.

Loftus’ advanced skepticism argument contains the same fallacy as Hume’s argument against miracles. According to Hume, the presumption against miracles is so great that it would practically take a miracle to overcome it. But, of course, there would be an advanced presumption against that miracle and so on. Thus, it is in advance practically impossible for any event to be confirmed as a miracle.  Or to put it another way, Hume argued that: (1) Natural laws are regular. (2) Miracles are rare. (3) The evidence for the regular is always greater than the evidence for the rare. (4) An intelligent person should always base his beliefs on the greater evidence. (5) Therefore, the intelligent person should never believe in miracles. Besides the fact that premises (3) is false, even on a naturalistic basis (since the Big Bang, spontaneous generation of first life, and macro-evolution are rare and not regular events), there is an absurd conclusion contained in Hume’s argument that is also contained in Loftus’ reasoning.

Now the absurd conclusion that follows from Hume’s reasoning is that even if a miracle actually happen (like the resurrection of Jesus), no intelligent person should believe in it. Now there is something patently wrong with an argument that insists we should not believe in something, even if has actually happened! Likewise, it is also unreasonable to argue that even if there is good evidence for an event, nevertheless, no rational person should believe it. Why not? That is what rational people do–they believe based on good evidence.

Neither Hume nor Loftus would reason this way about the Big Bang or spontaneous generation of first life. Naturalists believe these events happened, even though they are not being repeated regularly. Why then should a Christian who has good reasons to believe in God (like the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments) approach his belief with advanced skepticism. We have offered this evidence elsewhere , so it need not be repeated here. Advanced skepticism should only be used when one has advanced evidence or good reasons to disbelieve that the event really did not happen. Otherwise, one should come with an open mind to the question.

The truth is that the only way the atheist or skeptic can even compete on the playing field of religious truth is to load the dice or stack the deck. Most often this is done by assuming either metaphysical or methodological naturalism. Otherwise, their position is often absurd. This is clear from two illustrations. In the face of the strong evidence in favor of a Big Bang origin of the universe, British atheist Antony Kenny wrote: “A proponent of [the big bang] theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came from nothing and by nothing” (emphasis added). But even the skeptic David Hume said, “I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause” (emphasis added). Likewise, Harvard’s Richard Lewontin confessed correctly: “Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to understanding the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its construct . . . because we have a prior commitment to materialism. . . . We are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes. . . . Moreover that materialism is absolute for we cannot allow a divine foot in the door” (New York Review of Books, 1/9/96, emphasis added). Trying to reach someone like this is a case of not being able to make the horse drink after you led him to the water. Lewontin is a classic case in point. He admits an incredible bias in advance of looking at the facts that would accept “patently absurb” views “against common sense” because of a “prior” and “absolute” commitment to a naturalistic and materialistic world view (i.e., atheism). Loftus is not as blunt, but he has a similar blind spot when he argues against common sense and Hume’s principle of “constant conjunction” and posits pure chance (which can’t cause anything–only minds and natural forces can) caused the incredible specified and irreducible complexity found in living things. No one ever observes any such thing happening once, let alone over and over (as Hume’s principle demands). Nor has it been repeated in the laboratory without intelligent intervention.

Conclusion

While Loftus’ view does not come across as strong as Lewontin’s, nonetheless, the same bias is there against a view (theism) that he admits doubting originally for non-rational reasons. He admits that he came gradually “by a leap of faith,” and he attempts to justify this rationally by offering reasons based on bias, unjustified conclusions, and self-defeating presuppositions. Looking at the evidence through these lenses will never lead one to the truth. And it will do no good in the end for anyone to blame it on God for not overpowering a skeptics mind or will. For no skeptic would want a God who forces them to believe against their will. The God of the Bible is not that kind of God (Mt. 23:37) but is “longsuffering toward us, not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance [change their mind]” (2 Pet. 3:9).

In summation, one can place question marks on both his “conversion” and “deconversion.” Given the legalistic context, one can question whether or not he really understood the grace of God. And by his own testimony, the initial factors that prompted his “deconversion” were not really rational but emotional and volitional. As to the rational doubts that ensued, there is nothing much new that other skeptics have not already asked – and apologists have not already answered.

[Footnotes missing]

Copyright © 2012 NormanGeisler.net – All rights reserved

A Response to Craig Blomberg’s “Can We Still Believe in the Bible?”


A Response to Craig Blomberg’s Can We Still Believe in the Bible?

 

by Norman L. Geisler

 

Introduction

            The real answer to the question posed by Craig Blomberg’s book title is: Yes, we can believe in the general reliability of the Bible, but No we do not believe in its inerrancy, at least not in the sense meant by the framers of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI).  Blomberg mistakenly attributes his own version of inerrancy to the ICBI.

In general there are many helpful things said by Blomberg in the first three chapters in defense of the reliability, canonicity, and transmission of the Bible.  Indeed, we have often positively cited his book on The Historical Reliability of the Gospel.  However, our focus here is on Blomberg’s strong attack on inerrancy as we presented it in our recent book, Defending Inerrancy: Affirming the Accuracy of Scripture for a New Generation (Baker Books, 2011) and in particular his personal attack on the authors of the book and some other supporters of ICBI inerrancy.

However, our response here is not with persons but with principles.  So, our critique is not against any person but only the ideas expressed.  Our evaluation is focused on what they teach, not on their character or motives.  We respect the individuals as scholars who disagree with inerrancy and love them as brothers in Christ.  Our concern is with one thing and one thing only: Is their teaching in accord with the doctrine of inerrancy as defined by the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI)?  So, when we use of the word “inerrancy” in this article we mean the ICBI view of inerrancy as expressed in the following documents.

 

The ICBI Documents on Inerrancy

            There were four official documents produced by ICBI related to defining inerrancy as follows:

 

1) The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (1978)–CSBI

2)  The official ICBI Commentary on the Chicago Statement –CSBI Commentary

3)  The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics (1982)– CSBH

4)  The official ICBI commentary titled Explaining Hermeneutics: A Commentary on the Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics—CSBH Commentary

 

These four documents are collected together in Explaining Biblical Inerrancy (Bastion Books: 2013).   Together they express the official ICBI view on the meaning of inerrancy.  Other related books were also published under the ICBI label such as, Inerrancy (Geisler, ed.), Hermeneutics, Inerrancy and the Bible (Earl Radmacher and Robert Preus, eds.), Inerrancy and the Church(John Hannah, ed.), and Biblical Errancy: Its Philosophical Roots (Geisler, ed.).

 

Blomberg’s View on the ICBI Statements

            Blomberg is aware of all these ICBI statements on inerrancy and even cites some of them (Blomberg, Can We Still Believe the Bible? [hereafter B], 136, 149, 170, 178, 222, 262).  He even goes so far as to claim agreement with everything in the “Chicago Statement’ (CSBI) on inerrancy except one implied word (B, 273), the word always in the last line.  He believes that ICBI is claiming that a denial of inerrancy always has grave consequences.  Otherwise, Blomberg even calls the “Chicago Statement” on Biblical inerrancy (CSBI) “a carefully crafted document” (B, 149).  Further, he praises Article 18 of CSBI, saying, “this affirmation reinforces everything we have been discussing” (B, 170).  In addition, he commends the “reasonably well highlighted” statement on genre criticism in CSBI (B, 178).  Strangely, Blomberg even commends one Chicago statement more than the other, declaring: “The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics CSBH) has not had nearly the lasting effect that the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy did, which is a shame, because in many ways it is the superior of the two documents” (B, 261, n. 98).

Blomberg’s Views on Inerrancy Contradict ICBI

A Statement of His View

Although Blomberg claims he does not personally hold many of the views which he describes below (see B, 177), nonetheless, he believes that none of them is inconsistent with belief in inerrancy.  In other words, according to Blomberg, one can hold any of the following views without denying the inerrancy of Holy Scripture:

  1. He denied the historicity of Jesus’ command about getting the coin from the mouth of the fish (in Matthew 17:27), saying, “Yet even the most superficial application of form criticism reveals that this is not a miracle story, because it is not even a story” (“NT Miracles and Higher Criticism” in JETS 27/4 [December 1984] 433).  But this is a futile attempt to defend his disbelief by diverting attention from his denial of the historicity of this text on the grounds that it was not a story but a command (B, 263, n 113).  By focusing on these factors, attention is deflected from a crucial point, namely, that Blomberg does not believe this event ever happened, as the Bible says it did.  Blomberg added, “Further problems increase the likelihood of Jesus’ command being metaphorical” (B, “NT Miracles,” 433).
  2. According to Blomberg, “The author’s intention [in Genesis] is almost entirely to narrate the “who” rather than the “how” of creation” (B, 151).  So, almost nothing informs us about how origins occurred, whether by creation or by evolution.
  3. Blomberg claims that “Some [inerrantists] opt for forms of theistic evolution in which God creates the universe with all the mechanisms built in to give rise…to each new development in the creative ‘week’” (B, 151).  This too is deemed compatible with inerrancy according to Blomberg.
  4. He adds, “Must there have been a historical Adam and Eve? . . . Many scholars, including a few evangelicals, think not” (B, 152).  Blomberg adds, “Nothing in principle should prevent the persons who uphold inerrancy from adopting a view that sees adam (“man” or Adam) and hawwa (“life or Eve) as symbols for every man and woman…” (B, 152).
  5.  Further, Blomberg believes that “None of this theology [about Job’s view on suffering] requires Job to have ever existed any more than the teaching of the parable of the Good Samaritan requires the Samaritan to have been a real person” (B, 156).  He added, “Almost nothing is at stake if Job never existed, whereas everything is at stake if Jesus never lived” (B, 223).
  6. Likewise, he asserts that “Surely, however, someone might argue, Jonah must be completely historical, because Jesus himself likens his death and resurrection to Jonah’s experience with the great fish (Matt. 12:40; Luke 11:30).  Actually, this does not follow at all” (B, 157).
  7. Further, “Ultimately, what one decides about its [the Book of Isaiah’s] composition or formation need not have anything to do with biblical inerrancy at all” (B, 162, 163), even though he admits Jesus mentioned “the prophet Isaiah” as being author of texts in both sections of Isaiah (B, 161).
  8. Isaiah may not have predicted “Cyrus” by name 150 years in advance (in Isaiah 45:1) of his reign because “Cyrus could in fact be a dynasty name (like “Pharaoh” in Egypt) rather than a personal name (B, 162).  This too is deemed compatible with inerrancy.
  9. According to Blomberg, the prophet Daniel may not have predicted all the things his book indicates because “Perhaps two works associated with the prophet Daniel and is successor, written at two different times, were combined” (B, 164).
  10. Blomberg, argues that treating sections of “Matthew as Midrash” and not as history would have been taken by his audience “who would have understood exactly what he was doing, not imagining his embellishment to be making the same kinds of truth claims as his core material from Mark and Q” (B, 166).
  11. Likewise, Blomberg believes that the story of “Lazarus” (in Luke 16) is a “parabolic fiction” (B, 150).
  12. Although Blomberg attempts to downplay it (B, 272), he has shown an openness to aberrant views in his book co-authored with a Mormon titled How Wide the Divide in that they agree on 12 affirmations, the first of which is: “1. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one eternal God.”  But anyone who has studied Mormonism knows that Mormons do not believe in the Trinity but in the heresy of Tritheism.  Further, they believe in Polytheism of which the prophet Joseph Smith said: “God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted man for I am going to tell you how God came to be. We have imagined and supposed that God was God from all eternity… I will refute that idea, and take away the veil, so that you may see” (April 6, 1844). Since Mormons have not repudiated the prophetic office of Smith or any of the official Mormon’s many denials of essential Christian doctrines, cozying up to Mormon is not the most doctrinally discerning thing one can do (see Ron Rhodes, Reasoning from the Scriptures with Mormons).

In short, according to Blomberg, it is consistent with inerrancy to deny the historicity of Adam, Eve, Job, and Jonah, as well as the historicity of early Genesis and the doctrine of creation.  Likewise, he holds that an inerrantist need not believe that there was only one Isaiah or that he and Daniel made the supernatural predictions traditionally attributed to them.  He claims that even the Mormon cult has significant commonalities with evangelical Christianity so that the divide is not so wide as evangelicals have traditionally thought, even though Mormons deny the deity of Christ, the Trinity, and Salvation (to the highest heaven) by grace alone through faith in Christ alone, and many other evangelical beliefs (See Geisler and Rhodes,Conviction without Compromise, Harvest House, 2008).

 

Blomberg’s Views Contradict the ICBI View on Inerrancy

Blomberg’s claims to the contrary, one thing is certain: his viewsare contrary to the clear statements of the ICBI.  Consider the following ICBI declarations against Blomberg’s view on some of these very issues:

  1. Genesis 1-11 is Historical. CSBH, Article 22 “affirms that Genesis 1-11 is factual, as is the rest of the book.”  CSBI Article XIII reads: “We deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual.  Some for instance, take Adam to be a myth, whereas in Scripture he is presented as a real person.”
  2. Historicity of the Flood.  CSBH: Article XIX affirms “…the factual nature of the account of the creation of the universe, all living things, the special creation of man, the Fall, and the Flood. These accounts are all factual, that is, they are about space-time events which actually happened as reported in the book of Genesis (see Article XIV).”
  3. Theistic Evolution and Genesis. CSBH: Article XIX: “WE DENY that Scripture should be required to fit alien preunderstandings, inconsistent with itself, such as naturalism, evolutionism, scientism, secular humanism, and relativism.”  Further, “… it is important to apply the “literal” hermeneutic espoused (Article XV) to this question. The result was a recognition of the factual nature of the account of the creation of the universe, all living things, the special creation of man, the Fall, and the Flood. These accounts are all factual, that is, they are about space-time events which actually happened as re-ported in the book of Genesis (see Article XIV).” Further, “There was…complete agreement on denying that Genesis is mythological or unhistorical. Likewise, the use of the term ‘creation’ was meant to exclude the belief in macro-evolution, whether of the atheistic or theistic varieties” (ibid., emphasis added).
  4. Historicity of Jonah.  CSBI Article XIII reads: “We deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual….  Others take Jonah to be an allegory when he is presented as a historical person and [is] so referred to by Christ.”
  5. Historicity of the Gospels.  CSBI Article XVIII “We affirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by the grammatico-historical exegesis, taking account of its literary forms and devices, and Scripture is to interpret Scripture.  We deny the legitimacy of any treatment of the text or quest for sources lying behind it that leads to relativizing, dehistoricizing, or discounting its teaching, or rejecting its claim to authorship.”  CSBH Article XIV says: “We affirm that the biblical record of events, discourses and sayings, though presented in a variety of appropriate literary forms, corresponds to historical fact.  We deny that any event, discourse of saying reported in Scripture was invented by the biblical writers or by the traditions they incorporated.”  Further, CSBH Article XIII asserts that “We deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual.”  Blomberg tries in vain to avoid the impact of this statement by presupposing that the Gospel narratives do not all “present” themselves as historical.  However, this is clearly contrary to (1) what the Gospel of Luke claims (Lk. 1:1-4); (2) the literal historical-grammatical method ICBI adopts; (3) the correspondence view of truth employed by ICBI which presumes narratives are literal unless shown to be otherwise.   
  6. The Use of Extra-Biblical Genre

            Traditionally, many have considered the Gospels to be a genre of their own (sui generis) because of their unique nature as a revelation of God.  However, Blomberg buys into the currently popular notion that the Gospels should be interpreted by extra-biblical genreHe wrote:  “Once we determine, as best we can, what a passage affirms, according to the conventions of its style, and genre, a commitment to inerrancy implies acceptance of the truth of those affirmations.  But a commitment to inerrancy does not exclude a priori any given literary style, form, or genre that is not inherently deceptive” (B, 164).  In short, we must determine first what a passage means according to its genre.  We cannot know in advance that it is going to be historical just because it is a narrative or is in a historical book.  Further, the genre can be an extra-biblical like the Greco-Roman genre.  Hence, an extra-biblical genre can determine the meaning of a biblical text.  This is, of course, contrary to the ICBI statements on genre for several reasons.

First, ICBI Article XIII forbids the use of extra-biblical genre to determine the meaning of a biblical text.  It reads “We deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual” (emphasis added).  Further, CSBH Article XIV says: “We affirm that the biblical record of events, discourses and sayings, though presented in a variety of appropriate literary forms, corresponds to historical facts” (emphasis added). 

            Second, ICBI demands interpreting “Scripture by Scripture” (CSBI Article 18), not the Bible by extra-biblical genre.  That is, nothing external to the New Testament text should be hermeneutically determinative of the meaning in the text.  In some cases, one can derive the meaning (use) of a term from contemporary use of the word. But the meaning of a text is discovered from studying the text in its grammatical and historical setting, as compared to related Scripture on that text.

Third, the alleged “purpose of the author” of which Blomberg speaks is not the determinative factor in understanding a text.  For there is no way to know what the author had in his mind behind the text except by what he affirmed in the text.  Hence, the appeal to the linguistic philosophy of John Austin to determine the illocutionary (purpose) act or the perlocutionarly act (results) is futile.  Usually, all we have in Scripture is the locutionary act (What is affirmed).  So, the locus of meaning has to be in what is affirmed, not why it is affirmed because often we are just guessing about that.  Thus, the genre critic Blomberg is using extra-biblical ideas to determine the meaning of the biblical text.

 

Blomberg’s Attack on Defenders of the ICBI Statements

            Not only do the ICBI statements repeatedly contradict Blomberg’s view on inerrancy, but he repeatedly distorts the ICBI statements and demeans the character of those who defend the inerrancy of Scripture.  We note first of all his unscholarly and unprofessional characterizations of those who defend the historical biblical view of inerrancy as represented in the ICBI statements.

             His Excessively Negative language about the Defenders of Inerrancy

            Blomberg often employs condemnation and exaggeration instead of refutation related to inerrantists claims.  He labels inerrantists, for example, as “very conservative” (B, 7), “overly conservative” (B, 217), “ultra conservative” (B, 11, 214), “hyperconservative” (B, 13), “extremely conservative” (B, 7).  Of course, this tends to make his views look more moderate by comparison, when, as we shall see, they are in direct opposition to those the mainstream evangelical view as reflected in the ICBI statements.  He even likens ICBI defenders of inerrancy to Nazis and Communist (B, 8)!  He quotes with approval the statement, “the far left and the far right—avoid them both, like the plague” (B, 8). At one point he stops just short of questioning the Christianity of ICBI supporters (B, 254).  What is more, he sometimes makes it very clear about whom he is speaking by name (Robert Thomas, David Farnell, William Roach, and myself)–all Ph.D. in biblical related studies who have written critical reviews of Blomberg’s positions. He also addresses Dr. Al Mohler and Master’s Seminary in negative terms.

Such exaggerated language is not only unprofessional and unscholarly, it borders on being morally libelous, as the following statements reveal.  Strangely and inconsistently, Blomberg responds strongly when other scholars use a negative term about his views (B, 254).

His Unjustified Condemnation of Alleged Motives and Character of Inerrancy Defenders

Blomberg goes further than extremist labeling of inerrancy defenders. He claims that we “simplistically” distorted the evidence in order to oust Robert Gundry from the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) over his midrash denial of the historicity of certain sections of Matthew (B, 167).  He charges that we engaged in a “political campaign” against Gundry (B, 167).  Elsewhere, he alleges that we have utilized a “standard ploy throughout his [my] career” when “trying to get someone removed from an organization” (B, 262 n. 111).  He adds the allegation that inerrancy is used as “a blunt tool to hammer into submission people whose interpretation of passages differs from ours…” (B, 125).  These charges of an alleged sinister and continuous career of unjustified activity on my part are both untrue, unjustified, and unethical. Indeed, they are serious moral judgments of motives for which Blomberg should apologize.  Someone has rightly asked why it is that those who defend inerrancy are attacked and those who attack inerrancy are defended.

Without attributing motives, one thing seems clear: “Blomberg is dead-set on broadening the acceptable borders of orthodoxy on inerrancy, the result of which would be a more inclusive statement that would embrace scholars (like Blomberg himself) who have moved well beyond inerrancy as traditionally understood and as expressed by the ICBI.  This may explain the use of such passionate and uncalled for language in describing those who wish to retain a more traditional stand on inerrancy.  Perhaps a lot of their passion and zeal arises from the fact that those who hold a more liberal view on inerrancy may fear their view may be deemed unorthodox too.

 

His Many Errors and Mischaracterizations of the Defenders of Inerrancy

 

Ironically, Blomberg’s attack on those who defend an inerrant Bible is filled with errant statements. Here is a list of some that come to mind.  Contrary to Blomberg’s charge, it is not true that:

 

  1. No one offered an “intelligent response” to Gundry (B, 167).  Even Blomgberg acknowledged that D. A. Carson wrote a critique of it, as did Doug Moo.  Not to mention the scholarly response given at ETS and articles published in the Journal of The Evangelical Theological Society (JETS, 2003).

 

  1. A majority of speakers at ETS were in favor of retainng Gundry in its membership (B, 166).  This is a misleading statement since, when given a chance to vote almost three-quarters of the membership voted to ask Gundry to resign.

 

  1. The proceeding of the ETS which resulted in Gundry’s removal from membership was not fair or representative (B, 166-167). On the contrary, it was the result of a long (two year) process, during which papers and articles were presented pro and con.  The meeting at which the vote took place was deliberate and orderly and the vote was taken properly.  Even Gundry accepted its conclusion.

 

  1. The vote for Gundry’s removal was not a bare minimum “just over” what was necessary (167).  The vote was 116 in favor of his removal and 41 opposed (as reported by Christianity Today 2/3/1984) which is almost 74% in favor of his removal.  This is nearly three-quarters of the membership present and well over the two-thirds (67%) necessary.

 

  1. ETS did not “expel” Gundry from membership (B, 167).  The vote was to ask Gundry to resign, not to expel him.  If he had refused to resign, then there could have been another vote to expel which was unnecessary because Gundry voluntarily resigned.

 

  1. The process of Gundry’s removal was a “political campaign” in which “circulating advertisements” occurred (B, 167).  This too is false.  No “campaign” was held and no “advertisements” were circulated.  Each ETS member was given a paper with quotations from Gundry’s book so that they could make an intelligent decision on how to vote.

 

  1. “Gundry’s views were simplistically presented…” at the ETS meeting (B, 167). This too is false.  Exact and complete quotations were given of Gundry’s views to each member.  There was nothing simplistic about it.

 

  1. Geisler utilized a “standard ploy throughout his career…when he is trying to get someone removed from an organization,” namely, getting all the living framers to agree with him in order to oust a member (262 n. 111). I never did and such thing.  In the Pinnock issue, Roger Nicole contacted all the founders of ETS, but I was not a founder of ETS and was not part of any such effort.  I have argued Licona’s views are contrary to the ICBI framers, but I was never part of a “ploy” or effort to get him ousted from the ETS organization, nor any other group.  Neither, have I done it “throughout my career” (which is now almost 60 years long because there was never another occasion in all those years where a group of framers were involved in getting someone removed from an organization in which I participated.  These are serious, sinister, and slanderous charges that impugns the character of another brother in Christ and call for an apology from the one who made them.

 

  1. Geisler resigned from ETS because they exonerated Clark Pinnock of the charges against him.  This is partly true.  After all, Pinnock claimed to believe in inerrancy, yet he has said in print that there were false predictions in the Bible (see Pinnock, The Most Moved Mover, 50), and he denied the Bible is the written Word of God (Scripture Principle, 128).  I was also disappointed with the process by which Pinnock was retained because it was not completely fair and open.  However, the main and underlying reason I left ETS was because I believed it has lost its integrity by allowing a scholars to join who did not have to believe the doctrinal statement on inerrancy as the founders meant it (see my article, “Why I resigned from the Evangelical Theological Socity,” at http://normangeisler.net/articles/Bible/Inspiration-Inerrancy/ETS/2003-WhyIResignedFromTheETS.htm.)

 

  1. Geisler has become increasingly more conservative over the years as indicted by the successive schools at which he has taught (B, 143-14).  This is false.  In each case my move to an established school was because I was offered what appeared to be a better opportunity for service.  In the case of the two Seminaries I helped start, they were after I retired and was asked by others to help them start two seminaries (where I still teach) which stress apologetics which has been a passion of mine from the beginning.  It had nothing to do with the degree of conservativeness of the Seminaries.  They all have sound doctrinal statements.  None of them was significantly more conservative than the others.

 

  1. Only a “tiny minority” throughout history held that inerrancy is the only legitimate form of Christianity (B, 221).  This is a purely “Straw Man” argument since almost no one holds this view.  ICBI, the view we are representing, states clearly that “We deny that such a confession is necessary for salvation” (CSBI Article 19).  It adds, “We affirm that the doctrine of inerrancy has been integral to the Church’s faith throughout its history” (CSBI, Article 16).  ICBI also held that there are “grave consequence” (CBSI Article 19) for denying inerrancy.  But it never affirmed that is the only legitimate form of Christianity.  So, this criticism is an empty charge, applying to almost no one.

 

Blomberg’s Misinterpretation of the ICBI Statements

 

Not only did Blomberg attack those who defend ICBI inerrancy but he distorts the meaning of the ICBI statements.  As noted earlier, Blomberg affirms the ICBI statements and even acknowledges the official commentaries.  Nonetheless, he often distorts the meaning of these statements to support his own unorthodox views which are, in fact, contrary to the ICBI statements.  Consider the following examples.

 

ICBI View of Truth as Correspondence

 

 One of the reason Blomberg can claim he agrees with the ICBI statements (and yet hold views opposed to them) is that he misinterprets the ICBI statements. CSBI Article 13 affirms: “We deny that it is proper to evaluate Scripture according to standards of truth and error that are alien to its usage or purpose.”  But after acknowledging this, Blomberg proceeded to read his own purpose into certain texts of Scripture so as to doubt or deny their historicity (see midrash discussion below).  This he does in direct contradiction to the ICBI official commentary (that he acknowledges) which declares a correspondence view of truth, as opposed to an intentionalist view which stressed (like Blomberg) the alleged purpose of the author, not the propositional affirmation of the author in the text.  This is directly contrary to the CSBI commentary which declares: “By biblical standards of truth and error is meant the view used both in the Bible and in everyday life, viz., a correspondence view of truth.  This part of the article is directed toward those who would redefine truth to relate to merely redemptive intent, the purely personal, or the life, rather than to mean that which corresponds with reality” (emphasis added).  When truth is defined as correspondence with the fact, one cannot easily escape the fact that that the sections of the Gospels doubted or denied by Blomberg, Robert Gundry, or by Mike Licona are a denial of inerrancy (see next).

ICBI View of Genre

It is difficult to understand how Blomberg can praise the ICBI statements as a whole and yet hold a genre view which is directly contrary to the ICBI view.  A hint as to how he does this is when he praises one half of an ICBI statement on genre (which he takes out of context) and questions the other half which speaks directly against his view.  For example, he agrees with CSBI Article 18 when it affirms that “Scripture is to be interpreted by grammatico-historical exegesis, taking account of its literary forms and devices, and that Scripture is to interpret Scripture,” especially to the part we highlighted.  However, he is not sure how this is consistent with the very next line which asserts: “We deny the legitimacy of any treatment of the text of quest for sources behind it that leads to relativizing, dehisorticizing, or discounting its teaching, or rejecting its claim to authorship” (emphasis added). And well he should disagree with this part because it is precisely what he approves of in the cases of Gundry, Licona, and himself.  He approves of relativizing, deshistoricisning, and rejecting the claim to authorship as consistent with inerrancy.

Relativizing.  Once the correspondence view of truth is not fully accepted, then truth becomes relativized because there is not objective reality to which it must correspond. Blomberg asserts, “What it means to say he Bible is wholly true varies widely from one genre to the next…” (B, 131).  So, the “truth” is relative to the genre, and the genre choices are not absolute by any stretch of the imagination.

Dehistoricizing.  For example, the choice of a midrash genre (Gundry) or a Greco-Roman genre (Licona) will determine whether or not the narrative is historically true or is just a legendary embellishment (see below).  So, for New Testament critics truth is relative to genre which in turn is relative to the interpreter.

Pseudonymity. Blomberg even allows for the use of an author’s name to be used when in part or in whole he did not write the biblical book with his name on it.  He himself believed that Part of 2 Peter was not written by the apostle Peter, and he allows (as consistent with inerrancy) for whole books to be such (B, 171).

Blomberg’s Defense of Robert Gundry

According to Robert Gundry, whose view is defended by Blomberg as consistent with orthodoxy, whole sections of Matthew (like the Visit of the Magi—Matthew 2) are not historical because the author’s purpose was not to affirm what corresponded with reality (as in a correspondence view of truth), but to use a midrashic embellishment understood as such by his Jewish audience (B, 164f).  So viewing “Matthew as Midrash” and not historical “would have understood exactly what he was doing, not imagining his embellishment to be making the same kinds of truth claims as his core material from Mark and Q” (B, 166).

Of course, Blomberg laments that an overwhelming majority (nearly 74%) of the ETS voted to ask Gundry to resign from ETS because of his denial of the historicity of certain passages in Matthew.  Blomberg remains proud that his is one of the small minority who voted to retain Gundry in ETS. Indeed, as even Blomberg admits (B, 168), the framers of the statement (of which I was one) “had Gundry in mind” when the CSBH statements were made which we certainly did. We wrote: “WE deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual” (CSBH Commentary on Article 13).   No amount of re-interpretation can override the clarity of this statement or the testimony of living framers as to its meaning.  And when the framers die, the written words of the framers (as here) will remain to vouch for the meaning of their words.

Blomberg’s Defense of Murray Harris

            There seems to be a camaraderie among many biblical scholars that blinds them to some serious errors and prompts them to put fraternity over orthodoxy. Professor Murray Harris had claimed the resurrection body was “essential immaterial” (Raised Immortal, 53-54), even though the Bible (Lk. 24:39; Acts 2:31) and the Early Creeds affirmed the resurrection in the “flesh.”  Further, Harris affirmed the ascension of Christ was a “parable” (RI, 92).  Further, he held that believers receive a spiritual resurrection body at death (RI, 44, 100) while their physical bodies remain rotting in the grave.  In spite of all this, Blomberg, in an act that seeming puts fraternity above orthodoxy, defends his fellow New Testament scholar’s view as orthodox.

Further, Blomberg was unaware of what the real issues were (see our Battle for the Resurrection, Thomas Nelson: 1989. Or see the third edition Bastion Books: 2014), namely, that we had written a whole book (titled, In Defense of the Resurrection, Witness Inc, 1993, chap. 5) responding to Harris’s objection.  Neither did Blomberg show awareness of the fact that some 90 counter-cult group pronounced Harris’s views “false doctrine,” “unorthodox,” or even “cultic” (ibid., 189).  Nor was Blomberg cognizant of the fact that Harris had been warned by Trinity that he would lose his position, if he did not change his view on the resurrection of believers.  Harris did change his view over the weekend when the Trinity appointed (not ETS related) a committee of three scholars to met with him.  One would have expected that a scholar of Blomberg’s reputation would have looked into this issue more carefully before pontificating on it.

Blomberg’s Defense of Mike Licona

It is incredible that anyone, let alone a biblical scholar, would defend the orthodoxy (i.e., compatibility with inerrancy) of Mike Licona’s Greco-Roman genre views.  Licona has yet to retract his view that the resurrection of the saints in Matthew 27 is a legendary, poetic embellishment (see TheResurrection of Jesus, 552, 553, 548), even though he is now not as sure of it as he once was. Further, Licona embraces the Greco-Roman Bios which admits that it is “a flexible genre [wherein] it is often difficult to determine when history ends and legend begins” (Licona, ibid., 34).  This is ironic in view of Blomberg and Licona’s criticism that the defenders of inerrancy are imposing their modern view of what an error is on the Bible when in fact it is they who are imposing their modern view of genre criticism on the Bible.

More importantly, Licona believes there is a contradiction in the Gospels about the day on which Jesus was crucified, yet he insists this is consistent with a belief in inerrancy!  In a debate with Bart Ehrman (Spring, 2009), Licona said, “I think that John probably altered the day [on which Jesus was crucified] in order for a theological—to make a thelogical point there.  But that does not mean that Jesus wasn’t crucified” (emphasis added).

The ICBI framers condemned Licona’s kind of view in clear and unequivocal language when they spoke against “dehistoricizing” the Gospels (CSBI, Article 18).  Likewise, they affirmed: “WE deny that generic categories which negate historicity may rightly be imposed on biblical narratives which present themselves as factual” (CSBH Commentary on Article 13).   Licona’s view  is so far from measuring up to ICBI standard for orthodoxy that R.C. Sproul wrote: “As the former and only President of ICBI during its tenure and as the original framer of the Affirmations and Denials of the Chicago Statement on Inerrancy, I can say categorically that Mr. Michael Licona’s views are not even remotely compatible with the unified Statement of ICBI”(Letter, May 22, 2012, emphasis added).

 

 

Conclusion

            One fact emerges from Blomberg’s recent book, namely, whatever merits it has, the view which he defends is contrary to the ICBI view of inerrancy.  And since the ETS has accepted the ICBI definition of inerrancy (in 2003), it is also contrary the statement of largest group of inerrantist scholars in the world!  So much for Blomberg’s charge that the defenders of the ICBI statements on inerrancy, including living framers like J. I. Packer, R. C. Sproul, and myself, are a tiny extremist minority.  And to debunk the living framers, as Blomberg did (B, 262, n 111), because they will someday be dead, misses the point, namely, they are the best testimony to the meaning of their own words while they are alive.  And their written words will still live on even after they die.

Finally, we do agree with Blomberg’s words when he wrote: we should embrace a “full-fledged inerrantist Christianity so long as we ensure that we employ all parts of a detailed exposition of inerrancy, such as that found in the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy…, and not just those sections that are most amenable to our personal philosophies or theologies.  This also means that we interpret the Chicago Statement, like the Bible, in terms of what is actually written, and not merely what one of its authors might have wanted to write or might have wanted it to mean” (B, 222). Unfortunately, however, as has been shown above, such a view is not the view that Blomberg promotes, but it is the view he attacks.

 

 

About the Author

Dr. Geisler is a graduate of Wheaton College (B.A., M.A.), William Tyndale College (Th.B.), and Loyola University (Ph.D.).  He has taught at the College or graduate level for over 50 years.  He is the author or co-author of more than 100 books, including Inerrancy, General Introduction to the Bible, The Big Book of Bible Difficulties, and Defending Inerrancy.  He is a former president of The Evangelical Theological Society and co-founder and first president ofThe Evangelical Philosophical Society.  He was co-founder of theInternational Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI) and was a co-drafter of the famous ICBI “Chicago Statement” on inerrancy and editor of the ICBI books.  He has taught at some of the top evangelical seminaries in America, including Trinity Evangelical Divinity School and Dallas Theological Seminary.  He also co-founded two seminaries, Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte, NC and Veritas Evangelical Seminary in Los Angeles–schools where he still teaches.

 

I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist


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I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist

by Norman L. Geisler and Frank Turek

Crossway Books, 2004

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Translations available:  Dutch, Korean, Portuguese and Romanian

Translation in Brazillian Portugese: Não tenho fé suficiente para ser ateu

Não tenho fé suficiente para ser ateu

Norman Geisler

Editora Vida

Idéias com o objetivo de destruir a fé cristã sempre bombardeiam os alunos do ensino médio e das universidades. Este livro serve como um antídoto excepcionalmente bom para refutar tais premissas falsas. Ele traz informações consistentes para combater os ataques violentos das ideologias seculares que afirmam que a ciência, a filosofia e os estudos bíblicos são inimigos da fé cristã.

Antes de tocar a questão da verdade do cristianismo, essa obra aborda a questão da própria verdade, provando a existência da verdade absoluta. Os autores desmontam as afirmações do relativismo moral e da pós-modernidade, resultando em uma valiosa contribuição aos escritos contemporâneos da apologética cristã.

Geisler e Turek prepararam uma grande matriz de perguntas difíceis e responderam a todas com habilidade. Uma defesa lógica, racional e intelectual da fé cristã.

from http://www.apologia.com.br/?p=33